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Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the
New Economy
Christopher S. Yoo†
Recent mergers and academic commentary have placed renewed
focus on what has long been one of the central issues in media policy:
whether media conglomerates can use vertical integration to harm
competition. This Article seeks to move past previous studies, which have
explored limited aspects of this issue, and apply the full sweep of modern
economic theory to evaluate the regulation of vertical integration in
media-related industries. It does so initially by applying the basic static
efficiency analyses of vertical integration developed under the Chicago
and post-Chicago Schools of antitrust law and economics to three
industries: broadcasting, cable television, and cable modem systems. An
empirical analysis reveals that the structural preconditions recognized by
both Schools as necessary for vertical integration to harm competition do
not exist in any of these industries. In addition, the cost structure of these
industries suggests that vertical integration may well lead to efficiencies
sufficient to justify allowing such integration to occur.
A dynamic efficiency analysis provides additional reasons for
believing that attempts to regulate vertical integration in these industries
are misguided. Growing reliance on compelled access to redress the
problems purportedly caused by vertical integration threatens to dampen
investment incentives in technologically dynamic industries in which such
incentives are particularly important. Not only does forcing a monopolist
to share an input deviate from the system of well-defined property rights
needed to promote efficient levels of investment, it also deprives new
entrants seeking to compete directly with the supposed monopoly
bottleneck of their natural strategic partners. The Article also engages a
complex web of arguments involving the extent to which technological
innovation is affected by market concentration, standardization, and
network externalities. A close review of the economic literature reveals
†
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that the relationship between these factors is too ambiguous to support the
type of simple policy inference needed to prohibit vertical integration as a
regulatory matter. The Article concludes with an analysis of the
intellectual and institutional obstacles for adopting a more integrated
economic approach to vertical integration in these industries.
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Introduction
The megamerger between America Online and Time Warner almost
unquestionably represented a watershed moment in business history. Not
only did it represent the largest merger the world had seen to date,1 the
combination of Internet content and transmission under the same corporate
umbrella threw the already turbulent telecommunications industry into
further turmoil. The merger forced all industry players to reevaluate their
business plans and prompted speculation about what other mergers might
follow.2
As dramatic as the merger’s impact on the business environment was,
the merger’s impact on the regulatory environment may have been even
greater in that it breathed new life into one of the more hotly debated
issues in media policy: “open access” to high-speed broadband systems.3
Until recently, most individuals connected to the Internet via narrowband
technologies, which employ conventional telephone lines to convey
Internet content at speeds no greater than fifty-six thousand bits per second
(56 kbps). The last several years have witnessed the arrival of broadband
services, which are mainly provided via cable television systems through
cable modems and or via a special telephone-based technology known as
digital subscriber lines (“DSL”). These new means of transmission
represent a major technological leap forward, allowing users to receive
1
At the time the deal was announced, it was valued at over $150 billion. Martin Peers et
al., Media Blitz: AOL, Time Warner Leap Borders to Plan a Mammoth Merger, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,
2000, at A1. By the time the merger was consummated, its value had shrunk to around $100 billion,
Jill Carroll, AOL-Time Warner Merger Clears FCC, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2001, at A3, and the deal
had been eclipsed by Vodafone’s acquisition of Mannesmann, Philip Shishkin & William Boston,
Vodafone Wins EU Clearance to Acquire Mannesmann in Record $180 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 2000, at A14.
2
See Bruce Orwall & John Lippman, High Concept in Hollywood: More Web Alliances for
Hollywood, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at B1; Susan Pulliam & Paul M. Sherer, Anything Goes! After
AOL Time Warner, Who’s Next?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2000, at C1.
3
For a complete discussion of the regulatory history of open access, see infra Subsection
III.A.2.
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Internet content at speeds exceeding one million bits per second (1 Mbps).
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) estimates that within
the next four years, over one-third of all U.S. households will subscribe to
some form of broadband service.4
The concern about open access stems from one important difference
between narrowband and broadband connections to the Internet. In the
narrowband world, customers can use their telephone lines to connect to
any one of a large number of Internet service providers (“ISPs”).
Broadband providers, in contrast, typically require their customers to
employ a proprietary ISP.5 Competitors and observers began to raise
concerns that such exclusivity arrangements had the potential to reduce
consumer choice and harm competition. As a result, these parties asked the
FCC to impose an “open access” requirement that would require cable
modem systems to make their transmission lines available to other, nonproprietary ISPs on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.6
Early calls for open access fell on deaf ears. Consistent with its
longstanding policy of non-regulation of computer-based services,7 the
FCC rejected calls for imposing open access as a condition to approving
AT&T’s acquisition of TCI and MediaOne.8 Attempts to impose open
access through municipal regulation were effectively blocked by a series
of judicial decisions holding that the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction over
the issue.9 Just seven months after its most recent refusal to impose open
access, however, the FCC reversed course and embraced the concept of
open access by conditioning its approval of the AOL-Time Warner merger
on the merged company’s willingness to negotiate access agreements with
4
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,913, 20,983, ¶ 186 (2000)
(Second Report) [hereinafter Second Advanced Services Report].
5
For example, before its collapse, Excite@Home, which was the largest ISP serving cable
modem subscribers, was owned by such major cable modem providers as AT&T, Comcast, Cox
Communications, Cablevision Systems, and Shaw Cablesystems, and was the exclusive ISP for those
systems. Time Warner, which is the second largest high-speed broadband provider, has previously
required all of its users to use a proprietary ISP called RoadRunner. See Applications for Consent to
the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc.,
Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9863, ¶ 107 (2000) (Memorandum Opinion
and Order) [hereinafter AT&T-MediaOne Merger].
6
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, 14 F.C.C.R.
3160, 3197-98, ¶ 75 (1999) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) [hereinafter AT&T-TCI Merger];
AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9866, ¶¶ 114-15.
7
See, e.g., JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET 8-12
(FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 31, July 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.
8
AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3205-07, ¶¶ 92-96; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra
note 5, at 9866-73, ¶¶ 116-28.
9
See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001); AT&T
Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
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at least three unaffiliated ISPs.10 The breadth of the reasoning contained in
its Memorandum Opinion and Order regarding the merger suggest that the
FCC may be willing to consider far more sweeping action.11
This abrupt change in policy sparked new regulatory and academic
interest in open access. Not only did the FCC’s decision place new
importance on the Notice of Inquiry currently pending before the agency,12
it also stimulated a new round of scholarship that raised two different types
of arguments in favor of open access. The first set of arguments centered
on the concern that cable modem systems would use vertical integration or
other forms of exclusive dealing to harm competition in the market for
ISPs.13 In so arguing, these scholars invoked one of the central issues of
vertical integration theory—whether a company can use its monopoly
power over one level of the chain of production to harm competition in
another level that otherwise would have been competitive. The danger that
media companies might exercise market power vertically has long been a
major focus of federal media policy, having played a pivotal role in the
seminal cases regarding the structural regulation of broadcasting14 and
cable television.15
The other set of arguments added a distinctively “New Economy”
twist to the debate. For example, Professors Mark Lemley and Lawrence
Lessig, who are without question two of the leading legal scholars on law
and technology issues, contend that open access is essential to preserving
and promoting continued innovation on the Internet.16 Other scholars have
employed such new economic tools as game theory17 and network
economics18 to fashion arguments in support of open access that go far
10
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner
Inc., Transferee, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6590, ¶ 96 (2001) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) [hereinafter
AOL-Time Warner Merger]. In so concluding, the FCC endorsed a similar conclusion drawn by the
Federal Trade Commission. See America Online, Inc., Docket No. C-3989, 2001 WL 410712 (F.T.C.
Apr. 17, 2001) (Decision and Order).
11
AOL-Time Warner Merger, supra note 10, at 36-57, ¶¶ 81-127.
12
See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,287 (2000) (Notice of Inquiry).
13
See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over Cable, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677 (2001); Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential Demand for Broadband
Telecommunications and Consumer Access to Unaffiliated Internet Content Providers, 18 YALE J. ON
REG. 129 (2001); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case
Study of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001). For a detailed review of
these arguments, see infra notes 310-322 and accompanying text.
14
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). See generally infra text accompanying notes
42-49.
15
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994). See generally infra text accompanying notes 209-214.
16
Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
17
See Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 655-57.
18
See Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 161-65.
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beyond any of the rationales advanced in prior debates about vertical
integration in media-related industries.19
To date, no one has undertaken a comprehensive evaluation of the
economic arguments surrounding these issues. Media scholars have
historically analyzed the problems associated with vertical integration in
largely non-economic terms.20 It is only in recent years that scholars have
begun to bring the insights of the burgeoning economic literature on
vertical integration to bear on the regulation of media industries.21 While
providing a welcome and useful starting point for exploring these issues,
these initial economic studies have ultimately proven to be somewhat
incomplete in that they have either limited their focus to a single
communications technology or have concentrated only on certain
economic schools of thought without taking the full sweep of modern
vertical integration theory into account. The need to come to grips with the
full range of issues raised by the literature on vertical integration is likely
to grow even more onerous in the near future. As Professors Joseph
Kearney and Thomas Merrill have observed, calls for open access in the
communications sector are part of a new emerging paradigm that they

19
This Article focuses solely on the economics unique to media-related industries. As a
result, I do not discuss telephone-related technologies, which tend to be natural monopolies and which
do not require large, up-front sunk costs in content. In so doing, I do not mean to suggest that vertical
integration in the telephone industry is unimportant. On the contrary, it is now well-known that such
concerns underlay the 1982 breakup of AT&T, see United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), as well as the provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 that prohibited the former Bell Operating Companies that did not yet face local competition
from entering the long distance market, see 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. III 1997). For insightful
discussions of the continuing influence of concerns about vertical integration on current telephone
policy, see Timothy J. Brennan, Does the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Still Apply Today?, 40
ANTITRUST BULL. 455 (1995); and Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications
in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1999).
20
Most analyses have focused on whether vertical structural regulations violate the First
Amendment. E.g., THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING (1994); Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does It
Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 755 (1995); Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment
Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401 (1989).
21
See DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN CABLE
TELEVISION (1997); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying the New Antitrust
Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479 (1999); Jim Chen, The
Last Picture Show (On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV.
1415 (1996); David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Bright Lines, the Federal Communications
Commission’s Duopoly Rule, and the Diversity of Voices, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 331 (1990); John E.
Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and
Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891 (2001); John E. Lopatka & Michael G. Vita, The Must-Carry
Decisions: Bad Law, Bad Economics, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61 (1998); James W. Olson & Lawrence
J. Spiwak, Can Short-Term Limits on Strategic Vertical Restraints Improve Long-Term Cable Industry
Market Performance?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283 (1995); James B. Speta, Handicapping the
Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 39 (2000) [hereinafter Speta, Handicapping]; James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable
Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (2000) [hereinafter Speta, Vertical Dimension].
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believe is effecting a “grand transformation” in the way that policy makers
are approaching all regulated industries.22
As a result, I believe that the time has come to undertake a more
systematic review of the economics of vertical integration and access
regimes in order to explore the extent to which the insights provided
support or undercut recent attempts to regulate the vertical market
structure of the various media industries.23 Only by bringing together all of
the various threads of vertical integration theory can we understand the
way that the different parts of the theory interact with one another.
The basic organization of this Article is to use the major conceptual
strands in the economic literature on vertical integration to analyze
previous attempts to regulate vertical integration in three different
segments of the communications universe—broadcasting, cable television,
and high-speed broadband. Part I uses the FCC’s first attempt to address
the issues raised by vertical integration—the Chain Broadcasting Rules—
to review the basic economics of vertical integration.24 Even the most
cursory reading of the economic literature reveals that issues surrounding
vertical integration have proven to be quite controversial, as the Harvard
School approach to industrial organization, which tended to regard vertical
integration as illegal per se, gave way to the Chicago School of antitrust
law and economics, which tended to regard vertical integration as more
benign. The Chicago School’s call for treating vertical integration as legal
per se has in turn inspired the development of the post-Chicago School,

22
See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-57 (1998).
23
This Article is the first step in what I hope will be a comprehensive critique and
reconceptualization of media regulation. Previous scholarship in this area has tended to take each
medium as a universe unto itself. As a result, policy debates tended to focus on the economics
associated with the particular means of transmission at issue and the First Amendment implications of
the communications being transmitted. Technological convergence, however, is altering media
economics in fundamental ways that make the previous technological orientation untenable. My longterm goal is to begin thinking about media regulation in a more integrated manner by examining the
major regulatory approaches taken with regard to each of the existing communications technologies
and determining the extent to which the lessons contained in each can serve as a model of regulation
for the others. This Article focuses on the characteristic that I believe dominates the approach to
regulating cable television (i.e., concerns about the vertical exercise of market power). Subsequent
papers will focus on the common carriage and scarcity/diversity paradigms associated with telephony
and broadcasting.
24
As scholars have frequently noted, firms can achieve many of the same benefits through
vertical contractual restraints. As a result, the insights are quite similar. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID
L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 20, 82 (1983);
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES 29-30, 35-37 (1975); Andy M. Chen & Keith N.
Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 583-85, 587, 590-91
(1999). For more detailed analysis of the extent to which vertical restraints can simulate vertical
integration, see BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra, at 52-82; PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 552-69 (1992); and JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 173-81 (1988).
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which has renewed scholarly interest in the ways that vertical integration
can harm competition.
Although the scope of disagreement among these approaches remains
significant, what I find most interesting is the extent to which consensus
exists on certain issues. In particular, a review of the literature reveals that
the Chicago School and post-Chicago models both begin from the premise
that certain structural conditions must exist before vertical integration can
pose any threat to competition. Furthermore, Chicago School and postChicago theorists generally agree that vertical integration may lead to
efficiencies that may justify vertical integration even when the market
structure creates some anti-competitive dangers. An application of this
basic framework to the broadcast television industry suggests that the
emphasis on preventing vertical integration is fundamentally misguided
since the relevant markets are not structured in a way that would permit
any firm to use vertical integration to harm competition. The analysis
shows, moreover, that the cost structure of producing television
programming is such that vertical integration is likely to lead to the
realization of significant efficiencies. While it is true that game theory,
network economics, and innovation-based models do indicate that vertical
integration can sometimes harm competition, a close analysis of the formal
models reveals that such anti-competitive effects arise only under
particular circumstances. As a result, although these analyses provide
strong support for rejecting the Chicago School’s call for treating vertical
integration as legal per se and insisting that vertical arrangements remain
subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason, they do not support
the imposition of categorical regulatory rules that would, in essence,
render vertical integration illegal without any analysis of the facts of a
particular case. Such an outcome would be tantamount to a return to the
rule of per se illegality associated with the now-discredited Harvard
School approach.
Part II uses an analysis of vertical integration in the cable television
industry to extend the analysis further. In addition to applying the
framework developed in Part I, this Part also discusses the problematic
nature of compelled access as a remedy. Unlike conventional antitrust
remedies, which seek to break up the monopoly power, access remedies
simply demand that the monopoly bottleneck be shared, a result that does
not necessarily lead to the reductions in price and increases in quantity
required to enhance static efficiency. Access remedies cause even greater
problems in terms of dynamic efficiency. The central problem is that
forcing a monopolist to share an input rescues other firms seeking access
to that input from having to develop alternative sources of supply. Access
remedies thus can entrench the existing monopoly by depriving firms
interested in competing with the monopoly of their natural strategic
179
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partners. As a result, the economic literature cautions against compelling
access whenever the bottleneck resource is available from another source,
even if it is only available at significant cost and in the relatively long run.
This is particularly true in technologically dynamic industries in which the
prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to compete
directly with the bottleneck are the highest.
Part III employs the lens of the open access debate to add another
layer to the economic analysis. In addition to applying the analytical
frameworks developed in the previous parts to the problem of open access
to cable modem systems, this Part will respond to the New Economybased arguments raised by Professors Lemley, Lessig, and others that
restrictions on vertical integration are necessary to preserve and promote
technological innovation. In particular, it examines a complex web of
arguments involving the extent to which innovation is affected by market
concentration, standardization, and network externalities. A close review
of the economic literature on these subjects reveals that these arguments
are considerably more ambiguous than open access advocates would have
us believe. While the sensitivity of these theories to the factual context
might possibly provide support for prohibiting a particular instance of
vertical integration on a case-by-case basis, it seems unlikely that these
theories would support the type of simple policy inference needed to
justify holding a specific practice illegal without any particularized inquiry
into the facts. Part IV offers an analysis of the intellectual and institutional
obstacles for adopting a more comprehensive economic perspective.
It should be noted that the Article’s focus on the policy question leads
to two caveats. First, in focusing on the economic desirability of
permitting vertical integration, I set aside, for the time being, any extended
analysis of the important question of whether regulation of vertical
integration is either permitted or even compelled under the current
regulatory regime. I thus take no position on whether open access is
permitted or mandated under current law.25 Second, this Article does not
address questions of constitutionality. This is not because statutory
authorization is unimportant or because regulation of vertical integration
does not raise any First Amendment concerns.26 It is because both of those
25
For detailed assessments of the statutory status of open access, see generally Chen, supra
note 13; Howard A. Shelanski, The Speed Gap: Broadband Infrastructure and Electronic Commerce,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 721, 740-42 (1999); and Speta, Handicapping, supra note 21, at 61-75.
26
I thus disagree with Lemley and Lessig’s suggestion that open access does not implicate
the First Amendment. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 955 (“There is no governmental
regulation of speech at issue here.”). For discussions of the First Amendment implications of open
access, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV.
281 (2000); Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23 (2000); and Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom
of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87 (2000).
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inquiries focus on what policy makers can do under the law. In so doing,
they tend to elide over the more fundamental questions about what policy
makers should do. In the absence of an affirmative policy justification for
imposing vertical structural regulation, the First Amendment question
never arises.
I.

The Chain Broadcasting Rules and the Basic Economics of Vertical
Integration

This Part will use the FCC’s first major initiative designed to regulate
vertical relationship in media industries to lay out the basic economic
analysis of vertical integration. Section A begins by outlining the structure
of the broadcast television industry and then describes the relevant
regulatory scheme, known as the Chain Broadcasting Rules. It then
identifies the primary economic arguments upon which the Chain
Broadcasting Rules are based, determining that the FCC was motivated by
the same concerns that underlay the major judicial decisions on vertical
integration: the problems of leveraging and foreclosure.
Section B then reviews the historical development of vertical
integration theory, tracing both the Chicago School’s critique of the
courts’ hostility towards vertical integration during the 1950s and 1960s,
as well as the post-Chicago reaction to that critique. Although these two
approaches differ on many of the particulars of competition policy, a close
reading of the literature reveals the existence of some common ground.
Both approaches recognize the existence of certain structural preconditions
that must be satisfied before vertical integration poses any threat to
competition. In addition, both approaches acknowledge, for the most part,
that vertical integration can yield certain efficiencies that may make
vertical integration economically desirable.
The resulting analytical framework is applied to the broadcast
television industry in Section C. This analysis reveals that the relevant
markets are simply too unconcentrated and too unprotected by barriers to
entry for vertical integration to represent a plausible threat to competition.
In addition, a review of the cost structure of producing television
programming suggests that it is quite possible that vertical integration in
the broadcast television industry will yield significant efficiency benefits.
Specifically, the existence of significant up-front, fixed-cost investments
and minimal marginal costs of transmission make producers of television
programming extremely dependent on their ability to reach guaranteed
audiences and leave them vulnerable to post-investment opportunistic
behavior. Under these circumstances, the limits on vertical integration
imposed by the Chain Broadcasting Rules appear to make little sense.
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A. The Chain Broadcasting Rules: Context, Substance, and Rationale
1.

The Structure of the Broadcasting Industry

Although the structure of the broadcasting industry may at times seem
mysterious, when viewed from a certain perspective, it is in fact quite
ordinary. Its basic organization differs little from that of the typical
manufacturing industry, which is divided into a three-stage chain of
production and distribution comprised of manufacturers, wholesalers, and
retailers. The first and last stages are easiest to understand. The first stage
is manufacturing, which is occupied by the companies that create the
actual products to be sold. Retailers, who are responsible for final delivery
of the products to end-users, occupy the last stage. Although it is
theoretically possible for retailers to obtain products directly from
manufacturers, in practice, the logistics of doing so have become so
complicated that it is often necessary for an intermediate stage to develop
between manufacturers and retailers. Firms operating at this intermediate
stage, known as wholesalers, purchase goods directly from manufacturers
and assemble them into complete product lines for retailers to purchase.
The broadcasting industry can, for the most part, be mapped onto this
three-stage framework.27 For most of the history of the television industry,
the manufacturing stage has been populated principally by the movie
studios, which create the television programs in the first instance. The
wholesale stage is occupied by the networks, which purchase the broadcast
rights to programs from the studios, aggregate them into program
packages, and redistribute them via satellite to local broadcast stations.
The networks in turn sell28 these program packages to the local broadcast
27
Although, for the purposes of program distribution, it is proper to regard networks and
local broadcast stations as successive stages in a vertical chain of production, that relationship is
complicated by the fact that, with regard to advertising, networks and local broadcast stations can be
viewed as horizontal competitors. Advertisers have the choice of either spending their advertising
money in the national market governed by the networks or in the spot market governed by the local
broadcast stations. Although this dimension of competition is also important, this Article will limit its
focus to the more vertical aspects of broadcast regulation relating to program distribution.
28
In one sense, it may seem strange to say that networks “sell” program packages to the
local broadcast stations. In the typical purchase transaction, one party offers a cash payment in
exchange for goods or services provided by another party. In such cases, the cash and the goods travel
in opposite directions. In the typical transaction between a network and its broadcast affiliate, the
network provides both the program packages and additional money to the station. In other words, the
cash and the goods are traveling in the same direction, with the network seemingly receiving nothing
in return. The solution to this apparent anomaly is well explained by the Report of the FCC’s Network
Inquiry Special Staff:
The relationships between the commercial broadcast television networks and their
affiliated stations can be characterized in two equivalent ways. The broadcast networks
can be described as buying access to the time of stations, paying the stations both in cash
and by making time available within and between programs for sale by stations directly
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stations that comprise the retail stage of production responsible for
delivering the program packages to the end users.29
As with other consumer goods markets, however, regulators became
concerned that integration between the different levels of the chain of
production might pose a threat to competition. In order to address these
concerns, the FCC enacted rules designed to limit the extent to which such
vertical integration could occur as one of its first major regulatory
initiatives.
2.

The Chain Broadcasting Rules

Concerned by the increasing dominance that the three major radio
networks—NBC, CBS, and the Mutual Broadcasting System—were
exerting over their broadcast affiliates, the FCC launched an investigation
in 1938 to determine what, if any, restrictions should be placed upon
them.30 This investigation culminated three years later with the issuance of
the Report on Chain Broadcasting31 and the enactment of the Chain
Broadcasting Rules.32
The Chain Broadcasting Rules placed direct restrictions on the extent
to which networks could vertically integrate into local broadcasting.33 The
to advertisers. Alternatively, one can think of stations as purchasing programs from the
networks, paying for these programs by permitting the networks to sell advertising time
within programs and to retain a portion of the revenue that is thereby obtained. Under
either view, the relationship between networks and their outlets is principally vertical
with regard to program exhibition.
1 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JURISDICTION,
OWNERSHIP, AND REGULATION 395 (1980) [hereinafter NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS] (footnote
omitted).
29
It should be noted that not all broadcast programming passes through all three stages of
production. For example, broadcast networks on occasion bypass the manufacturing stage by creating
their own content, such as news and sports programs. Similarly, local broadcast stations at times
bypass both upstream stages by creating local news broadcasts and other original programming. In
addition, some programs in effect bypass the network stage and move directly from the movie studios
to the local broadcast stations through syndication. Notwithstanding these variations, the basic threestage model is useful to capture the basic structure of the broadcast industry. Indeed, the variations
discussed above are largely consistent with the focus of this Article, since the fact that two stages are
often collapsed into one can be seen as a form of vertical integration.
30
See 3 Fed. Reg. 637 (Mar. 26, 1938).
31
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (1941).
32
For useful overviews of the Chain Broadcasting Rules, see Emord, supra note 20, at 40511; NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 445-49; STANLEY M. BESEN ET AL.,
MISREGULATING TELEVISION 32-35 (1984) [hereinafter MISREGULATING TELEVISION]; and Chen,
supra note 21, at 1451-54.
33
Specifically, the FCC prohibited networks from owning more than one station in any
market and from owning stations in markets with so few stations that competition would be
substantially restrained. REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 31, at 92 (Rule 3.106),
repealed by Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R. 4538,
4540, ¶ 10 (1995) (Report and Order). The former provision has been largely overshadowed by the
FCC’s duopoly rule, which prohibits all owners, networks and non-networks alike, from owning more
than one station in any market. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.355 (1999).
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FCC later bolstered this limit to vertical integration by promulgating rules
limiting the number of television stations that any one person could own.34
Although the initial rule banned any person from owning more than three
stations,35 this number increased steadily over the years.36 Current law
permits ownership of any number of stations so long as the total reach of
the group does not exceed thirty-five percent of the national audience.37
Although not targeted towards the networks specifically, the national
ownership rules serve as the primary limit on network ownership of
broadcast stations.38
The Chain Broadcasting Rules also included a number of restrictions
on the networks’ ability to use vertical contractual restraints, banning the
use of contract provisions requiring exclusive dealing, territorial
exclusivity, and long affiliation terms.39 In addition, the rules guaranteed
the local stations’ right to reject any programs that they deemed
unsatisfactory40 and restricted the use of contract provisions granting
networks guaranteed access to affiliates’ time during certain portions of
the broadcast day (a practice known as “option time”).41
In the landmark case of NBC v. United States,42 the Supreme Court
upheld the Chain Broadcasting Rules as a proper exercise of the FCC’s
statutory obligation to regulate broadcasting in accordance with the public
34
For reviews of the history of the group ownership rules, see Chen, supra note 21, at
1445-46; and Glen O. Robinson, The “New” Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 289, 292 (1996).
35
See Rules and Regulations Governing Experimental Television Broad. Stations § 4.226, 6
Fed. Reg. 2282, 2284-85 (May 6, 1941).
36
See Multiple Ownership, 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (May 23, 1944) (authorizing group ownership
of up to five radio stations); Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and
Regulations Relating to the Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broad. Stations, 18 F.C.C.
288 (1953) (Report and Order) (limiting any one owner to five television stations nationwide);
Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954) (Report and Order) (authorizing
group ownership of up to seven stations so long as two stations were UHF); Amendment of Section
73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636] of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple
Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 100
F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (authorizing group ownership of up to twelve
stations), on reconsideration, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (adding the
additional requirement that the group reach no more than twenty-five percent of the national audience).
37
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c), 110 Stat. 56, 110
(codified as 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(e)(1) (1999)). Interestingly, the FCC had already signaled its
willingness to consider raising the cap to as high as fifty percent by the time the Act was passed. See
Robinson, supra note 34, at 292 (citing Broad. Servs.; Television Stations, 60 Fed. Reg. 6490 (1995)).
38
See 100 F.C.C.2d at 50-54, ¶¶ 97-107.
39
47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a)-(c) (1999).
40
Id. § 73.658(e).
41
The FCC rejected the Chain Broadcasting Report’s call for an outright ban of option
time, opting instead to place additional restrictions on it. 6 Fed. Reg. 5258 (1941) (extending the
minimum notice period for the exercise of option time to fifty-six days and limiting the number of
hours that could be reserved through option time). The FCC banned option time altogether in 1963.
Option Time and the Station’s Right to Reject Network Programs, 34 F.C.C. 1103, 1130 (1963)
(Second Report and Order) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(d) (1999)).
42
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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interest.43 Consistent with the spirit of the day,44 the Court did not subject
the economic rationales underlying the Rules to any significant scrutiny,
opting instead to defer to the agency in this regard.45 The Court later relied
heavily on this decision in subsequently upholding the national ownership
rules.46
In 1946, the FCC extended the Chain Broadcasting Rules to television
without conducting any specific analysis of their applicability to the new
medium.47 This action was clearly prophylactic, as there were only six
television stations on the air in the entire U.S. at the time.48 The FCC has
since largely eliminated the Chain Broadcasting Rules with respect to
radio,49 so, as a practical matter, their only remaining relevance is with
respect to television.
3.

The Economic Theory Underlying the Chain Broadcasting Rules

The Chain Broadcasting Rules reflected the FCC’s belief that the
networks were using vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints
to harm competition in two ways. First, the FCC was concerned that the
use of such provisions allowed networks to use their dominant positions to
reduce the local broadcast stations’ freedom to choose,50 a concern
analogous to the concern in antitrust theory that a dominant firm might
“leverage” its market power over one stage of production to reduce
competition in an adjacent stage that otherwise would be competitive.
Second, the FCC was also concerned that allowing networks to tie up local
broadcast stations tended to obstruct the growth of new networks,51 a
concern analogous to modern concerns about “foreclosure.”
43
Id. at 215-19.
44
See, e.g., JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 95-103, 132-40 (1938). For
general descriptions of the courts’ deferential attitude towards agency policymaking, see Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1048-50, 1056-59
(1997); Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing
Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1417-19 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1677-78 (1975); and Keith
Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 574-75 (1992).
45
319 U.S. at 218-19; see also id. at 224-25 (rejecting the argument that the Chain
Broadcasting Rules were arbitrary and capricious).
46
United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
47
Amendment to Part 3 of the Comm’n’s Rules, 11 Fed. Reg. 33 (1946).
48
See Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R.
4538, 4539, ¶ 5 (1995) (Report and Order).
49
Review of Comm’n Rules and Regulatory Policies Concerning Network Broad. by
Standard (AM) and FM Broad. Stations, 63 F.C.C.2d 674 (1977) (Report, Statement of Policy, and
Order).
50
See REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, supra note 31, at 4, 52, 65- 67.
51
See id. at 51-52, 54, 59, 62, 67. It should be noted that the FCC also based its report in
part on considerations unrelated to competition policy. For example, at times, the Report on Chain
Broadcasting also relies in part on concerns more closely allied with the First Amendment, such as the
perceived need to encourage locally produced programming. See id. at 4, 63, 65.
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The Chain Broadcasting Rules’ reliance on the perceived dangers
posed by leveraging and foreclosure was an apt reflection of the prevailing
economic wisdom of the day. At the time, the Harvard School of Industrial
Organization52 (“Harvard School”), associated with the work of economist
Joe Bain53 and legal scholars Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner,54 dominated
antitrust law. The Harvard School based its hostility towards vertical
integration on three central tenets. First, it readily accepted the leverage
theory of vertical integration, believing that firms with as little as five
percent of the market could use vertical integration to exert market power
against upstream and downstream markets.55 Second, the Harvard School
also believed that vertical integration allowed firms to foreclose entry
either by tying up the supply of necessary inputs56 or by forcing new
entrants to enter at two different levels of production.57 Third, Harvard
School scholars believed that vertical integration provided few efficiency
benefits58 and was more often motivated by the desire to create barriers to
entry.59
From the 1950s through the early 1970s, the Harvard School swept
the field60 and became the orthodox position on the Supreme Court.61 In
52
For helpful overviews of the Harvard School approach, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 1.7, at 42-46, § 2.2a, at 60 (2d ed. 1999); F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4-6 (1970); Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law
and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 493-501 (1983); Robert J.
Larner & James W. Meehan, Jr., The Structural School, Its Critics, and Its Progeny: An Assessment, in
ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY 179, 180-91 (Robert J. Larner & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds.,
1989); Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1104, 1104-23 (1979); and Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It’s Been, Where
It’s Going, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 289, 290-92, 312-13 (1983).
53
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 155-56 (1956); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 179, 360-64, 381 (2d ed. 1968).
54
CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1959); CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956); Donald Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50 (1958). In fact, Kaysen was able to
influence doctrine directly when he served as a law clerk to Judge Wyzanski in one of the leading
antitrust cases of its time. See Carl Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 100 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 713-15 (1987).
55
See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 54, at 132 (arguing that firms “can, through the
leverage effects of firms in one market on those in another to which they stand in the relation of
supplier or customer, enhance existing power, or enable it to be applied in a new market”).
56
See id. at 121 (“Vertical integration backward over limited raw material supplies or
forward over limited market outlets may provide either the basic sources of the market power of the
firm or important buttresses to it.”).
57
See id. at 120.
58
See BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 53, at 155-56; BAIN, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION, supra note 53, at 179, 360-64, 381.
59
See BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION, supra note 53, at 144-47.
60
In fact, at the time, the Harvard School counted even such future critics as George Stigler,
Ward Bowman, and Milton Friedman among its adherents. See GEORGE STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN
UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 97, 99-100 (1988); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U.
PA. L. REV. 577, 589, 641 (1953).
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case after case, the Court struck down vertical mergers by firms
controlling as little as five percent of the market.62 The Court followed a
parallel pattern with respect to vertical contractual restraints, either holding
them illegal per se on the grounds that the restraint at issue evinced such a
“pernicious effect on competition” and such a “lack of any redeeming
virtue” that little would be lost if they were “presumed to be . . . illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use”63 or striking them down at such low levels of
concentration as to be tantamount to the same thing.64 The Harvard School
approach also became enshrined in the initial Merger Guidelines issued by
the Justice Department in 1968, which disfavored any vertical merger
involving a firm holding as little as six to ten percent of its market.65 Given
the prevailing hostility towards vertical integration, it seemed quite natural
for the FCC to impose categorical regulations that in essence made vertical
integration in the broadcast industry illegal per se.
B.

The Basic Economics of Vertical Integration66
1.

The Chicago School’s Rejection of Per Se Illegality

The academic and doctrinal consensus in place at the time the FCC
established the Chain Broadcasting Rules would not prove to be lasting. A
new body of economic scholarship, spearheaded by a group of economists
associated with the University of Chicago,67 unleashed a critique of the
Harvard School’s approach to vertical integration that remains one of the
central influences in competition policy to this day.
61
See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
515, 516-17 (1985).
62
See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1971) (striking down vertical
merger resulting in 10% foreclosure); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-34 (1961)
(striking down vertical merger resulting in 5% and 1% foreclosure); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1956) (striking down vertical merger resulting in 6% to 7%
foreclosure).
63
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (holding tying illegal per se); see
also United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (same); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1968) (same); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1966) (holding territorial restrictions illegal per se); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1962) (same).
64
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1948) (striking down
exclusive dealing contract that foreclosed 16% of the market).
65
U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines § 12, 33 Fed. Reg. 23,442 (1968),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,101.
66
Readers already familiar with the basic economics of vertical integration might prefer to
skip directly to infra Section I.C.
67
For a useful overview of the Chicago School, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School
of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
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The Chicago School systematically called into question each of the
three central propositions that underlay the Harvard School’s hostility
towards vertical integration. First, the Chicago School argued that the
leverage theory of vertical integration provided neither the incentive nor
the ability to harm competition. Second, the Chicago School attacked the
notion that vertical integration could foreclose entry. Third, Chicagoans
offered plausible arguments that vertical integration could lead to more
significant efficiency benefits than the Harvard School thought possible. I
will discuss each in turn.
a.

The Critique of Leverage

The Chicago School leveled a twofold attack on the notion that firms
could use vertical integration to gain leverage over another market. One
attack focused on the structural preconditions required to state a coherent
leveraging claim. The other attack was more radical; it argued that, even
when the structural preconditions identified in the first attack were met,
vertical integration did not provide firms with any additional market
power. As a result, the Chicagoans argued, firms will generally find
leverage to be unnecessary.
Beginning with the first attack, Chicagoans pointed out that it is
impossible to state a coherent theory of leverage unless two structural
preconditions are met. First, the merging firm must have monopoly power
in its primary market since, without such power, any attempt to charge
supra-competitive prices would simply induce customers to obtain the
goods they need from other sources. In short, a firm that lacks market
power has nothing to leverage in the first place.68 Second, the market into
which the firm seeks to vertically integrate (called the secondary market)
must also be concentrated and protected by barriers to entry. If no such
barriers to entry exist, any attempt to raise price in the secondary market
will simply attract new competitors until the price drops back down to
competitive levels.69 Unless these two structural preconditions are met, it
is impossible to see how vertical integration could provide any firm with
the ability to extract any profit from either market.
In addition, the Chicago School pointed out that, although firms with
monopoly power may have the ability to exercise leverage over upstream
and downstream markets, those firms typically lack the incentive to do so.
68
See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 870-71 (2d ed. 1982)
(“The leverage theory . . . is beside the point if the integrated firm lacks a monopoly.”); Aaron Director
& Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956)
(“Firms that are competitive cannot impose coercive restrictions on their suppliers or their customers
as a means of obtaining a monopoly. They lack the power to do this effectively.”).
69
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 172-73 (1976).
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This is because there is only one monopoly profit in any chain of
production, and any monopolist can capture all of that profit without
having to resort to vertical integration. All it has to do is simply price its
goods at the monopoly level.70
A simple numerical example will help illustrate the point.71 Suppose
that a monopolist refines ore into copper ingot and sells it to a downstream
firm that fabricates the ingot into copper pipe that is sold into a
competitive market. Suppose further that the cost of refining ore into ingot
is $40, that the cost of fabricating the ingot into pipe is $35, and that the
monopoly price of the final good is $100. If the monopolist were to
vertically integrate into fabrication, it could charge $100 for the final good
and thereby earn a profit of $25 per unit (i.e., $100 - $40 - $35). The
monopolist need not vertically integrate to capture this profit, however. All
it needs to do is price the ingot at $65, which would allow it to earn the
same profit of $25 per unit (i.e., $65 - $40). Since the downstream firm
faces competition, it will simply set its markup equal to its costs. This
results in the price of the final good also being set at its profit-maximizing
price of $100 (i.e., $65 + $35). Thus, as a general matter, the monopolist
gains nothing by vertically integrating into fabrication. All it needs to do to
capture all of the available profit is simply price the input so that the final
good is priced at the monopoly level.
Chicago School scholars did note two relevant exceptions to their
critique of leveraging. First, they pointed out that leverage might be
profitable if the monopolist controls an input that can be used in variable
proportions with other competitively supplied inputs.72 The logic is
straightforward: A firm with monopoly control over an input will price it
70
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 226-31, 372-73, 375 (1978); POSNER,
supra note 69, at 173, 197; POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 802-03, 870; Ward S.
Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-21 (1957); Director
& Levi, supra note 68, at 290.
71
The example is taken from Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 32 (1st
Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
72
See BORK, supra note 70, at 229-31; POSNER, supra note 69, at 201; POSNER &
EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 874; Bowman, supra note 70, at 25-27; M.L Burstein, A Theory of
Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 68, 76-83 (1960); John S. McGee & Lowell R. Bassett,
Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J.L. & ECON. 17, 22-32, 38 (1976); Posner, supra note 67, at 937.
For the seminal economic articles, see L.W. McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of
Firms, 61 ECON. J. 785 (1951); and John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of
Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL. ECON. 924 (1971). For useful reviews appearing in
the economic literature, see BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 24, at 31-35; F.M. SCHERER & DAVID
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 522-27 (3d ed. 1990);
TIROLE, supra note 24, at 179-81; Masahiro Abiru, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions, and
Successive Oligopolies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 315, 324 (1988); and Martin K. Perry, Vertical
Integration: Determinants and Effects, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 183, 191-92
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). For overviews appearing in the legal literature,
see HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, § 9.3a, at 377-78; Chen & Hylton, supra note 24, at 598-99, 627-28;
and David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTITRUST L.J.
917, 922-24 (1995).
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above cost. This price increase will lead customers to substitute alternative
inputs whenever possible, a reaction that reduces the monopolist’s market
power and decreases the profits it earns. The input can eliminate the
reduction in profits resulting from input substitution by vertically
integrating into fabrication.73
Chicago School scholars conceded that, under these circumstances, a
monopolist could use vertical integration to earn positive profits, but
tended to downplay the significance of the insight.74 Subsequent
economists have largely agreed, in part because the welfare implications of
input substitution are actually quite ambiguous.75 Although input
substitution can reduce monopoly profits, it also reduces total welfare by
inducing customers to deviate from the most efficient input mix.
Determining which of the two countervailing effects will dominate can be
quite difficult.76 In any event, any reduction in welfare is likely to be
relatively small.77 As a result, the consensus position is that input
substitution does not pose a problem significant enough to be worth
redressing.78 And even in markets where market power exists, it is

73
The monopolist could accomplish much the same effect through vertical contractual
restraints requiring that customers agree not to substitute inputs.
74
See BORK, supra note 70, at 229-31 (arguing that input substitution rarely occurrs and as
a result was an insufficient basis for regarding vertical mergers as anything but per se legal); POSNER,
supra note 69, at 201 (arguing that “[w]hich effect dominates is an empirical question in each case, and
probably an unanswerable one in the present state of economic science. There is accordingly no basis,
as yet at least, for prohibiting these vertical mergers either”) (footnote omitted); McGee & Bassett,
supra note 72, at 32, 38 (accepting the insight, but arguing that it should be addressed through
horizontal remedies).
75
See George A. Hay, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Integration, 1 IND. ORG. REV. 188
(1973); Richard Schmalensee, A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration, 81 J. POL. ECON. 442, 448
(1973); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control with Variable Proportions, 82 J. POL. ECON.
783, 794-96, 798, 799 (1974).
76
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 72, at 523-24 (“The mathematical conditions underlying
this result are complex.”). Specifically, the welfare tradeoff described above turned largely on the
elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of demand for the final good. Economists that have assumed
that the final product market is perfectly competitive have disagreed over the range of elasticities that
lead to a price increase. Compare Hay, supra note 75, at 194; Warren-Boulton, supra note 75, at 784,
787, 799; and Schmalensee, supra note 75, at 447, with Parthasaradhi Mallela & Babu Nahata, Theory
of Vertical Control with Variable Proportions, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1007, 1014-15 (1980); and Fred M.
Westfield, Vertical Integration: Does Product Price Rise or Fall?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 334, 335-346
(1981). Scholars that have modeled the final product market as oligopolistic have reached similar
disagreement. Compare Michael Waterson, Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and Oligopoly,
92 ECON. J. 129, 139 (1982) (concluding that, if the final product market is oligopolistic rather than
competitive, the impact on welfare depends on the elasticity of substitution), with Abiru, supra note
72, at 324 (employing similar assumptions to conclude that price will fall and welfare will increase
regardless of elasticity of substitution).
77
Perry, supra note 72, at 192 (noting that the percentage welfare loss appears to be less
than a couple percent); Reiffen & Vita, supra note 72, at 923 (drawing the same conclusion).
78
See Perry, supra note 72, at 192 (“[I]t is not clear that variable proportions raises a major
policy issue on vertical integration.”); Reiffen & Vita, supra note 72, at 923 (“The variable proportions
models of vertical integration seldom have been regarded as providing a sound basis for guiding
vertical merger enforcement policy.”).
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arguable that horizontal remedies will prove more effective in curbing it
than any prohibition of vertical integration or vertical restraints.79
The second exception is more significant for the purposes of this
Article. It acknowledges that a monopolist subject to rate regulation may
well find it profitable to integrate vertically. Gaining control of a second,
unregulated level of production would allow the firm to earn the profits
foreclosed by regulators.80 In such cases, it is arguably appropriate to
prohibit vertical integration in order to isolate and quarantine the
monopolist. Such regulation is justified, however, only in cases of natural
monopoly, where any attempt to break up the monopoly would ultimately
prove futile. If the market at issue is not a natural monopoly, both rate
regulation and the concomitant prohibition of vertical integration are
equally unwarranted.
b.

The Critique of Foreclosure

Chicago School supporters also debunked the notion that a firm
without market power could use vertical integration to foreclose
competitors. Suppose that a shoe manufacturer that controls a nondominant share of total shoe manufacturing (say, ten percent) decides to
integrate vertically into retail shoe stores and sell its shoes only through
dedicated outlets.81 It cannot be said that the decision to integrate vertically
has foreclosed any of the shoe manufacturer’s existing competitors, since
they still have available the number of shoe retailers (ninety percent)
sufficient to allow them sell all of their available supply (ninety percent).
Vertical integration into retailing may realign the patterns of distribution,
but it cannot limit the amount of the market available to rivals.82
79
WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 324 (1990); McGee &
Bassett, supra note 72, at 22-32, 38; Perry, supra note 72, at 192.
80
BORK, supra note 70, at 376; POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 809, 870 n.2;
Bowman, supra note 70, at 21-23. For a detailed exposition of AT&T’s use of this form of leverage to
harm competition for long distance telephony, see Timothy J. Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should
Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets: Understanding the Divestiture in U.S. v. AT&T, 32 ANTITRUST
BULL. 741 (1987).
81
Those familiar with antitrust will recognize that this hypothetical is based on the facts of
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
82
BORK, supra note 70, at 232; Sam Peltzman, Issues in Vertical Integration Policy, in
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS MERGERS 167, 169-70 (J. Fred Weston & Sam Peltzman eds., 1969). Posner
and Easterbrook illustrate the point with the following numerical example:
Suppose GM bought 10% of its gasket needs from each of 10 firms (A through J), that
GM purchased 10% of all gaskets sold in America, and that firms A through J were of
equal size. GM now purchases firm A and announces that it will buy its gasket
requirements from A exclusively. Would B through J care? No. They still would have
90% of the nation’s gasket production capacity and would supply 90% of the market. The
firms to which A used to ship 90% of its gasket output now would turn to the market and
find B through J ready to supply that demand. The number of gaskets sold is unchanged;
market shares are unchanged; only the patterns of sales are altered.
POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 870.
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In addition, the Chicago School argued that vertical integration
between shoe manufacturers and shoe retailers cannot deter new entry
unless there are barriers to entry protecting the shoe retailing market. This
is because, even if the existing shoe manufacturers have locked up all of
the existing shoe retailers, absent barriers to entry in retailing, any new
shoe manufacturer seeking to find distribution should find distributors
waiting to meet it.83
c.

Efficiency Justifications for Vertical Integration

Having cast doubt on whether vertical integration could plausibly
harm competition in the absence of monopoly power in the first market
and barriers to entry protecting the second market, Chicago School
scholars bolstered their campaign against the per se illegality of vertical
integration by identifying several ways in which vertical integration could
actually enhance efficiency. The two sources of efficiency most relevant to
the purposes of this Article are the elimination of double marginalization
resulting from successive monopolies and the reduction of transaction
costs.
Elimination of Double Marginalization. Drawing on the pioneering
work of Joseph Spengler,84 Chicagoans pointed out that vertical integration
or restraints can be welfare-enhancing when successive stages of
production are both controlled by monopolies.85 Chicago School scholars
pointed out that this so-called “double marginalization” problem leads
successive monopolies to set higher prices than would firms that used
some vertical device to coordinate pricing decisions. It has now become
generally accepted that vertical integration between successive
monopolists is unambiguously welfare-enhancing.86
83
See BORK, supra note 70, at 241; POSNER, supra note 69, at 197-98; GEORGE J. STIGLER,
THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 113-22 (1968); Director & Levi, supra note 68, at 293.
84
See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347
(1950); see also Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and
Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960) (reviewing the early scholarship on successive
monopoly theory).
85
See BORK, supra note 70, at 229; POSNER, supra note 69, at 200-01; POSNER &
EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 875-76; Peltzman, supra note 82, at 171 n.3; see also Fishman v.
Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 563 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). For useful discussions
of the economic literature on successive monopoly, see BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 24, at 31-36;
TIROLE, supra note 24, at 174-77; and FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF
MARKETS 51-63, 80-82 n.1 (1978). For useful discussions appearing in the legal literature, see
HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, § 9.2c, at 374-77; and Chen & Hylton, supra note 24, at 595-97, 631-32.
86
TIROLE, supra note 24, at 177 (“[W]elfare is unambiguously increased by the elimination
of the double marginalization.”); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and
Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 328 (1991) (“The welfare effects of the monopsonist’s
backward vertical integration are unambiguously positive.”); Chen & Hylton, supra note 24, at 598
(“In sum, vertical integration makes both the producers and consumers better off.”); see also Wirtz,
807 F.2d at 563 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Propositions about the economics of mergers often are
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Again, the example involving the fabrication of copper ingot into
copper pipe discussed above provides a useful illustration.87 Suppose that
both the company that refined copper ore into ingot and the company that
fabricated the ingot into pipe were both monopolists. As noted before, the
cost of manufacturing the ingot was assumed to be $40, the cost of
fabricating the ingot into pipe was $35, and the profit-maximizing price for
pipe was $100. In an effort to capture all of the monopoly profit, the ingot
monopolist would charge $65 for the ingot ($40 in costs + $25 in available
profit) and hope that the pipe fabricator will price at cost. The pipe
fabricator will similarly attempt to capture all of the available profit by
charging $60 ($35 in costs + $25 in available profit) and hope that the
ingot manufacturer will price at cost. The result is that the final product
will cost $125, a price driven well above profit-maximizing levels that
would be in the self-interest of the two monopolists. Although both firms
could increase the total profit available by agreeing on a way to reduce the
final price, the fact that the firms are locked into a classic bilateral
monopoly will render the terms of any such agreement indeterminate and
greatly increase the likelihood of deadlock.88 Vertical integration would
eliminate this problem, however, since the integrated entity would simply
set the final price of the pipe at the profit-maximizing level of $100
without having to worry about the allocation of the monopoly profits
between the two different stages of production.
Reduction of Transaction Costs. The Chicago School also contended
that vertical integration could promote efficiency by reducing transaction
costs. Some of these arguments followed the Coasean insight89 that
integration can reduce the overall friction involved in organizing business
enterprises by internalizing certain transactions within the firm.90 Others
suggested that vertical integration can lead to efficiencies by allowing
firms to avoid the transaction costs associated with protecting themselves
against opportunistic behavior. In particular, the literature identifies at
least three types of opportunistic behavior that firms may seek to avoid.
Hold Up. The landmark article by Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford,
and Armen Alchian identified a type of opportunistic behavior that can
arise whenever a firm makes an investment that is uniquely tailored to the
needs of the other. When the cost of such an asset exceeds the value of its
next-best use, the investment is said to create “appropriable quasi-rents,”

filled with ifs and maybes; competing schools of thought produce different prescriptions. That
successive monopolies injure consumers is a proposition on which there is unanimous agreement.”).
87
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
88
Machlup & Taber, supra note 84, at 105-06, 111-13; Wirtz, 807 F.2d at 563 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
89
R.H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
90
See BORK, supra note 70, at 227.
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because they allow others to hold up the investing party in an attempt to
extract a greater proportion of the joint benefits.91
Firms confronting the risk of such opportunistic behavior essentially
have two options. First, they can attempt to anticipate the problems and
incorporate solutions to them into the contractual relationship.92
Negotiating and enforcing such contracts can be quite costly, and the costs
of protecting one’s interests via contract rise dramatically as the size of the
relationship-specific investment increases and as information becomes
increasingly asymmetric and hard to verify. These problems are
exacerbated still further if the risks associated with the project are high and
the number of alternative business partners is relatively small.93 In
addition, the impossibility of anticipating every possible contingency
inevitably means that all contracts are in some way analytically
incomplete. At some point, transaction costs may rise to the point where
they frustrate the parties’ ability to reach a mutually beneficial bargain.
When this occurs, the firms may find it beneficial to solve the problem
through vertical integration. Bringing the two firms under the same
corporate umbrella eliminates the incentives for engaging in opportunistic
behavior designed to affect the division of profits between the two firms.
The firms can then give their undivided attention to determining the
combination of resources that maximizes joint profits and, as a result,
maximizes total welfare.94
The classic example discussed in the literature is GM’s 1926
acquisition of one of its component manufacturers, Fisher Body.95
According to Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, the shift from wooden to
metal automobile bodies required Fisher Body to make investments in new
metal stamping technology unique to GM’s cars. Under the KleinCrawford-Alchian framework, the existence of such relationship-specific
investments raised the danger that GM would act opportunistically against
Fisher Body after the investment costs had already been sunk. To mitigate
this risk, GM and Fisher Body entered into a long-term exclusive dealing
agreement in which the price was set at operating costs plus a substantial
91
Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
92
Id. at 302-07; see also POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 886 (“[L]ong term
exclusive dealing contracts may be an effective way of dealing with opportunistic behavior.”).
93
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 24, at 22-24, 28-29; Chen & Hylton, supra note 24, at 59091.
94
OLIVER E. WIILLAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 48-49 (1985);
Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric
Generating Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 37 (1985); Klein et al., supra note 91, at 302-04; see also
Chen & Hylton, supra note 24, at 591; Perry, supra note 72, at 214.
95
Klein et al., supra note 91, at 308-10. For a discussion of the seminal place that the Fisher
Body case has taken in the literature, see Daniel F. Spulber, Economic Fables and Public Policy, in
FAMOUS FABLES OF ECONOMICS 15-18 (Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002).
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markup for capital costs. While well-designed to protect Fisher Body
against opportunistic behavior by GM, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian
contend that the contract was not well-designed to protect GM against
opportunistic behavior by Fisher Body. When the demand for metalbodied automobiles increased dramatically, Fisher Body was able to use its
capital investments much more efficiently than the original contract had
envisioned, and the existing formula allowed Fisher Body to charge GM
prices that overcompensated it for its capital costs. In addition, Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian argue that Fisher Body maximized its own profits
by employing labor-intensive production methods that were
technologically inefficient and by refusing to locate its plants near GM’s.
Unable to manage its relationship with its input supplier through
contractual devices, GM was left with no choice but to vertically integrate
backwards into body fabrication by acquiring Fisher Body.96
Free Riding. Free riding represents another type of opportunistic
behavior that can cause transaction costs to rise. As Lester Telser’s
seminal article demonstrated, transaction costs tend to rise any time a firm
is not able to capture all of the benefits created by its own conduct,
because the existence of such positive externalities gives other firms the
incentive to attempt to free ride on the benefits created by other firms.97
For example, suppose that a firm manufactures a technically complicated
product that requires significant presale services (such as the
demonstration of the product). Telser argues that retailers will have the
incentive to shirk in providing such services in the hopes that other
retailers will bear the costs of providing such services. If all retailers
respond to these incentives in the same way, the total amount of presale
services will fall below efficient levels.98
A manufacturer facing the possibility of such free riding has two
alternatives. It can contractually specify the level of presale services that
each retailer is required to offer. Alternatively, it might attempt to rely on a
vertical contractual restraint, such as resale price maintenance or exclusive
sales territories, to align the retailers’ incentives with the manufacturers’.99
96
Klein et al., supra note 91, at 309-10.
97
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86
(1960).
98
Id. at 91-92. Although the problems associated with free riding and hold up bear many
similarities, they are in fact analytically distinct. Free riding is a result of externalities and derives from
the inability of each firm to internalize all of its costs and benefits. As a result, it is endemic to all
markets without well-defined property rights. The possibility of hold up typically arises when a firm
must make a relationship-specific investment. The danger of opportunism does not appear until after
this investment is made. As such, it is not endemic to the market itself, but rather is a product of a
particular investment decision, which explains why the literature refers to the gains as “quasi-rents,” as
opposed to true rents. In addition, since hold up does not depend upon any notion of externalities, it
can occur even in markets with well-defined property rights.
99
BORK, supra note 70, at 290-91; POSNER, supra note 69, at 148-50; Robert Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 453-54
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Such contracts can be quite expensive to negotiate and enforce, however,
and are inevitably incomplete. If the transaction costs become sufficiently
large, a manufacturer might instead choose to obviate the entire problem
by vertically integrating into distribution.
Adverse Selection. The third example of opportunistic behavior is
known in the literature as “adverse selection.” In the context of
manufacturing and distribution, it typically arises when products are nonhomogeneous and the manufacturer is unable to determine the value of its
products easily. Customers facing such a situation have the incentive to
expend a great deal of costs searching through the goods in an attempt to
find the goods that are relatively underpriced. The seller will in turn have
the incentive to expend additional funds sorting its goods, in order to avoid
being left with an inventory comprised solely of below-average goods.
These difficulties in determining product quality can thus lead to wasteful
expenditure of resources, which Roy Kenney and Benjamin Klein call
“oversearching.”100
The parties can avoid these costs, however, either by vertically
integrating or by agreeing to a vertical contractual constraint, such as a
long-term exclusive dealing arrangement, that functionally serves the same
purposes.101 In addition, Kenney and Klein suggest that a manufacturer
may mitigate oversearching by selling its goods in bundles. The logic is
that bundling goods directs the parties’ attention away from the value of
individual items, which is information that is extremely expensive to
obtain, and instead focuses attention on the average value of the entire
bundle, which is information that that can be gleaned more cheaply.
Bundling, therefore, can reduce transaction costs by decreasing the parties’
incentives to expend additional effort in sorting through the goods since,
on average, the overpriced and underpriced goods in the bundle tend to
balance each other out.102
As Kenney and Klein point out, bundling of goods is quite common.
Take, for example, the supermarkets’ common practice of selling groups
of potatoes in opaque plastic bags. If the supermarket were to offer a bin of
potatoes for individual sale at a specified price, purchasers would have the
incentive to sort through the bin to find the best potatoes (i.e., potatoes that
are underpriced, in that their value exceeds the average value of the bin).
(1966) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason]; Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled,
1977 SUP. CT. REV. 171, 180-81 [hereinafter Bork, Vertical Restraints]; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 148-50 (1984); Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283-85 (1975).
100 Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON.
497, 503-04 (1983).
101 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
102 See Kenney & Klein, supra note 100, at 505.
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The initial purchasers who find such potatoes receive a windfall. Later
purchasers will find a bin composed entirely of potatoes that are worth less
than the average price of the bin. A seller who wishes to avoid being left
with a bin full of low-quality goods can either charge less than the average
price or can attempt to sort the potatoes in advance and price them
appropriately. Such efforts are costly. Furthermore, additional sorting is
unlikely to eliminate this problem, since even if potatoes of different
grades are placed into separate bins, the same effect will occur within each
bin, albeit on a smaller scale. Prepackaging the potatoes into preset
bundles may deal with this problem more effectively, since doing so
reduces the incentives to oversearch by making information about quality
harder to determine and by refocusing purchasers’ attention towards the
average quality of the goods.103
Kenney and Klein also used examples directly relevant to media
markets to illustrate their point. The one that has garnered the most
attention is their discussion of the movie studios’ practice of “block
booking,” which was struck down by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.104 This practice prevented movie theaters from
licensing individual films and instead required them to purchase packages
of films arranged by the studio.
According to Kenney and Klein, block booking served two distinct
purposes. First, it reduced the costs of distributing first-run movies. The
practice stems in large part from the difficulty in determining the true
value of a movie at the time it is initially licensed. The complexities of
scheduling theaters generally required that licensing agreements be signed
before the film was produced. Even when that was not the case, advance
screenings did not yield much useful information, since consumer response
to particular films remained unpredictable.105 According to Kenney and
Klein, Paramount used block booking to reduce the transaction costs of
distributing first-run movies by allowing the movie studios to lower the
expenses associated with scheduling movies for release.106
Second, block booking solved adverse selection problems in the
market for second-run films. A movie’s initial run, of course, tended to
reveal a movie’s real value. Armed with knowledge that was unavailable
ex ante, movie theaters have the incentive to accept only those films
known ex post to be underpriced (i.e., whose value exceeds the value of
the average film) and to reject or shorten the run of those films known ex
post to be overpriced (i.e., whose value falls below the value of the
average film). Kenney and Klein argued that block booking could
103
104
105
106

See id. at 515.
334 U.S. 131 (1948).
See Kenney & Klein, supra note 100, at 518, 520-21.
Id. at 521.
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eliminate these incentives by preventing theater owners from
opportunistically attempting to renegotiate deals based on the new
information and by redirecting the focus of both parties to the average
price.107 If block booking contracts become subject to renegotiation or too
expensive to enforce, firms may find it preferable to vertically integrate
into distribution.
The Empirical Evidence on Transaction Costs. The transaction cost
approach pioneered by the Chicago School was thus able to offer a number
of theoretical explanations of why vertical integration might enhance
efficiency and was able to identify several specific examples that appeared
to confirm these theories. Establishing that something is possible,
however, does nothing to establish whether something is likely. As a result,
economists have conducted extensive empirical studies in an attempt to
determine whether and how frequently such transaction cost efficiencies
actually exist.108 Although many of these results are promising, they are
not sufficient to establish whether vertical integration actually produces
the transaction cost efficiencies described in the theoretical literature.
Other studies challenged the historical examples upon which the
proponents of particular theories of transaction cost efficiencies have
based their claims. For example, a number of distinguished scholars,
including Ronald Coase himself, have challenged the Klein-CrawfordAlchian account of Fisher Body. These critics argue that vertical
contractual restraints were more than sufficient to protect GM’s interests
and point out that at the time that Fisher Body supposedly acted
opportunistically, GM already owned sixty percent of Fisher Body’s
common stock.109 Klein, in turn, responded by arguing that the relevant
quasi-rents resulted from firm-specific human (rather than physical)
capital110 and by placing greater emphasis on Fisher Body’s supposed
refusal to locate its plants near GM’s.111
107 Id. at 521-23.
108 For surveys of the empirical literature on transaction costs and vertical integration, see
Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from
Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation, 9 J. REG. ECON. 5, 14-15 (1996); Paul L.
Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 95, 107-11 (1988); Perry, supra note 72, at 215-19; Aric Rindfleisch & Jan B. Heide,
Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, Present, and Future Applications, 61 J. MARKETING 30, 32-39
(1997); and Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost
Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 334, 349-50 (1995).
109 See generally Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher
Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67 (2000); R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43
J.L. & ECON. 15 (2000); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 30-31
(1988); Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43
J.L. & ECON. 33 (2000).
110 Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher BodyGeneral Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 199, 204-08 (1988).
111 Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON.
105 (2000).
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Another set of commentators has challenged Kenney and Klein’s
account of the Paramount case. Block booking can only reduce transaction
costs if the licensing agreement prevents theater owners from renegotiating
the terms of the contract after the true value of the films has been revealed.
Andrew Hanssen effectively undercut Kenney and Klein’s analysis by
demonstrating that the typical block booking contract permitted theater
owners to reject a significant number of second-run films and that the
movie studios often did not force theater owners to fulfill all of their block
booking obligations.112 Kenney and Klein, in turn, responded with an
alternative account of the Paramount case. According to this new account,
the parties relied on self enforcement, regulated by the mutual need to
preserve reputational capital, rather than the provisions of the contract to
protect themselves against opportunistic behavior. The real purpose of the
contract was to provide a safety net to guard against the failure of such self
enforcement. As a result, Kenney and Klein argued that it is not surprising
that the parties occasionally deviated from the strict contract terms.113
It appears that the critics have gained the upper hand in these debates,
a development made important because of the manner in which the
proponents of the various efficiency theories relied upon the specific
examples they cited as the primary support for their plausibility. These
empirical disputes cannot completely resolve these issues, however. Even
though subsequent work has called the specific examples cited into
question as an empirical matter, the falsification of these particular
examples does not necessarily invalidate these proposals as a theoretical
matter. As Timothy Muris, the recently appointed Chairman of the FTC,
has observed, the principal empirical questions surrounding the transaction
cost implications of vertical integration and vertical restraints have yet to
be resolved.114
It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that the unavailability of
definitive empirical proof of the existence of such efficiencies renders the
112 F. Andrew Hanssen, The Block Booking of Films Reexamined, 43 J.L. & ECON. 395
(2000).
113 Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film
Contracts, 43 J.L. & ECON. 427, 430-32 (2000).
114 Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 910-11 (2001); see also Eddie Correia, Antitrust Policy After the Reagan
Administration, 76 GEO. L.J. 329, 331 (1987) (noting that the empirical evidence for “the most
fundamental assumptions” underlying economic policy are “often very thin”); William H. Page, The
Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary
Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1242 (1989) (observing that Chicago School studies “do not resolve
many of the most basic empirical questions associated with the policy choices that the [Chicago]
models pose”); id. at 1252 (noting that “[t]he state of empirical research” on resale price maintenance
“is inadequate to resolve the dispute”). These issues are rendered even murkier by the argument that
even when opportunism emerges as a real problem, the parties might look to governmental regulation
to ensure that the various parties do not take advantage of one another. See Victor P. Goldberg,
Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976).
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Chicago School’s efficiency arguments unimportant. The mere possibility
that such efficiencies might exist raises serious questions about the
appropriateness of treating vertical integration as illegal per se. As the
Court has noted, per se illegality is appropriate only if the practice is so
pernicious and lacking in redeeming value that nothing would be lost if it
were presumed to be illegal without any examination of the facts of a
particular case.115 Chicagoans maintained that even if they could not
establish that such efficiencies existed in all cases, they had at least raised
a sufficient possibility that such efficiencies might exist to justify
evaluating vertical integration under the case-by-case approach associated
with the rule of reason.116 Even those who question whether vertical
integration is likely to lead to widespread transaction cost savings will still
pause before embracing the presumption that vertical integration is
sufficiently likely to harm competition to justify embracing a blanket
prohibition of the practice.
d.

The Impact of the Chicago School Critique

Although the Chicago School began as “little better than a lunatic
fringe,”117 its attack on the existing orthodoxy regarding vertical
integration ultimately proved transformative. Mainstream antitrust scholars
have now largely accepted the Chicago School’s critiques of the Harvard
School’s reliance on leverage and foreclosure theory.118 The Supreme
Court has followed suit, on some occasions overruling precedents holding
various vertical restraints to be illegal per se119 and on other occasions
accomplishing essentially the same result by requiring plaintiff’s to
establish the existence of the structural preconditions discussed above
before subjecting the restraint to antitrust scrutiny.120
115 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
116 See Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 99, at 453-54; Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum
Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886 (1981); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 99, at
153; Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and The Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
117 Posner, supra note 67, at 931.
118 See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 758, at 27-32
(1996); 4 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1004, at 222 (1980);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, § 7.6b, at 301-02; Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins and Reciprocity: A
Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-1410 (1980); Richard S.
Markovits, Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE L.J. 195, 199-205 (1970);
Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 282 (1987).
119 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum resale price maintenance);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (vertical territorial restrictions); see
also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236-37 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.)
(concluding that exclusive dealing contracts are now governed by the rule of reason).
120 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992)
(concluding that monopolization requires proof of monopoly power in primary market); Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296-97 (1985) (holding that
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The ultimate testament to the triumph of the Chicago School’s
precepts is the Justice Department’s Vertical Merger Guidelines.
Promulgated in 1984121 and apparently still in force today,122 the Vertical
Merger Guidelines embrace the structural preconditions identified by the
Chicago School as essential to proving that a vertical merger is likely to
have an anti-competitive effect. First, the Guidelines require that the
primary market must be concentrated. The Guidelines measure the degree
of market concentration by using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index
(“HHI”),123 which has become the standard concentration measure for
antitrust enforcement purposes. The Guidelines indicate that the antitrust
authorities are unlikely to challenge a vertical merger unless HHI in the
primary market exceeds 1800, which is the level of concentration that
would result in a market comprised of somewhere between five and six
equal competitors.124 Second, the Guidelines require that the secondary
the per se rule against group boycotts requires proof of market power in primary market); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-15 (1984) (holding that the per se rule against tying
requires proof of market power in primary market and substantial foreclosure of secondary market); cf.
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (stating that antitrust laws regard “the
conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do
so”).
121 See 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).
122 The 1992 statement that accompanied the issuance of new Horizontal Merger Guidelines
indicated that Section 4 of the 1984 Guidelines continued to provide the relevant guidance for vertical
mergers. See U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Non-Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/2614.htm. The Clinton Administration did consider adjusting the Vertical Merger
Guidelines, but did not do so, as evidenced by the fact that the Guidelines continue to appear on the
Justice Department’s website. As a result, legal commentators have uniformly indicated that the
Vertical Merger Guidelines remain in force. See, e.g., M. Howard Morse, Vertical Mergers: Recent
Learning, 53 BUS. LAW. 1217, 1224 (1998). For a review of the recent increase in vertical merger
enforcement actions, see id. at 1226-45.
123 HHI is a measurement of market concentration that is calculated by squaring the market
share of each competitor and then summing the resulting numbers. For example, a market of four firms
with market shares of 30%, 30%, 20% and 20%, respectively, would have an HHI of 302 + 302 + 202 +
202 = 900 + 900 + 400 + 400 = 2600. The result is a continuum that rates the concentration of a market
on a scale from 0 (in the case of complete market deconcentration) to 10,000 (in the case of
monopoly).
124 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 122, § 4.213. The Vertical Merger
Guidelines reserve the possibility of challenging mergers at lower HHI levels if “effective collusion is
particularly likely.” Id. Because vertical mergers are less likely than horizontal mergers to create
competitive problems, the Vertical Merger Guidelines apply a somewhat more liberal standard than
that applied to horizontal mergers. Id. § 4.0. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines classify markets in
which the post-merger HHI is below 1000 as “unconcentrated.” Horizontal mergers in such markets
are ordinarily not subject to challenge. U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.51(a), 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992), revised, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 13,104 (Apr. 8, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/
hmg1.html. Markets in which the post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800 are “moderately
concentrated.” Horizontal mergers in markets that fall within this range “potentially raise significant
competitive concerns” and may be subject to challenge if they increase HHI by more than 100 points.
Id. § 1.51(b). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines treat markets in which the post-merger HHI exceeds
1800 as “highly concentrated.” In these markets, mergers that raise post-merger HHI by more than 50
points “potentially raise significant competitive concerns” and may be challenged. Mergers that raise
post-merger HHI 100 points are “presumed . . . to create or enhance market power or facilitate its
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market also be concentrated as well as protected by barriers to entry.125
Lastly, even if those preconditions are met, the Guidelines recognize that
the presence of significant efficiencies might nonetheless justify permitting
a vertical merger to go forward even when the market structure raises the
possibility that the merger might have some anti-competitive effects.126
Not content with these victories, the Chicago School proponents
urged that the regulators subject vertical integration to even greater
deference. Specifically, Chicagoans believed that they had completely
discredited any possibility that a vertical merger could have any anticompetitive effects. In the absence of any plausible harm to competition,
these theorists posited that all instances of vertical integration must be
motivated by the desire to realize pro-competitive efficiencies. As a result,
it was not sufficient simply to move from the preexisting world of per se
illegality to the rule of reason. Instead, they contended that it would be
appropriate to go so far as to treat vertical integration as per se legal.127
2.

The Post-Chicago School’s Rejection of Per Se Legality

The Chicago School’s call for regarding vertical integration as legal
per se in turn inspired a new generation of scholars known as the postChicago School.128 Unlike the Chicago School’s previous critics, postChicago scholars accept economic efficiency as the goal of antitrust.129
They parted company with Chicagoans, however, by rejecting the static
nature of the price theoretic models that provided the foundation for
exercise” and are likely to be challenged. Id. § 1.51(c). Interestingly, even if measured against the more
stringent standards applied to horizontal mergers, most of the markets under consideration in this
Article are too unconcentrated to permit any firm to use mergers to threaten competition.
125 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 122, § 4.212.
126 Id. § 4.24.
127 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 70, at 226, 231. Chicago School theorists offered similar
views with respect to vertical restraints. See id. at 288 (“Analysis shows that every vertical restraint
should be completely lawful.”); Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 99, at 397 (“The thesis advanced
here is that every vertical arrangement should be lawful.”); Bork, Vertical Restraints, supra note 99, at
181-82 (“[A]ntitrust should have no concern with vertical restraints; all should be lawful.”); Richard A.
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI.
L. REV. 6, 22-25 (1981) (“best to declare that purely vertical restraints on intrabrand competition . . .
legal per se”); see also POSNER, supra note 69, at 182 (advocating per se legality of tying contracts).
128 For overviews of the post-Chicago School, see Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments
in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
After Chicago]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 257 (2001) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago]; Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the
Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219 (1995); and Michael W. Klass &
Michael A. Salinger, Do New Theories of Vertical Foreclosure Provide Sound Guidance for Consent
Agreements in Vertical Merger Cases?, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (1995).
129 See Baker, supra note 128, at 646; Jacobs, supra note 128, at 222, 242. As Carl Shapiro
so colorfully put it, “If ‘Post-Chicago Economics’ stands for the notion that . . . antitrust should move
away from promoting efficiency and consumer welfare, count me out.” Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and
Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 484 (1995) (footnote omitted).
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Chicago School scholarship.130 Instead, they employed game theory and
other methods for modeling strategic behavior to study the impact of
vertical integration when markets function imperfectly. These tools
enabled them to identify circumstances under which firms have the ability
to use the leverage provided by a dominant position in one market to harm
competition.131 The existence of formal models showing potential anticompetitive effects arising from vertical relationships served as a powerful
rebuttal to the Chicago School’s call for treating vertical integration and
vertical restraints as legal per se. It is my hope to lay out a more complete
analysis of the post-Chicago theories of vertical integration elsewhere. In
addition, Part III will specifically address some particular attempts to
apply post-Chicago principles to vertical integration in the cable modem
industry.132 For the time being, it is sufficient to restrict myself to a few
observations.
First and foremost, notwithstanding the significant differences
between these two schools of thought, a close examination of the postChicago literature reveals the existence of some common ground. Most
important for the purposes of this Article is the fact that the post-Chicago
theories of vertical integration either explicitly or implicitly rely on the
existence of the same structural preconditions identified by the Chicago
School. Specifically, the post-Chicago scholarship models typically model
the relevant markets either as dominant firm industries133 or as
oligopolistic markets undergoing Cournot or Bertrand competition.134 Both
of these approaches essentially require that the relevant markets be highly
concentrated and protected by barriers to entry.135 In the absence of such
130 Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 128, at 256; Kaplow, supra note 61, at 527-31;
William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern
Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1465 (1990); Williamson, supra note 52, at 299-301.
131 See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 205 (1990); Janusz A. Ordover et
al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Michael H. Riordan,
Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1232 (1998); Michael
H. Riordan, & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63
ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J.
ECON. 345 (1988); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
267, 268 (1983).
132 See infra Subsection III.B.4.
133 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 128, at 325-26; Salop & Scheffman,
supra note 131, at 267.
134 See, e.g., Hart & Tirole, supra note 131; Ordover et al., supra note 131; Riordan & Salop,
supra note 131; Salinger, supra note 131.
135 Dominant firm industries are generally defined as those in which the largest firm has at
least a sixty percent share and into which entry is not easy. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing
Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 953, 965 n.50 (1979). Cournot and Bertrand models similarly assume that entry is impossible and
that market concentration is directly linked to anti-competitive effects. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON
& JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 157, 165, 167, 175 (3d ed. 1999);
JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 233-40, 247-52, 256-57 (2000). See
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structural features, the formal models recognize that vertical integration
may be just as likely to lower price and increase welfare and that the
ability of existing players or new entrants to expand their outputs will be
sufficient to defeat any attempt to increase price above competitive
levels.136
Furthermore, post-Chicago theorists generally accept the Chicago
School position that, even when the market structure is conducive to
leveraging, vertical integration may lead to efficiencies sufficient to offset
any concomitant anti-competitive effects and that whether a particular
instance of vertical integration impedes or promotes competition depends
on which of these two effects dominates.137 In fact, the parallels between
their recognition that vertical integration can promote welfare either by
eliminating the problems of double marginalization138 or by minimizing
transaction costs139 and the Chicago School arguments detailed above are
striking. Thus, as post-Chicago theorists candidly acknowledge, the
existence of potential efficiencies makes it impossible to take an a priori
stance of hostility or non-hostility towards vertical integration.140
For the purposes of this Article, then, it is sufficient to draw two
limited conclusions. First, since regulations of the type at issue in this
Article prohibit vertical integration without any inquiry into the specific
facts of the case, those regulations necessarily presuppose that the proper
generally Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 1488; Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 128, at 274, 275
n.291; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for Exclusionary
Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1301 n.37, 1302, 1310-11 (1987); Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra
note 128, at 324-25; Janusz A. Ordover, Predation, Monopolization, and Antirust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 537, 566; Williamson, supra note 118, at 293. For critics offering the
same observation, see Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 564, 566 (1991).
136 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 532-33; Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers
in Multi-Product Industries and Edgeworth’s Paradox of Taxation, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 545 (1991). It
should be noted that there is one family of post-Chicago models that does not necessarily depend upon
the existence of market power in the relevant markets. These models turn on the possibility that a
strategizing firm could use tying or some other form of vertical restraint to force other players below
minimum viable scale. See, e.g., Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 837 (1990). Such models have little relevance to the contexts addressed by this Article,
since minimum viable scale in the industries discussed in this Article tend to be too low to make this a
viable strategy. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001).
137 See, e.g., IAN AYRES, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND OVERBUYING: AN ANALYSIS OF
FORECLOSURE VIA RAISED RIVALS’ COSTS 17-20, 23-24 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 8803,
1988); Hart & Tirole, supra note 131, at 212; Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 679-82; Riordan &
Salop, supra note 131, at 522-27, 544-51, 564; Salinger, supra note 131, at 349-50; see also Thomas
G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve
Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 277-80 (1986) (conducting a similar analysis with respect to
vertical restraints).
138 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 526-27; Salinger, supra note 131, at 354-55.
139 See Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 673; Williamson, supra note 135.
140 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 526-27; Salinger, supra note 131, at 349-50; see
also Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 128, at 352-56.
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stance with respect to vertical integration is one of per se illegality.141
Although Chicagoans and post-Chicagoans disagree over the nature and
frequency of the circumstances under which vertical integration can harm
competition, they agree that vertical integration often enhances welfare. As
a result, nothing in the debate provides any support for a return to the
discredited Harvard School position of treating vertical integration as
illegal per se.
Second, the debate between the Chicago and the post-Chicago
Schools only seems to confirm the value of continuing to follow the basic
approach taken by the Vertical Merger Guidelines, since both approaches
seem to highlight the importance of focusing on market concentration,
barriers to entry, and the potential for welfare-enhancing efficiencies.142
The post-Chicagoans’ only quibble appears to be with the HHI levels used
to demarcate when a market is sufficiently concentrated as to create a risk
of anti-competitive danger.143 Such concerns are mitigated in large part by
these scholars’ embrace of the Vertical Merger Guidelines when defending
the administrability of their theories,144 their apparent willingness to apply
the HHI thresholds appearing in the Guidelines,145 and their reticence in
proposing an alternative numerical standard.146
Thus, notwithstanding the considerable divergence of opinion
between the Chicago School and the post-Chicago School on a wide range
of issues, the situations identified by the post-Chicago School in which
vertical integration can harm competition reinforce, rather than undercut,
the appropriateness of continuing to rely on the Vertical Merger
Guidelines as a basis for determining whether a vertical merger is likely to
harm competition. Although many questions remain with respect to
vertical integration, the Guidelines continue to represent the underlying
economic consensus and as a result constitute an appropriate starting point
for evaluating the effect that vertical integration is likely to have on
competition.

141 Professor Louis Kaplow’s pathbreaking analysis of the Chicago School’s critique of
leveraging is not to the contrary. By identifying particular circumstances in which leverage could harm
competition, his article was meant to “establish[ ] only that leverage must be taken seriously; other
explanations offered by the critics of leverage theory to explain restrictive practices are not ruled out.”
Kaplow, supra note 61, at 516.
142 See Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 533, 540-41 (noting that their approach called
for a structural evaluation of concentration and barriers to entry similar to that followed by the Vertical
Merger Guidelines); see also Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 137, at 284-85 (calling their theory
“broadly consistent” and “fundamentally consistent” with the Vertical Merger Guidelines).
143 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 137, at 284-85.
144 See id. at 255-58, 289.
145 See id. at 261-62 (referring to HHI levels of “1000 (or 1800)”).
146 See Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 682-83 (noting that one post-Chicago model
suggests that another numerical standard might be appropriate without suggesting any alternative).
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Applying the Basic Economic Framework to the Chain Broadcasting
Rules

The tripartite approach taken by the Vertical Merger Guidelines thus
provides an appropriate basis for evaluating whether vertical integration
can plausibly pose the threat to competition that the FCC envisioned when
it enacted the Chain Broadcasting Rules. As noted earlier, the FCC’s
central concerns were that the broadcast networks would be able to use
their dominance over the wholesale level of production to harm
competition at the retail level of production and to lock up local broadcast
stations in ways that would forestall the emergence of new networks.
Under the framework established by the Vertical Merger Guidelines, the
market for networks represents the primary market, and the market for
broadcast stations represents the secondary market. For vertical integration
to pose a sufficient danger, then, (1) the market for networks must be
concentrated, (2) the market for broadcast stations must also be
concentrated and protected by barriers to entry, and (3) there must be no
plausible efficiencies resulting from network ownership of broadcast
stations. A systematic evaluation of each of these criteria reveals that none
of them are met. As such, under the Guidelines approach, vertical
integration between broadcast networks and local broadcast stations is
insufficiently likely to produce the type of anti-competitive effects that
would justify imposing a blanket prohibition on vertical integration of the
type embodied in the Chain Broadcasting Rules.
1.

Concentration in the Market for Television Networks

The first step in determining whether vertical integration between
broadcast networks and broadcast stations will have anti-competitive
effects is evaluating whether the market for networks is concentrated. The
key to evaluating the degree of concentration in a particular market is
product market definition. As the D.C. Circuit has noted, “entertainment is
an industry in which antitrust concepts such as product market . . . are
exceptionally difficult to apply.”147 Policymakers and commentators have
long debated whether such alternative media as print and videocassette
recorders should be regarded as substitutes for broadcast programming.148
147 National Ass’n of Theater Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
148 See Syracuse Peace Coun., 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5053-54, ¶¶ 66-72 (1987) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order); Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations Concerning
the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 198-219, ¶¶ 85-128
(1985) (Report); Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the
Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. Stations, 100
F.C.C.2d 17, 25-26, ¶¶ 25-26 (1984) (Report and Order); Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
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I leave resolution of such complex issues for another day. To simplify the
analysis, I will take the less controversial tack of focusing solely on
alternative sources of television programming that more clearly represent
substitutes for the original broadcast television networks.
Even the casual observer is no doubt well aware that the market for
television broadcast networks has undergone a significant degree of
deconcentration in recent years. The last fifteen years have witnessed the
arrival of Fox as a fourth major television network strong enough to
produce such hit shows as “The Simpsons” and “The X-Files” as well as
capture such marquee properties such as the NFL. Three other fledgling
networks—UPN, WB, and PaxTV—have also joined the fray. In addition,
the last thirty years have witnessed an explosion of independent television
stations that offer still more programming in direct competition with the
broadcast networks.149 As a result, even if the relevant market were limited
solely to the market for broadcast television, it appears that the market is
too unconcentrated to permit the networks to harm competition in the
market for local television stations.150
It is likely, however, that restricting our focus to other broadcast
television networks would be too narrow. Proper market definition
requires the inclusion of products that act as substitutes for broadcast
networks as well. It now seems relatively clear that broadcast television
networks compete directly with television networks transmitted via cable,
direct broadcast satellites (“DBS”), and similar technologies (which the
federal statutes term multichannel video programming distributors or
“MVPDs”).151 As the FCC’s most recent Annual Report on Competition in
Video Markets reveals, cable television is now essentially universally
available, with cable lines passing ninety-seven percent of all households
nationwide,152 and DBS is available to any home with a clear line of sight

73.636 of the Comm’n’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad.
Stations, 95 F.C.C.2d 360, 387-89 & n.101 (1983) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); JONATHAN LEVY
& FLORENCE SETZER, MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION IN HOME VIDEO MARKETS 51-53 (FCC
Off. of Plans & Policy Staff Report, Dec. 23, 1982); Lawrence P. Blaskopf, Note, Defining the
Relevant Product Market of the New Video Technologies, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 75 (1985);
Harry Boadwee, Note, Product Market Definition for Video Programming, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1210,
1210 & nn.3-4 (1986).
149 Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, 560-61, ¶¶ 27-29 (1995)
(Report and Order).
150 See id. at 562 n.64 (noting that the HHI for national prime-time broadcast television
program distribution was 1366).
151 For a description of the various MVPDs, which also include home satellite dishes
(“HSD”), multichannel multipoint distribution systems (“MMDS”), satellite master antenna television
systems (“SMATV”), open video systems (“OVS”), see Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Mkts. for the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC 01-389, slip op., at 10-54, ¶¶
15-115 (F.C.C. rel. Jan. 14, 2002) (Eighth Annual Report), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-389A1.pdf [hereinafter Eighth Annual Report].
152 Id. at 87 tbl.B-1.
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to the sky.153 Competition among MVPDs has caused them to routinely
waive installation fees and other switching costs and has driven the price
of introductory packages to as little as nine dollars per month.154 As a
result, MVPDs have now overtaken conventional broadcasting as the
predominant means for delivering television programming to the home. As
Table I indicates, eighty-six percent of U.S. households now receive their
television through cable, DBS, or some other MVPD.
.
Table I. Deployment of Multichannel Video Programming
Distribution (“MVPD”) Technologies as of June 2001
MVPD Technology
Cable
DBS
SMATV
Home Satellite Dish
MMDS
Open Video Systems
Total MVPD Households
Total TV Households

Households
(millions)

% MVPD
Households

% Total TV
Households

68.98
16.07
1.50
1.00
0.70
0.60

78.11%
18.20%
1.70%
1.13%
0.79%
0.07%

67.51%
15.73%
1.47%
0.98%
0.69%
0.06%

88.31
102.18

100.00%

86.42%
100.00%

Source: Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 95 tbl.C-1.

Indeed, the FCC has explicitly recognized that cable and broadcast
networks operate as substitutes for one another. For example, in proposing
the elimination of the two-year limit on network affiliation agreements
enacted by the Chain Broadcasting Rules, the FCC recognized that the
emergence of alternative video delivery systems had subjected the

153 Id. at 56, ¶ 122. The only significant remaining impediment to MVPD deployment is the
inability of cable and DBS operators to reach residents living in large apartment buildings, which the
FCC terms multiple dwelling units or MDUs. Id. at 57-60, ¶¶ 124-36. The FCC has taken steps to
increase MVPD access to MDU residents and is currently considering what additional steps may be
necessary. See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecomms. Mkts., 15 F.C.C.R. 22,983
(2000) (First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in WT Docket No. 99-217,
Fifth Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, and Fourth
Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order in CC Docket No. 88-57); Implementation of
Section 207 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 23,874 (1998) (Second Report and Order);
Telecomms. Servs. Inside Wiring, 13 F.C.C.R. 3659 (1997) (Report and Order and Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
154 See Dish Network, Dish Network Special Offers, at http://www.dishnetwork.com/
content/promotions/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 12, 2001).
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established broadcast networks to increasingly vigorous competition.155
The FCC reconfirmed this conclusion when repealing the two-year limit
the following year.156 Similarly, when eliminating the Chain Broadcasting
Rules’ prohibition of network ownership of certain local broadcast
stations, the FCC relied in part on the emergence of cable and DBS as
viable alternatives to conventional over-the-air television broadcasting.157
Given the high degree of penetration achieved by the MVPDs and the
FCC’s recent regulatory decisions recognizing the interchangeability of the
various video technologies, it seems relatively clear that cable television,
DBS, and other MVPDs should be included in the same product market as
conventional broadcasting.
Once cable and the other MVPDs are included in the same product
market as broadcast networks, the task becomes one of computing the
relevant HHIs. Practical limitations lead me to include only those firms
already participating in the relevant markets. The FCC is currently
exploring whether focusing solely on current market participants
understates the competitiveness of particular markets, since doing so
ignores the fact that any attempt to increase price can often induce existing
players to expand output as well as attract entry by new firms.158 Since any
such entry would only increase the competitiveness of the market,
calculating HHIs on the basis of the current market can provide a useful
baseline for evaluating a market’s competitiveness. If HHIs calculated in
this manner fall below the HHI thresholds identified by the Vertical
Merger Guidelines, there would appear to be little basis for regulatory
concern.
Although it is conventional to calculate HHIs using product share, the
Guidelines issued by the Justice Department and the FTC to govern
horizontal mergers indicate that dollar sales may be more appropriate

155 Review of Rules and Polices Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations:
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5681, 5682, ¶ 18
(1988) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
156 See Review of Rules and Policies Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations:
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2757, ¶ 15
(1989) (Report and Order).
157 Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R. 4538,
4540, ¶ 10 (1995) (Report and Order).
158 Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 65, ¶ 154; see also Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, supra note 124, § 1.32 (recognizing that well-defined product market includes firms that
would enter in response to an increase in price). This revised approach would better incorporate the
core insights of “contestability” theory, which recognizes that the threat of potential entry can
discipline a market as effectively as competition from current market participants. Even markets that
are heavily concentrated may nonetheless be efficient so long as barriers to entry and exit are low. See
generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). For a compact overview of contestability theory,
see Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1
YALE J. ON REG. 111, 111-22 (1984).
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when products are differentiated.159 Consequently, I will estimate HHIs
using both dollar and audience share. Several considerations can make
calculating HHIs in the television industry quite tricky. Since certain cable
networks are jointly owned by several entities, it can be difficult to
determine how to attribute ownership interests.160 In addition, practical
considerations have forced me to base my analysis solely on published,
non-proprietary information. The following analysis is thus offered as a
rough-and-ready approximation of a true HHI. While a more refined
analysis would doubtlessly be better, I believe that these calculations are
sufficient to provide a working understanding of whether the market for
television networks is sufficiently concentrated to support claims that
vertical integration involving that market would harm competition. To give
the Chain Broadcasting Rules the widest possible berth, I attempted to
resolve all ambiguities in a way that maximized the effect on total HHI.
Although the issue is a close one, analyzed in terms of viewership
shares it appears that the market for television networks does not meet the
standard of concentration articulated in the Vertical Merger Guidelines to
raise the danger that the broadcast networks will be able to exert market
power against local broadcast stations. An analysis of the market for
television networks in terms of dollar share leads to the same conclusion.

159 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 124, § 1.41. A growing number of scholars
have questioned the appropriateness of using HHIs when products are differentiated. See Jerry A.
Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real
World Data, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 321, 337-38 (1997); Thomas Overstreet et al., Understanding
Econometric Analysis of the Price Effects of Mergers Involving Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST,
Summer 1996, at 30-31; Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products
Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 368-69
(1997); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products
Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 407, 423-24 (1994). It should be
noted that such concerns were raised in the context of horizontal rather than vertical integration. In
addition, although senior Justice Department officials acknowledge these problems, they still continue
to advocate the use of HHIs. See Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST,
Spring 1996, at 23, 28-29.
160 The FCC has traditionally taken a conservative approach to attribution, tending to regard
equity positions as low as five percent as constituting an attributable interest. 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.912 note
1(a), 73.3555 note 2(a), 76.501 note 2(a) (2000). The problem is that, while this approach may be
appropriately conservative in the context in which it has been applied, when calculating HHIs, taking a
broad approach to attribution may understate the degree of industry concentration. This is because
allowing control of a particular group of viewers to be counted as part of the audience of more than
one network tends to double count viewers in ways that makes market shares appear artificially low.
For general commentary on the problems associated with partial integration, see Timothy F. Bresnahan
& Steven C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 155 (1986); Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial
Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 594-98 (2000); and
Janusz A. Ordover & Carl Shapiro, The General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture: An Economic
Assessment, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1167, 1189-94 (1985).
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Table II. Concentration of the Market for Television Networks by
Audience Share as of November 2000
Network Owner

Rating

Share

HHI

Viacom, Inc.
Walt Disney Co.
News Corp.
General Electric Co.
AOL Time Warner Inc.
Liberty Media Corp.
USA Networks, Inc.
Other

16.6
16.3
9.9
9.8
8.2
4.8
2.7
2.5

23%
23%
14%
14%
12%
7%
4%
4%

550
530
196
192
134
46
15
4

Total

70.2

100%

1667

Source: Appendix A.

Table III. Concentration of the Market for Television Networks by
Dollar Share as of 2000
Network Owner
Walt Disney Co.
Viacom, Inc.
General Electric Co.
AOL-Time Warner Inc.
Liberty Media Corp.
News Corp.
USA Networks, Inc.
Other
Total

Revenue
($ in billions)

Share

HHI

8.1
6.1
5.2
4.9
4.7
2.4
2.3
0.5

24%
18%
15%
14%
14%
7%
7%
1%

565
316
233
207
188
49
45
2

34.2

100%

1605

Source: Appendix B.

The FCC has drawn the same conclusion in its recent regulatory
decisions. For example, in eliminating the term of affiliation rule in 1988,
the FCC concluded that the emergence of new broadcast stations, as well
as the emergence of cable television, substantially mitigated the possibility
that a broadcast network would be able to use its market position to harm
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competition.161 Similarly, in its 1995 action to eliminate the Prime Time
Access Rule, the FCC concluded that the increase in the number of
broadcast television networks had so deconcentrated the market that it was
no longer necessary to protect local television affiliates against possible
dominance by the broadcast networks.162 As a result, the FCC concluded
that the market for broadcast television networks was too unconcentrated
to permit any network to dominate the market for video programming
distribution.163 The subsequent emergence of DBS and other alternative
sources of video programming will only further erode the position of the
broadcast networks.
2.

Concentration and Barriers to Entry in the Market for Home
Delivery of Television Programming

In order for vertical integration to harm competition, the Vertical
Merger Guidelines require more than just concentration in the primary
market; the secondary market must also be susceptible to monopolization.
There is reason to doubt that the market for local broadcast stations is
sufficiently concentrated to raise this type of risk. The FCC’s Network
Inquiry Staff concluded in 1980 that the market for broadcast television
stations was sufficiently unconcentrated as to render any attempt at
foreclosure unprofitable.164 At the time, the average U.S. household could
receive 3.9 over-the-air television stations.165 By the year 2000, the
number of stations received by the average household had increased to
thirteen, a more than threefold increase over the number found
unconcentrated twenty years earlier.166 Furthermore, since that time
technological change has deconcentrated the market and lowered the
161 Review of Rules and Policies Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations:
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2757, ¶¶
14-16 (1989) (Report and Order).
162 Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, 562 n.64 (1995) (Report and
Order) (noting that the HHI for national prime-time broadcast television program distribution was
1366).
163 Id. at 556, ¶ 20. The FCC drew a similar conclusion in the proceedings that led to the
repeal of the financial interest and syndication rules (“finsyn”). See Review of the Syndication and Fin.
Interest Rules, Sections 73.659-73.663 of the Comm’n’s Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,165, 12,170, ¶¶ 26-27
(1995) (Report and Order); Evaluation of the Syndication and Fin. Interest Rules, 8 F.C.C.R. 3282,
3296, ¶¶ 43-50 (1993) (Second Report and Order); Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(i) and (ii),
Syndication and Fin. Interest Rules, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, 1052, ¶¶ 124-25 (1983) (Tentative Decision
and Request for Further Comments).
164 MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra note 32, at 60, 72-73, 169.
165 Review of Rules and Polices Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations:
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5681, 5685, ¶ 17
(1988) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
166 See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R.
11,058, 11,064, ¶ 9 (2000) (Biennial Review Report).

212

Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy
barriers to entry still further. As noted earlier, cable television and other
forms of multichannel video programming distribution have emerged as
real alternatives to broadcasting and have captured eighty-six percent of all
U.S. households.
Any remaining doubts are likely to be shattered by the imminent
arrival of digital television, which is scheduled to completely supplant the
current regime of analog transmission by the end of 2006.167 Although
early analyses assumed that digital broadcasters would transmit a single
channel of high definition television, it is now clear that a digital television
station also has the option to broadcast up to six standard definition digital
channels in the same amount of spectrum.168 The prospect of the average
household being able to receive more than seventy over-the-air broadcast
channels seems to all but guarantee that the local video distribution
markets will continue to be too unconcentrated for any degree of vertical
integration between a television network and its broadcast affiliates to
harm competition.
3.

Potential Efficiency Justifications

The final step in the economic analysis of vertical integration in the
broadcast television industry is an evaluation of possible efficiency
justifications that would justify permitting such integration to occur. An
analysis of the cost structure associated with producing and transmitting
television programming reveals that it is quite possible that broadcast
television networks will be able to realize significant economies from
vertical integration. As the following section will discuss in detail, the
combination of large, up-front fixed costs associated with creating the first
copy of television programs and minimal costs associated with distributing
167 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A) (2001). The statute extends this date if fewer than eighty-five
percent of the station’s viewers can receive the broadcaster’s digital signal either off-air or through
satellite or cable television. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(B) (2001). There are those that doubt whether
sufficient digital televisions will be sold to meet this standard.
168 As the FCC has noted:
In addition to being able to broadcast one, and under some circumstances two, high
definition television (“HDTV”) programs, the [digital television] Standard allows for
multiple streams, or “multicasting,” of Standard Definition Television (“SDTV”)
programming at a visual quality better than the current analog signal. Utilizing this
Standard, broadcasters can transmit three, four, five, or more such programs streams
simultaneously.
Advanced Television Syss. and their Impact Upon the Existing Television Broad. Serv., 11 F.C.C.R.
17,771, 17,772, ¶ 5 (1996) (Fourth Report and Order), modified, 12 F.C.C.R. 3388 (1997) (Order);
accord Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing “Must-Carry” Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (1997), 8
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 145 (2000) (“TV licensees have the option of either broadcasting a high
definition TV (HDTV) signal or multiplexing channel broadcasts to produce multiple digital standarddefinition television (SDTV) signals, which could accommodate four to six SDTV sub-channels or
more.”) (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COMPLETING THE TRANSITION TO DIGITAL
TELEVISION (1999)).
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programs to additional viewers give television programming many of the
attributes of a pure public good.169 The existence of high initial fixed costs
leaves broadcast networks quite vulnerable to opportunistic behavior.
Broadcast networks can eliminate these problems by using vertical
integration to guarantee that they will have access to audiences for their
programs. In addition, television programming has other qualities that
increase the transaction costs associated with program distribution still
further. The existence of these features makes it quite possible that vertical
integration will yield benefits sufficient to justify releasing the industry
from the strictures of the Chain Broadcasting Rules.
a.

Elimination of Double Marginalization and Static
Transaction Costs

The most singular economic feature of the broadcast industry is its
unique cost structure. Specifically, the creation of television programming
requires the incurrence of large, up-front, first-copy costs, while the cost of
making and distributing additional copies is trivial in comparison. Since
marginal costs are close to zero, vertical integration can allow firms to
mitigate the problems of double marginalization by charging a more
economically efficient transfer price. In addition, this cost structure causes
average cost to decline over all relevant volumes, as the large up-front
investments are amortized over an increasingly large number of viewers.
When faced with such a declining cost structure, economic efficiency
increases with every additional viewer reached. Broadcast programming
thus exhibits a natural tendency to seek as broad an audience as possible.
This does not mean that all programs must secure universal distribution in
order to survive or even that those programs that do achieve nationwide
distribution must achieve dominant shares. On the contrary, the economic
evidence suggests that programming is not a natural monopoly and that the
minimum viable scale for broadcast programming is relatively small when
compared to the nationwide audience. What it does mean is that broadcast
programming will naturally exhibit a tendency towards an equilibrium
level of distrubtion that is fairly widescale.170 The logical way for a
network to secure such access would be for it to vertically integrate into
the downstream stage or to negotiate contracts with its broadcast affiliates
guaranteeing it the ability to reach a large enough audience to lower its
costs. It also means that artificial barriers that prevent programming from
169
170

BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 23-24 (1992).
NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 398 & n.185, 519; MISREGULATING
TELEVISION, supra note 32, at 5; Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC
Regulatory Authority over Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77
NW. U. L. REV. 403, 408 (1982).
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securing its natural level of distribution can cause investment in
programming to fall below efficient levels. The Chain Broadcasting Rules
represent a significant obstacle to networks seeking to guarantee access to
viewers.
b.

Elimination of Strategic Behavior

In addition, the broadcast market is susceptible to all three types of
opportunistic behavior identified above. Specifically, the existence of
large, up-front fixed costs leaves networks vulnerable to the problems
associated with hold up and free riding. In addition, the fact that the
popularity of a particular television program is notoriously hard to
determine ex ante leaves networks vulnerable to adverse selection.
Unfortunately, the Chain Broadcasting Rules prevent networks from using
vertical integration or a related vertical contractual restraint to minimize or
even eliminate these problems.
Hold Up. The sunk cost investment needed to create original
television programming exposes broadcast networks to the possibility of
being held up. Networks, of course, will not invest in programming unless
it is likely that they will be able to recover both the fixed costs associated
with creating the programming, as well as the marginal costs of
distribution. Once the first-copy costs are sunk, however, it is possible for
broadcast stations to hold out in an attempt to avoid having to contribute to
fixed costs. The classic way to deter hold up behavior is either to vertically
integrate into retail distribution or to enter into a long-term contract or
some other contractual device that brings the interests of both parties into
alignment. Unfortunately, this is precisely the type of contract barred by
the Chain Broadcasting Rules.
Free Riding. The network-affiliate relationship is also potentially
fraught with free rider problems. Recall that the value of a program is
determined in no small part by the network’s ability to reach the largest
audience possible. Network profitability thus depends upon the willingness
of affiliates to “clear” programs provided by the network, since doing so
allows the first-copy costs to be spread across the largest possible
audience. Because of this, the value of the network to the local broadcast
affiliates depends upon the behavior of other affiliates, since the refusal by
any affiliate to carry a program offered by the network causes the fixed
costs to be spread over a smaller number of viewers. So long as this danger
exists, networks will factor the risk of non-carriage into their initial
decision to invest in programming. As the networks’ willingness to invest
in programming decreases, so does the profitability of the local broadcast
station. In other words, each affiliate’s programming decisions can impose
significant negative externalities on other affiliates, as greater defections
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lead to inefficient program distribution and lower overall investments in
programming.
The ideal situation for a network affiliate, however, is to refuse to
carry the least profitable programming provided by the network and to
contribute as little as possible to the fixed costs associated with creating
the programming. In effect, a station has the incentive to attempt to free
ride on the willingness of other affiliates to bear the costs associated with
creating and maintaining the network. Since all of the affiliates have the
same incentives in this regard, absent coordination sufficient to solve this
collective action problem, the affiliates will defect at an inefficiently high
rate. This will lead to an inefficient level of program distribution, which
will in turn create inefficiently low levels of investment in programming.
All of this could be solved by allowing networks to protect against
such free riding either by vertically integrating into the retail distribution
stage or by entering into affiliation agreements that limit an affiliate’s
ability to refuse to carry network programming. Doing so would not only
create a sounder financial basis for investment in the abstract, it would also
decrease the likelihood that an affiliate could free ride on fellow
affiliates.171 Again, the Chain Broadcasting Rules effectively prevent
television networks from availing themselves of either option.
Adverse Selection.
Another feature of the network-affiliate
relationships is the potential for adverse selection. As discussed earlier,
adverse selection arises when the quality of a product varies and is hard to
determine in advance. Customers looking to purchase such products have
the incentive to search to find the highest quality goods. The customer who
succeeds in finding such goods receives a windfall, having received goods
of above average quality without having to pay more than the average
price. In addition, the seller will be left with an inventory of below average
goods that it will be unable to sell at the average price. The need to avoid
this will lead to oversearching, as sellers invest additional resources in presorting the goods and pricing them at different points and buyers invest
additional resources inspecting the goods in an attempt to gain an
information advantage over each other.
Television programming bears all of the characteristics of a classic
adverse selection problem. As noted earlier, the quality of goods varies
and is very hard to determine ex ante when the initial investment in
creating the program is made.172 The networks could avoid adverse
selection problems either by vertically integrating, by entering into an
exclusive dealing arrangement,173 or by bundling programs together in a
171 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 171-72.
172 See id. at 164; see also Kenney & Klein, supra note 100, at 534 (noting that the value of
movies can be hard to determine in advance).
173 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 163.
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way that forces the local broadcast affiliates to focus on the average
quality of the programs.174 Unfortunately, the existing prohibitions on
option time and mandatory clearance included in the Chain Broadcasting
Rules prevent networks from fully mitigating these problems in this
manner.
There are thus several plausible arguments that permitting vertical
integration in the broadcast industry would allow firms to realize
efficiencies. As noted earlier, for the purposes of my argument, it is not
necessary to establish that such efficiencies actually exist in all cases with
respect to broadcasting. The key question underlying the choice between a
per se and a rule of reason approach is whether such efficiencies are so
implausible and the practice in question so inherently suspect that little
would be served by evaluating whether any such efficiencies actually exist
in a particular case. It thus suffices to conclude that the danger of
anticompetitive effects seems so remote and the potential efficiencies seem
sufficiently plausible to justify rejecting flat regulatory prohibition of
vertical integration in the broadcasting industry.
D. The Future of the Chain Broadcasting Rules
The foregoing analysis reveals that the market for broadcast networks
and the market for broadcast stations are both sufficiently unconcentrated
and unprotected by barriers to entry as to make it unlikely that any
television network could use vertical integration in a way that could harm
competition. Furthermore, it appears that vertical integration could yield
significant efficiency benefits. The problem, as one group of distinguished
commentators has noted, is that the “the network-affiliate relationship is
overregulated” and that the FCC’s focus on the supposed exclusionary
danger of the practices of the broadcast networks “has been so singleminded as to induce a form of regulatory paranoia.”175 These
commentators argued that the Chain Broadcasting Rules should therefore
be abolished.
The FCC agreed up to a point. For example, in 1989, the FCC
eliminated the rule limiting the term of network affiliation agreements to
two years.176 The FCC concluded that increases in the number of
independent television stations and the emergence of cable television
rendered it extremely unlikely that the use of long-term contracts posed a
174 Cf. NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 240-41; Kenney & Klein, supra note
100, at 505.
175 MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra note 32, at 92.
176 Review of Rules and Policies Concerning Network Broad. by Television Stations:
Elimination or Modification of Section 73.658(c) of the Comm’n’s Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 2755 (1989)
(Report and Order).
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significant threat to competition.177 The FCC further concluded that, by
limiting the networks’ ability to obtain guaranteed access to programming
outlets, the rule was discouraging the networks from investing in television
programming.178 Moreover, since the program production and acquisition
cycle often exceeded two years, the rule left the networks in the position of
having to invest in programming without any ability to control or predict
the size and location of the audience that would eventually be able to see
the program.179 The reduction in uncertainty would likely be especially
beneficial to new networks, which confront significantly higher risks than
established networks. Ironically, the FCC concluded, the term of affiliation
rule “‘may actually have the perverse effect of impeding new network
entry, without providing any countervailing benefits.’”180
In 1995, the FCC also eliminated the provision of the Chain
Broadcasting Rules that prohibited networks from owning stations in small
communities.181 The FCC concluded that the increase in competition for
television from new networks and the emergence of cable and DBS
rendered it unlikely that any such vertical integration would harm
competition.182 On the contrary, vertical integration offered networks the
chance to take advantage of managerial, technical, and other efficiencies
that would improve the financial viability and competitiveness of
television broadcast stations in small markets.183
The drive to repeal the Chain Broadcasting Rules eventually stalled,
however, as a proceeding to repeal the remaining provisions of the Chain
Broadcasting Rules has remained open without action since 1995.184 As a
result, the rules prohibiting exclusive affiliation agreements, territorial
exclusivity, compulsory carriage, and option time remain in force today.185
Therefore, despite the fact that the structure of the relevant markets is such
that additional degrees of vertical integration would pose little threat to
competition, broadcast networks remain unable to take certain steps that
might allow them to realize all of the available efficiencies. Thus, the
continued existence of these rules not only reflects an incomplete
understanding of the economics of vertical integration, it also harms
consumers by reducing the quality of programming available on broadcast
television. It remains to be seen whether the accession of a new FCC
177 Id. at 2757, ¶¶ 14-16.
178 Id. at 2757, ¶ 17.
179 Id. at 2757, ¶ 18.
180 Id. at 2757, ¶ 17 (quoting NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 486).
181 Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Television Broad., 10 F.C.C.R. 4538
(1995) (Report and Order).
182 Id. at 4539-40, ¶¶ 8, 10.
183 Id. at 4540, ¶ 11.
184 See Review of the Comm’n’s Regulations Governing Programming Practices of Broad.
Television Networks and Affiliates, 10 F.C.C.R. 11,951 (1995) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
185 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2001).
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Chairman will spark new interest in bringing this proceeding to
completion.
Recent events have also placed renewed focus on the other set of
regulations primarily responsible for blocking vertical integration by the
broadcast networks. The FCC recently denied the broadcast networks’
request that it repeal the rule prohibiting persons from owning stations
capable of reaching more than thirty-five percent of the nationwide
audience.186 The FCC agreed to refrain from enforcing that rule until a
pending judicial challenge to that decision was completed.187 In the
meantime, the issue created a major schism within the National
Association of Broadcasters, as both NBC and Fox have withdrawn to
protest the Association’s refusal to support lifting the thirty-five percent
national audience cap.188 As this Article was going to press, the D.C.
Circuit struck down the national audience cap as arbitrary and capricious
as well as a violation of the FCC’s statutory mandate.189 Given the salience
of this issue, it is quite possible that proceedings in connection with the
national ownership caps will provide policy makers with an opportunity to
rethink their approach to regulating vertical integration in the broadcast
industry.
II.

The 1992 Cable Act and the Dynamic Inefficiency of Compelled
Access

Anyone who peruses the findings and the legislative history of the
1992 Cable Act will easily discern that its enactment was animated in no
small part by concern over the increase in vertical integration in the cable
industry that was taking place at that time.190 Some of its provisions
imposed ownership restrictions similar to those appearing in the regulatory
186 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules
and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058,
11,072-74, ¶¶ 25-30 (2000) (Biennial Review Report).
187 See UTV of San Francisco, Inc., 16 F.C.C.R. 14,975, 14,982, ¶ 25 (2001). The FCC’s
action followed an initial refusal to suspend the national ownership restrictions for broadcasting in the
wake of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001), which overturned a similar national ownership restriction for
cable. See Applications of Shareholders of CBS Corp., 16 F.C.C.R. 5831 (2001).
188 Paige Albiniak, Fox Bows Out of NAB, BROAD. & CABLE, June 14, 1999, at 15; Paige
Albiniak, Peacock Finally Flies NAB, BROAD. & CABLE, Mar. 13, 2000, at 20.
189 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 00-1222 et al., 2002 WL 233650, at *10*16 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2002).
190 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-61 (entering legislative findings about the harms associated
with vertical integration in the cable industry); id. § 2(b)(5), 106 Stat. at 1463 (stating that it is the
policy of Congress to “ensure that cable television operators do not have undue market power vis-à-vis
video programmers and consumers”); S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 23-32 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1156-65 (reviewing the problems caused by vertical integration in the cable
industry).
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regime governing broadcasting. Most distinctive about the approach taken
by the 1992 Cable Act was its greater emphasis on a different regulatory
device—compelled access requirements—to redress the problems of
vertical integration.191
This Part will evaluate the policy underlying the restrictions on
vertical integration contained in the 1992 Cable Act by assessing the
extent to which vertical integration in the cable industry poses a sufficient
threat to competition. Section A will describe the basic structure of the
cable television industry and the regulatory scheme erected by the 1992
Cable Act. Section B will apply the basic economic approach developed in
Part I to the cable television industry in order to assess the extent to which
vertical integration in the cable industry poses a real threat to competition.
Section C will examine the unique problems posed by access as a remedy
to the problems of vertical integration. A review of the academic literature
reveals that compelled access is quite problematic as a remedy to vertical
integration. Section D will review the prospects for changes to the existing
regulatory regime.
A. Description of the Cable Industry and the Regulatory Restrictions on
Vertical Integration
1.

The Structure of the Cable Industry

Just like broadcasting, the cable industry can be mapped onto the
basic three-stage chain of production comprised of manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers that typifies the distribution of many, if not most,
physical goods in the U.S. economy.192 As was the case in broadcasting,
the manufacturing stage is again occupied by the movie studios and others
191 Although broadcast regulation did include some access requirements, those were
restricted to political speech and were motivated primarily by the desire to promote free speech and to
improve the functioning of the political process. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (1994); see also Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (describing the now defunct Fairness Doctrine, Political
Editorial Rule, and Personal Attack Rule). Competition policy in general, and vertical integration in
particular, did not appear to be a motivation behind the access requirements imposed on broadcasters.
192 LEVY & SETZER, supra note 148, at 39-40; see Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Video
Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the Movie Channel as a Case Study, in VIDEO MEDIA
COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 338, 347-48 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1985). It
is more natural to conceive of the relationship between the wholesale and retail stages of the cable
industry as a purely vertical relationship than it is with respect to broadcasting, in which the wholesale
and retail stages are also horizontal competitors for advertising dollars. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text. This is because, unlike in broadcasting, viewers are able to signal the intensity of
their preferences through direct payments. As a result, advertising represents a nearly inconsequential
amount of the revenue at the retail stage of the chain of production. See Michael G. Vita & John P.
Wiegand, Must-Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Economic Policy Analysis, 37 J.
BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 1 (1993) (reporting that advertising represents on average only 1.8% of a
cable operator’s total revenue).
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who create original television programming, as well as syndicators and
others who hold the rights to programming that has already been produced.
The wholesale stage is represented by the cable networks (such as
Lifetime, TBS, the USA Network, Nickelodeon, A&E, and the Discovery
Channel), which acquire the right to air programs and aggregate them into
program packages. Integration between the manufacturing and wholesale
stage is quite common in cable, with such popular networks such as CNN
and ESPN airing high percentages of programming that they produce
themselves. Because these functions are not as distinct as they generally
are in broadcasting, producers of original programming and cable
networks are often collectively referred to as “cable programmers.”193
The retail stage of the cable industry consists of local “cable
operators,” who receive licenses from municipal governments to operate
the web of coaxial cables connecting individual homes and for transmitting
the television programming into those homes.194 A company that controls
cable operators in more than one city is called a “multiple system
operator” (“MSO”). The largest MSOs in the U.S. include AT&T
Broadband, Time Warner Cable, Comcast Cable Communications, Charter
Communications,
Cox
Communications,
and
Adelphia
Communications.195
Historically, many of the largest MSOs have vertically integrated into
cable programming. For example, the second-largest MSO, AOL-Time
Warner, also controls a number of major cable networks, including TBS,
CNN, TNT, the Cartoon Network, HBO, and Cinemax. The third-largest
MSO, Comcast Communications, also runs a family of cable networks that
includes QVC, E!, and the Golf Channel. The largest MSO in the U.S.,
AT&T Broadband, similarly held major equity positions in a number of
cable networks until it completed its spin-off of Liberty Media on August
10, 2001. Cable networks that are under the same corporate umbrella as a
particular cable operator are called “affiliated programmers.” Cable
networks with which a cable operator has no vertical relationship are
called “unaffiliated programmers.”
2.

Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act Affecting Vertical Integration

The 1992 Cable Act contained a variety of measures designed to curb
the supposed dangers posed by vertical integration in the cable industry.
Many of these took the now familiar form of ownership limits and
structural restrictions. For example, Congress enacted the so-called
193 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 628 (1994).
194 Id.
195 See National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Top 25 MSOs (June 30, 2001),
at http://www.ncta.com/industry_overview/top50mso.cfm.
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“channel occupancy” provision, which authorized the FCC to place limits
on the number of channels that cable operators could devote to networks
with which they are vertically affiliated.196 Initially, the FCC set this limit
at forty percent of the operator’s channel capacity, only to see that limit
invalidated by the courts.197
The 1992 Cable Act also includes the so-called “subscriber limit”
provision, which authorizes the FCC to cap the number of cable
subscribers that any MSO can reach nationwide.198 To implement this
provision, the FCC initially prohibited any MSO from servicing more than
thirty percent of all MVPD subscribers only to see those limits invalidated
as well.199 At first blush, this limit appears horizontal in focus. On closer
inspection, however, it becomes clear that that is not the case. Horizontal
integration involves a merger of direct competitors. Cable operators in
different cities, however, serve different geographic markets and as a result
do not compete with one another.200 Thus, a merger between cable
operators serving different cities is not properly regarded as a true
horizontal merger, since such a merger cannot be said to eliminate any
direct competition. The real purpose for the subscriber limits is to prevent
large MSOs from exerting too much bargaining power upstream against
cable programmers in the national market for television programming.201
Thus, the subscriber limits are more properly understood as being driven
by vertical, rather than horizontal, concerns and as focusing on the national
market in which MSOs contract with cable programmers, rather than the
local markets in which cable operators contract with end users. In addition,
even when vertical integration was permitted, the Act prohibits vertically
integrated operators from entering into exclusive dealing contracts.202
196 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (1994).
197 Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act
of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 8565, 8592-96, ¶¶ 64-70 (1993) (Second Report and Order), rev’d & remanded
sub nom. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 644 (2001). The channel occupancy limit promulgated by the FCC applied only to the first seventyfive channels of any cable operator’s capacity. Any additional channel capacity was not subject to the
limit. Id. at 8601-02, ¶ 84.
198 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (1994).
199 Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of
1992, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,119, ¶ 55 (1999). Subscribers to new cable systems and cable systems in direct
competition with other cable systems did not count against the thirty percent cap. Id. at 19,112-13, ¶¶
33-34, 37.
200 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV.
123, 168 (1996) (noting that broadcasters and cable operators in Chicago do not discipline broadcasters
and cable operators in New York in the market for selling television to viewers).
201 See Time Warner Entm’t, 211 F.3d at 1319 (noting that Congress enacted the subscriber
limits in part because of the concern that “a few dominant cable operators might preclude new
programming services from attaining the critical mass audience necessary to survive”); see also 14
F.C.C.R. at 19,116, ¶ 43.
202 The statute prohibits exclusive dealing contracts in all areas served by cable at the time
the 1992 Cable Act was passed unless the FCC determines that such contract is in the public interest.
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The most striking feature of the 1992 Cable Act is the inclusion of
several compelled access requirements. The most controversial of these
were the “must-carry” provisions, which required cable operators to
provide free carriage to all full-power stations broadcasting within the
operator’s service area.203 In addition, the “leased access” provision
requires all cable systems with more than thirty-five channels to set aside
part of their channel capacity for use by unaffiliated programmers.204
Finally, the “program access” provisions prohibit vertically integrated
programmers from refusing to deal with unaffiliated operators and from
discriminating against them in the terms and conditions of providing
programming.205
3.

The Economic Theory Underlying the Restrictions on Vertical
Integration Contained in the 1992 Cable Act

A close analysis of the rationales underlying these provisions reveals
that, in enacting them, Congress was motivated by the same type of
economic concerns that lay behind the enactment of the Chain
Broadcasting Rules. The first was the concern that vertically integrated
programmers would use the leverage provided by their monopoly position
in the retail stage to discriminate against unaffiliated cable programmers,
thereby reducing competition in the wholesale stage of production.206 For
example, there is anecdotal evidence that Time Warner was able to
47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(D), (c)(4) (1994). In all other areas, exclusive dealing contracts are absolutely
barred. Id. § 548(c)(2)(C).
203 Id. §§ 534, 535. The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act followed two
unsuccessful attempts to impose must-carry by the FCC. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC,
835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
204 The amount of channel capacity that must be set aside for leased access varies from ten to
fifteen percent, depending on the size of the cable operator. 47 U.S.C. §532(b)(1) (1994). This statute
in effect overturned a previous Supreme Court decision holding that the FCC lacked the authority to
mandate leased access. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Leased access was
originally enacted in 1984 in order to bring about the First Amendment-related concern of assuring the
availability of “the widest possible diversity of information sources” for cable subscribers. 47 U.S.C.
§ 532(a). The 1992 Cable Act added a second rationale for leased access that focused on competition.
See id. (adding that leased access was intended “to promote competition in the delivery of diverse
sources of video programming”).
205 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(2)(B) (1994). Regulators imposed similar conditions while approving
both the Time Warner-Turner Broadcasting and the Liberty-TCI mergers. See United States v. TeleCommunications, Inc., No. 94-0948, 1994 WL 904122 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 1994); Time Warner, Inc.,
123 F.T.C. 171 (1997).
206 See Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-61 (finding that vertical integration gives vertically integrated
programmers “the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programmers” and “could make it more
difficult for noncable-affiliated programmers to secure carriage on cable systems”); S. REP. NO. 10292, at 25 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1158 (noting the concern that “vertical
integration gives cable operators the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programming
services”).
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forestall NBC’s first attempt to set up a cable news network to compete
directly with CNN simply by having all of the local cable operators under
its control refuse to carry the new network. Time Warner’s cable operators
only agreed to carry what would become CNBC after NBC agreed to focus
solely on business news and not to take steps to become a general news
service.207 Since this concern focuses on the possibility that a company
could use market power in one market to attack another market, this
argument corresponds to the concerns about leverage that underlay the
Chain Broadcasting Rules.
The second was the danger that vertically affiliated programmers
would lock up key cable programmers in order to suppress the emergence
of new MVPDs that would weaken their monopoly at the retail level. The
theory is that vertically integrated programmers could create barriers to
entry to DBS systems and other potential MVPD entrants by denying them
access to key cable networks.208 For example, the fear is that AOL-Time
Warner could forestall the emergence of DBS as a competitor to its local
cable operations by refusing to allow DBS to carry CNN, TBS, HBO, or
any of the other cable networks that it controls. This concern is analogous
to the foreclosure rationale underlying the Chain Broadcasting Rules.
In rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the must carry provisions
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (“Turner II”),209 a plurality of
the Supreme Court implicitly condoned the approach to vertical integration
taken by the 1992 Cable Act. The Court concluded that Congress had
before it substantial evidence that cable operators had ample incentive to
drop local broadcasters in favor of affiliated programmers.210 The plurality
stopped short of putting its imprimatur on any particular economic theory
of vertical integration embodied in the regulations, opting instead to defer
to the judgment of Congress so long as that judgment was backed by
substantial evidence.211
207 See WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 55-56 (citing Competition, Rate
Deregulation and the Comm’n’s Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Serv., 5
F.C.C.R. 4962, 5028-29, ¶¶ 120-22 (1990) (Report) [hereinafter 1990 Report on Cable Competition]).
208 See § 2(a)(5), 106 Stat. at 1461 (finding that “[v]ertically integrated program suppliers
. . . have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated cable operators over . . . programming
distributors using other technologies”); S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 26 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1159 (noting the concern that vertically integrated cable programmers had the
incentive and the ability to forestall entry by alternative video distribution technologies by
discriminating on the price and terms of providing programs or by simply refusing to sell any
programming).
209 520 U.S. 180, 196-200 (1997) (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer declined to join this
portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion, basing his decision solely on the government’s asserted interest
in “(1) preserving the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television and (2) promoting the
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources.” Id. at 226 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210 Id. at 197-98 (plurality opinion). Additional evidence submitted in the district court
bolstered this conclusion. See id. at 200-05.
211 Id. at 208-12.
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The D.C. Circuit initially followed similar reasoning, deferring to
Congress’s choice of the appropriate economic theory when rejecting
facial challenges to the subscriber limits, channel occupancy, and program
access provisions.212 A recent decision may signal greater skepticism on
the part of the D.C. Circuit of the vertical integration theories underlying
the 1992 Cable Act. In that decision, the D.C. Circuit struck down the
FCC’s implementation of the subscriber limits and the channel occupancy
provisions on the grounds that the FCC had failed to base its decision upon
substantial evidence appearing in the administrative record.213 A fair
reading of the opinion, however, reveals that, in so holding, the D.C.
Circuit did not mean to endorse or reject any particular economic theory of
vertical integration. In ruling that the FCC had failed to base its decision
on substantial evidence, the court specifically reserved the possibility that
the FCC could rely on different theories about how vertical integration
could harm competition on remand.214
It thus appears that the courts and the FCC have yet to settle on any
particular economic theory of vertical integration with respect to cable. It
is true that the argument that vertical integration does pose a significant
threat to competition has considerable intuitive appeal. As one witness
who testified regarding the 1992 Cable Act observed, “You don’t need a
Ph.D. in Economics to figure out that the guy who controls a monopoly
conduit is in a unique position to control the flow of programming traffic
to the advantage of the program services in which he has an equity
investment . . . and to the disadvantage of those services . . . in which he
does not have an equity position.”215 Application of the analytical
framework developed in Part I reveals, however, that, in light of the
current structure of the cable industry, such anti-competitive harms,
intuitive though they may be, are unlikely to arise. Thus, it seems that,
although a Ph.D. in economics may not be necessary to understand the
problem, any serious assessment of whether vertical mergers in the cable
industry help or harm competition requires more analysis than the
testimony quoted above would suggest.

212 See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 1313, 1319-20, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(subscriber limit and channel occupancy provisions), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001); Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (vertically integrated programmer
provisions).
213 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 644 (2001).
214 Id. at 1133.
215 See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 26 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1159
(quoting testimony of Preston Padden); accord Chen, supra note 21, at 1490-91 (“The fear is
instinctive and profound: She who controls the networks of the future shall control the terms of speech.
She who owns the superhighway shall fetch whatever toll she demands.”).
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Structural Market Conditions

As the analysis contained in Part I indicates, both Chicago and postChicago School economists agree that vertical integration is unlikely to
harm competition unless certain structural preconditions of the type
identified in the Vertical Merger Guidelines are met.216 Specifically, the
Guidelines require that (1) the primary market be concentrated and that (2)
the secondary market be sufficiently concentrated and protected by
barriers to entry as to be susceptible to monopolization. Even if these
preconditions are met, the Guidelines recognize that vertical integration
might still be justified if significant efficiencies exist.
When evaluated against these standards, it becomes relatively clear
that the restrictions on vertical integration in the cable industry enacted by
the 1992 Cable Act are not economically justified. In fact, a review of the
empirical literature studying vertical integration in the cable industry
further confirms this conclusion. This Section closes by evaluating the one
economically defensible justification for prohibiting vertical integration
(i.e., preventing cable operators from evading rate regulation). I conclude
that the decline and impending demise of rate regulation of the cable
industry has already undercut the relevance of this consideration.
1.

Concentration in the Market for MVPDs

As noted earlier, the first requirement under the Vertical Merger
Guidelines is market concentration in the primary market, which in this
case is the market for delivering multichannel television programming into
the home. In order to properly make this determination, it is important to
clear up a common misconception about the proper way to analyze this
problem. This is the assumption that because cable appears to be a natural
monopoly, it is a given that the market for MVPDs is highly concentrated.
This misconception is based on the belief that the relevant market for
analysis is the local market for distributing MVPD services directly to
consumers. If this is the appropriate market, then any restrictions on
vertical integration are completely unjustified notwithstanding the fact that
many of these markets may be true monopolies. This is because the level
of vertical integration has no bearing on the real source of monopoly
power in the first instance, which is the existence of the natural monopoly
in cable distribution. Even complete vertical integration in the industry
would not have any effect on the cable operators’ monopoly power vis-àvis consumers and thus would have no effect on the prices the cable
operators charge consumers or the quantity and quality of programming
216

226

See supra Subsection I.B.1.d.
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that they provide. Thus, if the proper market is the market in which cable
operators sell MVPD services to consumers, restrictions on vertical
integration amount to little more than rearranging the deck chairs on the
Titanic, in that such restrictions would rearrange distribution patterns
without having any effect on what is causing the ship is to go down in the
first place. On the contrary, even though prohibiting vertical integration
might not provide any benefit to consumers, it could inflict considerable
harm by preventing firms from achieving certain welfare-enhancing
efficiencies.
Remembering that the central concern reflected in the provisions of
the 1992 Cable Act under discussion is the cable operators’ ability to tie up
cable networks can clear up this resulting confusion. The relevant market,
then, is not the market in which cable operators sell MVPD services
directly to consumers, a market that until recently was purely local in
scope. Properly defined, the relevant market is the one in which cable
operators purchase video programming from cable programmers, a market
that is national in scope. In this market, the fact that a particular cable
operator may have a local monopoly is irrelevant so long as each network
has access to sufficient other cities around the U.S. As I explained earlier,
this is also why I regard the subscriber limits to be primarily vertical in
focus. Although the size of a particular MSO will not affect consumer
pricing of cable services in any local market, it can affect the national
market for cable programming by limiting the size of the market available
in the event that a cable programmer is unable to strike a deal with that
MSO. Thus, the appropriate unit of analysis, then, is the national market in
which MVPDs purchase video programming from cable programmers.
As mentioned earlier, however, a properly defined product market
also includes all available substitutes.217 FCC policy has long recognized
that conventional television broadcasting can act as a substitute for cable
television, so long as there are sufficient channels operating.218 The
transition to digital television will only cause this level of competition to
increase. As noted earlier, broadcasters have the option of using their
digital channels to send up to six standard-definition digital channels
instead of transmitting a single channel of HDTV.219 Thus, if it were still
legitimate to continue to apply the standards announced by the FCC in
217 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
218 Reexamination of the Effective Competition Standard for the Regulation of Cable
Television Serv. Rates, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4547-51, ¶¶ 7-30 (1991) (Report & Order and Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (ruling that broadcast television can provide effective competition to
cable so long as viewers can receive six over-the-air channels), superseded by 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)
(1994). This overturned a previous ruling placing the threshold even lower. Implementation of the
Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,648-50 (May 2,
1985) (Report & Order) (ruling that cable operators face “effective competition” whenever they
confront at least three over-the-air broadcast stations).
219 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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1991, the presence of even a single conventional television broadcaster
may be sufficient to provide some downward price pressure on cable
operators.
In addition, Congress and the FCC have each recognized that other
MVPDs are properly considered substitutes for cable.220 Under current
law, a cable operator faces effective competition if another MVPD is
available in at least fifty percent of the cable operator’s service area and if
the MVPD actually serves at least fifteen percent of MVPD households in
that area.221 After years of unfulfilled predictions,222 DBS has finally
emerged as a viable competitor to cable, offering a similar number of
channels at roughly comparable pricing and offering an array of additional
services that cable cannot currently provide.223 In addition, the enactment
of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Amendments of 1999
(“SHVIA”) removed one of the most significant impediments to DBS
growth by permitting DBS systems to carry local broadcast stations
affiliated with the major broadcast networks.224 A recent FCC empirical
study confirmed that, contrary to the findings of studies conducted prior to
the enactment of the SHVIA,225 DBS is now acting as a substitute to cable
television service.226
220 See 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(2), (3) (1997); Reexamination of the Effective Competition
Standard for the Regulation of Cable Television Serv. Rates, 6 F.C.C.R. 4545, 4551-54, ¶¶ 31-46
(1991) (Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) (ruling that a cable
operator faces effective competition if another cable system is available in fifty percent of the area’s
households and if ten percent of those households actually subscribe).
221 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1) (1994).
222 See G. KENT WEBB, THE ECONOMICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 15-16, 181-82 (1983); Jill
A. Stern et al., The New Video Marketplace and the Search for a Coherent Regulatory Philosophy, 32
CATH. U. L. REV. 529, 541-43 (1983); Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends—Part I: Why Can't
Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 254-55 (1987).
223 DirecTV’s basic package currently offers 105 channels for $31.99/month, a price that is
quite comparable to that charged by conventional cable services. DirecTV is also able to offer a wider
array of movie and sports offerings than conventional cable systems. See DirecTV, DirecTV Packages,
at http://www.directv.com/packages/packagespages/0,1336,516,00.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2001).
The Dish Network, run by Echostar, typically prices its basic 50-channel service at $21.99/month and
its 100-channel service at $30.99. At the time of this writing, the Dish Network was offering a
promotional price of $9.00/month with free installation on its 100-channel service. Dish Network, Dish
Network Special Offers, at http://www.dishnetwork.com/content/promotions/index.shtml (last visited
Dec. 12, 2001).
224 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122 (Supp. V 1999).
225 See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video
Programming, 15 F.C.C.R. 978, 1012-13, ¶¶ 71, 73 (2000) (Sixth Annual Report) [hereinafter Sixth
Annual Report]; AUSTAN GOOLSBEE & AMIL PETRIN, THE CONSUMER GAINS FROM DIRECT
BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE COMPETITION WITH CABLE TELEVISION 4, 27-28, 32 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8317, May 29, 2001), available at
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/austan.goolsbee/research/satfin.pdf.
226 Specifically, the empirical analysis in the FCC’s 2000 Report on Cable Industry Prices
concluded that the demand for cable is somewhat price elastic, which suggests that there are substitutes
for cable service. Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363, ¶ 48 (2001) (Report on Cable Industry Prices). The
addition of a DBS coefficient to the model confirmed that DBS was in fact a substitute for cable
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The effect has been striking. For the last several years, DBS
subscribership has grown at a rate nearly twenty times that of cable
subscribership. As Table I indicates,227 on a national level, DBS has now
surpassed the level required by Congress to represent effective competition
to cable operators, capturing eighteen percent of the MVPD market.228
Since DBS is in essence available to all U.S. households, the national
numbers suggest that cable operators probably face effective competition
in a large number of communities throughout the country. It appears to just
be a matter of time until the monopoly control that cable operators have
long exerted over the MVPD market completely erodes.
When DBS is included in the same product market as cable, it
becomes clear that the MVPD market is too unconcentrated to support a
credible leveraging argument. Once DBS and other MVPDs are included,
the HHI of the national market for the purchase of video programming
drops to 905, a level considered unconcentrated under the merger
guidelines.229
It thus appears that the national market for MVPDs is already too
unconcentrated to support the conclusion that vertical integration could
have any anti-competitive effects. The impending arrival of video-ondemand via the Internet promises to deconcentrate this market still further.

.

service, since the presence of DBS was found to cause a statistically significant reduction in cable
subscribership. Id. at 4364-65, ¶ 53.
227 Supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
228 National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Cable & Telecommunications
Industry Overview 14 (2001), at http://www.ncta.com/pdf_files/Ind_Ovrvw_060801.pdf.
229 Recent HHIs have been on a downward trajectory. See Eighth Annual Report, supra note
151, at 100 tbl.C-4 (reporting HHIs of 954 for the year 2000, 923 for the year 1999, and 1096 for the
year 1998); Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video
Programming, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034, 1121, ¶ 155 (1998) (Fourth Annual Report) [hereinafter Fourth
Annual Report] (reporting HHIs of 1166 for 1997 and 1013 for 1996); Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in Mkts for the Delivery of Video Programming, 11 F.C.C.R. 2060, 2126-27,
¶¶ 139-40 (1997) (Second Annual Report) [hereinafter Second Annual Report] (reporting HHIs of
1098 for 1995 and 898 for 1994); 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5106 tbl.I
(reporting HHI of 975 for 1990). It also treats AT&T Broadband and Time Warner Cable as separate
entities, even though AT&T owns a twenty-four percent stake in Time Warner Entertainment, since
AT&T has announced its intention to sell this holding. See Diane Mermigas, Schleyer’s Charge:
Keeping Status Quo, ELEC. MEDIA, Oct. 29, 2001, at 20.
EchoStar announced its plans to acquire Hughes’s DirecTV unit. See Nikhil Deogun & Andy
Pasztor, GM Agrees to Sell Hughes to EchoStar, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2001, at A3. In addition, AT&T
announced that it was selling its cable holdings to Comcast. See Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank,
AT&T Picks Comcast to Get Cable Unit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2001, at A3. Even if these companies
were to complete their mergers, total HHI would only increase to 1374, still well below the 1800 level
identified by the Vertical Merger Guidelines as the threshold for anti-competitive concern.
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Table IV. Concentration in the National Market for
Purchase of Video Programming as of June 30, 2001
Multichannel Video Programming
Distributor (“MVPD”)
AT&T Broadband
Time Warner Cable
Hughes Electronics Corp.
Comcast Cable Communications
Charter Communications
EchoStar Communications
Cox Communications
Adelphia Communications
Cablevision Systems Corp.
Insight Communications
Other
Total

Share

HHI

16.44%
14.35%
11.32%
9.53%
7.35%
6.98%
6.87%
6.51%
3.40%
1.54%
15.71%

270
206
128
91
54
49
47
42
12
2
4

100.00%

905

Source: Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 98 tbl.C-3.

2.

Concentration and Barriers to Entry into the Market for
Television Networks

The second structural precondition is that the secondary market—in
this case, the market for cable networks—must be concentrated and
protected by barriers to entry. An analysis of the industry strongly suggests
that this precondition is not met either. As Subsection I.C.1 covers in some
detail, the concentration levels in the market for television networks
appear to fall below the thresholds established by the Vertical Merger
Guidelines.
Indeed, the market for cable networks appears to be extremely elastic.
The factors of production used to create these networks—talent and
communication hardware—are readily available in markets already highly
organized to supply these same inputs to other industries.230 The empirical
record supports this conclusion as well. As Table V indicates, there are
currently more than 294 cable networks operating in the U.S., and the FCC
reports that an additional fifty-one networks are in the planning stages.231
In addition, the total number of cable networks has increased by more than
230
231

230

OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 222.
Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 67, ¶ 160.
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four times over the last decade, and the level of vertical integration has
dropped steadily as well. In the face of such data, it becomes all but
impossible to maintain the existence of any significant barriers to entry
into the market for cable networks.
Table V. Vertical Integration of Cable Networks
Total Networks
Vertically Integrated Networks
Pct. Vertically Integrated
Among Top 15 Networks by
Audience
Among Top 20 Networks by
Subscribers

1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
70 106 129 147 172 245 283 281 294
35
56
66
67
68
95 104
99 104
50% 53% 51% 46% 40% 39% 37% 35% 35%
10 12 11
8
7
9
8
6
7
13

14

13

9

8

9

8

9

9

Sources: Eighth Annual Report, supra note 151, at 66, ¶ 157, 120-21 tbls.D-6 & D-7; Annual
Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkts. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 16
F.C.C.R. 6005, 6078-79, ¶ 173, 6138-39 tbls.D-6 & D-7 (2001) (Seventh Annual Report); Sixth
Annual Report, supra note 225, 1057-58, ¶ 179, 1119-20 tbls.D-6 & D-7; Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,284, 24,376,
¶ 159 (1998) (Fifth Annual Report); Fourth Annual Report, supra note 229, 1122, ¶ 158, 1231-34
tbls.F-6 & F-7; Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video
Programming, 12 F.C.C.R. 4358, 4429-30, ¶ 142, 4470-81 tbls.6 & 7 (1997) (Third Annual Report);
Second Annual Report, supra note 229, 2132, ¶ 150, 2163-64 tbls.6 & 7; Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in Mkts. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 7522-23,
¶¶161-62 & n.434, 7526, ¶167 (1994) (First Report); 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note
207, 5109-14 tbls.4, 5, 7 & 8.

That said, this conclusion is not unassailable. Some economists have
long maintained that, when a market involves differentiated products, it is
possible that all networks do not compete with one another equally and
that submarkets may exist within the overall market for cable
programmers.232 Indeed, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that certain
networks, such as ESPN and CNN, may for all practical purposes be
essential and have few real substitutes233 and that vertical integration
232 The seminal submarket case is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962). Although it has largely lain fallow for some time, a number of recent cases have renewed
interest in it. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464-65 (1992); Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.20 (1985); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970
F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997). For recent articles favoring the use of submarket analysis, see
Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 203 (2000); and Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The
Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM L. REV. 1625 (1987). For recent analyses applying submarket
theory to electronic communications, see Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory
and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2293-98 (2000); and James E. Meeks, Predatory Behavior as an
Exclusionary Device in the Emerging Telecommunications Industry, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 125,
132 (1998).
233 See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 24 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1157; see
also WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 130 (“Although clearly an empirical question, there
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permitted some companies to forestall competition from networks that
directly competed with their own, vertically integrated networks.234
Indeed, as recounted below, recent studies have lent some empirical
support for the proposition.235 Submarket theory has its share of critics,
however. A number of leading antitrust scholars have condemned it as a
superfluous and confusing doctrine that adds nothing to the conventional
analysis of what is a proper market while raising the danger that the
relevant market will be defined too narrowly.236
Resolution of the controversy over the proper role of submarkets in
antitrust analysis exceeds the scope of this Article. For current purposes, it
suffices to point out that, even if submarket theory were accepted for all it
is worth, it would not support the enactment of the prohibitions of vertical
integration contained in the 1992 Cable Act. The existence of submarkets
would justify intervening with respect to vertical integration involving
only those cable networks that comprised the submarket, such as CNN or
ESPN. It would not justify the indiscriminate type of prohibition of all
vertical integration without regard to the type of programming involved
that is embodied in the 1992 Cable Act.
3.

Potential Efficiency Justifications for Vertical Integration in the
Cable Industry

The final stage of the basic analytical approach described above is an
assessment of whether vertical integration is likely to permit firms to
realize efficiencies. Given the similarity of the cost structures involved, it
should come as no surprise that the potential efficiencies resulting from
vertical integration in the cable industry are quite similar to those created
by vertical integration in broadcast television. Just as was the case in
broadcasting, the large, up-front costs associated with creating each
program make it especially important that cable programmers be able to
seems to be a consensus in the industry that the lack of more than one or two of the most well-known
networks would seriously handicap a multichannel competitor to an established cable system.”).
234 See WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 55-56, 68-69 (describing Time Warner’s
efforts to prevent entry of a general news service that would compete directly with CNN); Tasneem
Chipty, Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television
Industry, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 428, 429 & n.7, 437 (2001).
235 See infra Subsection II.B.5.a.
236 See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 553c, at 167, 172-77, (1995); Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past
and Future, 75 CAL. L. REV. 959, 979-80 (1987); David A. Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton
Administration, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 73 n.63 (1999); Lawrence C. Maisel, Submarkets in
Merger and Monopolization Cases, 72 GEO. L.J. 39 (1983); Timothy J. Muris, Economics and
Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 312 (1997); Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust for the Economy of
Ideas: The Logic of Technology Markets, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 83, 90 n.27 (2000); see also Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 218 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1033 (1987).
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obtain guaranteed distribution before making their initial investments in
the programming. In addition, cable programming exhibits the same type
of product complementarities as broadcast programming. As a result, the
potential efficiencies resulting from vertical integration end up being quite
comparable.
a.

Elimination of Static Transaction Costs and Double
Marginalization

Importance of Guaranteed Distribution. First, as was the case in
broadcasting,237 the existence of large, up-front, first-copy costs for
producing cable programming and the relatively low marginal costs
associated with conveying the program to another viewer causes costs to
decline across all relevant volumes. As a result, cable programming
exhibits a natural tendency towards broad-scale distribution, since
profitability now depends upon amortizing the fixed cost investment
across as many sales as possible.238
The existence of such fixed costs makes access to a large portion of
the market one of the primary determinants of economic success.
Programmers who can obtain guaranteed distribution have substantial
incentive to make efficient investments in programming. Conversely, cable
programmers that lack a guaranteed market face risks that can depress
investment in programming below optimal levels.239 These considerations
are particularly important for new networks, which face even greater risks.
Guaranteed distribution allows new networks to invest in their programs
with greater confidence.240 Indeed, industry participants confirm that
vertical integration was essential in getting programming stars such as
CNN, C-Span, the Discovery Channel, BET, and TNT off the ground.241
The efficient functioning of the cable industry thus depends in no
small part on the ability of cable programmers to ensure that they will have
access to a sufficient number of cable operators. This is not to say that all
programmers must secure universal distribution or that programming must
capture a dominant share in order to be viable. Indeed, minimum viable

237
238

See supra Subsection I.A.3.a.
See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 245; WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at

58.
239 LELAND JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION 60 (1994); OWEN &
WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 245; WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 61 n.11; Olson & Spiwak,
supra note 21, at 291.
240 WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 132.
241 See 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5009, ¶ 83, 5037, ¶ 144(a);
David Waterman, Vertical Integration and Program Access in the Cable Television Industry, 47 FED.
COMM. L.J. 511, 520 (1995).
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scale appears to be small relative to the national market.242 My point is that
the equilibrium levels for cable programming will exhibit a natural
propensity towards as wide a distribution as possible and that artificial
limits on cable programmers’ ability to secure such distribution may lead
them to underinvest in programming. Although it is possible that policy
makers could turn to regulation to guarantee such access, it is also possible
that private ordering would be even more effective. For example, cable
programmers could use contractual provisions to guarantee such access.
Doing so would involve a large number of such negotiations that can lead
to significant transaction costs. In addition, the inevitable incompleteness
of these contracts would leave the parties unable to eliminate all of these
risks. If these transaction costs are significant enough, cable programmers
may find it more efficient to internalize those transactions within the
boundaries of a single firm and instead use vertical integration to
guarantee the access that they need in order to make efficient program
investments.243
Programming Complementarities. In addition, bringing transmission
and content under the same corporate umbrella can help control for the fact
that the value of a particular cable network is not simply a function of its
own intrinsic qualities, but depends as well on what other networks are
being provided. The solution to this problem is simple. Allowing cable
operators the freedom to choose what programming they will convey
effectively internalizes these externalities by bringing them all under joint
control. Conversely, restrictions limiting the cable operator’s ability to
refuse to carry particular programming (such as the must-carry and leased
access provisions contained in the 1992 Cable Act) can lead to a
suboptimal program mix. This is particularly true where products are risky
and difficult to value in advance, as is the case here. 244
The Problem of Double Marginalization. As noted earlier, vertical
integration can enhance efficiency by allowing the integrated firm to
transfer inputs at marginal cost.245 In the case of cable television, the
marginal cost of duplicating and distributing programming to additional
viewers is arguably so close to zero that any attempt to charge a positive
price can reduce net economic welfare. Bringing programming and
distribution under the same corporate umbrella draws attention away from
the transfer price charged for programming and leads the vertically
integrated entity to maximize its profits solely in terms of the price of the
242 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 122 S.
Ct. 644 (2001).
243 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5009, ¶ 84; OWEN & WILDMAN,
supra note 169, at 245; Chipty, supra note 234, at 431-32.
244 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 220, 245.
245 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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final good. In so doing, vertical integration has the potential to yield a
more economically efficient result.
b.

Elimination of Strategic Behavior

In addition, the existence of large sunk costs and externalities creates
the danger that cable programmers and cable operators will act
opportunistically in an attempt to capture a greater percentage of the
available profits. Vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints can
allow cable programmers and cable operators to avoid incurring the
transaction costs associated with protecting themselves against this
possibility.
Hold Up. As noted earlier, the sunk cost investments needed to create
original programming expose cable programmers to the possibility of
opportunistic behavior. Cable programmers will not invest in
programming unless it is likely that they will be able to recover both the
fixed costs associated with creating the programming as well as the
marginal costs of distribution. Once the first-copy costs are sunk, however,
it is possible for the cable operators to hold out ex post in an attempt to
drive price down to marginal cost. Thus, the danger of being unable to
recover sunk costs can lead cable programmers that are unable to protect
themselves ex ante against this possibility not to invest in creating new
programming even when doing so would enhance welfare. While it is
theoretically possible to use contractual devices to guard against such
opportunistic behavior, such contracts may be costly to negotiate and, in
any event, will not be able to anticipate every possible contingency. Thus,
if the levels of risk and the costs of negotiation are relatively high, it may
be more efficient for firms to use vertical integration to protect themselves
against such sunk cost opportunism, since any attempt to hold up would
simply redistribute profits between levels of production without having
any effect on the firm’s overall return.246
Free Riding. There appear to be two different ways in which free
riding may lead to a systematic underinvestment in cable programming.
First, cable operators have the incentive to attempt to free ride on other
cable operators’ contribution to the first-copy costs of production. Efficient
production of any high fixed cost good requires all those purchasing that
good to bear part of those fixed costs. Cable operators, however, have the
incentive to shirk on bearing those costs. Ideally, a cable operator would
prefer to rely on other cable operators to cover the up-front costs
246 Id. (citing Franklin M. Fisher, The Financial Interest and Syndication Rules in Network
Television: Regulatory Fantasy and Reality, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 263, 273 (Franklin M.
Fisher ed., 1985)); WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 47; Olson & Spiwak, supra note 21, at 29091.
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associated with creating the program in the first instance and would simply
pay the marginal costs associated with distributing the program. Even
though such free riding also causes a decline in the attractiveness in the
cable operator’s own programming, the decline would only be in
proportion to its share of the national market. Although the various cable
operators around the country would mutually benefit from restoring the
investment in programming to efficient levels, the transaction costs
associated with forging and monitoring such an agreement would
potentially be huge. Since tying the fortunes of the cable operators and the
cable programmers together allows the cable operator to internalize the
negative externality effect on program supply, thereby reducing the cable
operators’ incentives to shirk in the first instance, vertical integration
offers another way for cable programmers to solve this problem.247
Second, even cable operators who do not shirk on price may attempt
to free ride on the promotional efforts of other cable operators.248 Like
most industries, there is an optimal level of promotion for the cable
industry. Promotional efforts have the effect of increasing the market,
which in turn allows the fixed costs to be spread over a larger viewer base.
However, as before, cable operators do not capture all of that benefit,
gaining only in proportion to national market share. Again, the ideal
position for a cable operator is for other cable operators to undertake the
promotional efforts necessary to build the audience for a particular
network to its optimal level, while that operator gains the benefit of the
efforts of other operators while simultaneously avoiding paying the costs
of promotion. In other words, it attempts to free ride on the promotional
efforts of other operators. If enough operators shirk in this manner, the
industry will offer a suboptimal level of promotion. Even though all would
be better off if they could mutually agree to engage in higher levels of
promotional activity, there is no mechanism through which the various
operators could coordinate their actions, and, even if there were, the costs
of forging and enforcing such an agreement would likely be large. Thus,
even a cable operator who foregoes the opportunity to free ride in terms of
contribution to fixed costs may attempt to free ride in terms of promotion.
Again, vertical integration has the potential of eliminating the incentives
for shirking, since doing so would internalize both the gains and losses
from shirking within the same firm.249

247 WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 74-76. Waterman and Weiss also offer a formal
model of this problem. Id. at 78-86.
248 See generally supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing Lester Telser’s
pathbreaking work on free riding on promotional activities).
249 See 1990 Report on Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5010, ¶ 86; Waterman, supra
note 241, at 521.
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Again, it bears repeating that it is not my purpose to argue that such
transaction cost efficiencies actually exist. As I noted earlier, the existence
of such benefits is far from uncontrovertible.250 My point is simply that
such efficiencies are sufficiently plausible to justify hesitating before
erecting any regulatory barriers to vertical integration in the cable industry.
Such considerations are better handled in the case-by-case context of an
antitrust court applying the rule of reason than through the more
categorical per se approach represented by a regulatory solution.
4.

The Special Problem of Rate Regulation

There is one significant risk resulting from vertical integration in the
cable television industry that does not exist with respect to the broadcast
television industry. As noted earlier, the existence of rate regulation at one
level of production can provide a substantial anti-competitive motive for
vertical integration or vertical restraints. This is because a monopolist who
is barred by rate regulation from earning all of the available monopoly
profits in one market can attempt to tie its product to an unregulated
product in an adjacent, competitive market. In the absence of rate
regulation on the second level, vertical integration could thus allow the
monopolist to evade the consequences of regulation altogether.251 As
commentators have pointed out in the past, cable operators facing rate
regulation at the retail level may have an incentive to vertically integrate
backwards into programming.252
Recent changes in the regulatory and technological environment have
effectively rendered this argument toothless. This is because a provision
included in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated rate
regulation of all but the basic tier of cable programming services.253 Even
the basic tier is subject to deregulation if a cable operator faces
competition from another MVPD that can reach fifty percent of the
households in the cable operator’s franchise area and actually reaches
fifteen percent of those households.254 The emergence of DBS as a major
competitor to cable makes it extremely likely that rate regulation will soon
come to an end in most cities, since DBS is essentially universally
available and, as Table I indicates, has already surpassed the fifteen
percent threshold required under the statute on a nationwide level.255 As a
250 See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
252 See J.A. Ordover et al., Nonprice Anticompetitive Behavior by Dominant Firms Toward
the Producers of Complementary Products, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION, supra note 246, at 115,
127-28.
253 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(1), (b) (1994).
254 Id. § 543(l)(1)(B).
255 See supra Subsection I.C.1.
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result, this argument will likely soon be rendered moot, since the
elimination of rate regulation would effectively undercut its core premise.
5.

Empirical Evidence on Vertical Integration in the Cable Industry

It thus appears as a matter of theory that, in the cable industry, as it is
currently structured, vertical integration is unlikely to harm competition.
On the contrary, the existence of potential transaction cost savings flowing
from vertical integration suggests that, if anything, the various limits on
vertical integration imposed by the 1992 Cable Acts may actually be
harming consumers. With regard to cable, however, we have the benefit of
more than just theory. There is an excellent body of empirical work
studying the impact of vertical integration on the cable industry. These
studies provide us with greater insight into the potential anti-competitive
impact of vertical integration identified in theoretical literature.
a.

Efficiency Effects vs. Strategic Effects

Of particular interest for our purposes is a group of studies examining
the overall impact of vertical integration on competition.256 There have
been two lines to these studies, one focusing on basic cable networks and
the other focusing on premium cable networks. A recent article by
Tasneem Chipty brings both of these lines of empirical inquiry together in
insightful ways.257 What is most singular about Chipty’s work, however, is
its attempt to evaluate the overall impact that the various pro-competitive
and anti-competitive effects have on total consumer surplus.
The methodologies underlying these lines of study are similar.258
They begin by comparing the carriage decisions of vertically integrated
cable operators and non-vertically integrated cable operators.
Unsurprisingly, these studies uniformly found that cable operators were
more likely to carry networks with which they were vertically affiliated.
The greater willingness to carry vertically affiliated networks is ultimately
ambiguous, however, since it is consistent with both foreclosure (i.e., the
operator is trying to use vertical integration to prevent the emergence of
new competitors) and an efficiency justification (i.e., vertical integration
256 For discussions of the early empirical work on the cable industry, see OWEN &
WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 246-50; see also Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 692.
257 Chipty, supra note 234.
258 The only other paper of which I am aware that attempted to analyze the welfare impact of
vertical integration in the cable industry is George S. Ford & John D. Jackson, Horizontal
Concentration and Vertical Integration in the Cable Television Industry, 12 REV. INDUS. ORG. 501
(1997). Ford and Jackson concluded that, although vertical integration lowered programming costs, it
also led to an overall increase in the price charged to consumers that on balance caused consumer
welfare to drop. Ford and Jackson’s analysis was limited to a single, own-price effect.
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allows the realization of cost reductions that makes the vertically affiliated
network more attractive than the unaffiliated network).
These studies solved this conundrum by also looking at the
willingness of vertically integrated cable operators to carry unaffiliated
networks. If vertical integration were motivated by foreclosure, one would
expect that the increased willingness to carry affiliated networks be offset
by a decreased willingness to carry unaffiliated networks. In contrast, if
vertical integration were motivated by efficiency concerns, one would
expect that the increased willingness to carry vertically affiliated networks
would be matched by an increased willingness to carry unaffiliated
networks, since the cost savings would allow the cable operator to engage
in more efficient operations.
The conclusions drawn by these initial studies differed with respect to
basic cable and premium cable networks. With respect to basic cable
networks, the early studies by Benjamin Klein, Robert Crandall, and the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration uniformly
found the evidence to be more consistent with an efficiency story than a
foreclosure story. Each study found that greater willingness to carry
affiliated networks was correlated with a greater willingness to carry
unaffiliated programming. Since any pure foreclosure story would have
required a reduction in the amount of unaffiliated programming carried,
these studies rejected the notion that vertically integrated cable operators
were engaging in any systematic discrimination against unaffiliated
programmers.259
Studies of premium cable networks tended to draw the opposite
conclusion. For example, a 1997 study by David Waterman and Andrew
Weiss found that vertical integration with premium cable networks did
tend to lead to some foreclosure, since vertically integrated cable operators
were simultaneously more likely to carry affiliated premium networks and
less likely to carry unaffiliated premium networks.260 In addition, vertical
integration appeared to reduce the total number of networks carried by the
cable operator.261 Waterman and Weiss were unable to determine whether
these effects indicated that vertical integration on the whole yielded procompetitive or anti-competitive effects.262
Chipty’s study confirmed and extended these conclusions, by finding
evidence indicating that vertical integration had both competitive and anti259 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 246-50 (describing these studies).
260 WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 90. For an earlier version of this study, see David
Waterman & Andrew A. Weiss, The Effects of Vertical Integration Between Cable Television Systems
and Pay Cable Networks: 1988-1989, 72 J. ECONOMETRICS 357 (1996).
261 WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 98-100.
262 Id. at 103, 105, 142-43; see also OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 246 (noting that
a study conducted by Michael Salinger found some evidence of discrimination by vertically integrated
MSOs against competing premium movie channels).
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competitive effects. To determine the possible anti-competitive effects,
Chipty measured the extent to which certain cable operators carried a
home shopping channel with which they were vertically integrated (QVC)
and compared it with the extent to which those same operators carried a
home shopping channel with which they were not vertically affiliated
(HSN). Chipty found that cable operators that were vertically integrated
with QVC were simultaneously more likely to carry QVC and less likely
to carry HSN than were non-vertically affiliated cable operators.263 Chipty
similarly found that vertically integrated cable operators were more likely
to carry premium cable networks with which they were vertically
integrated and less likely to carry unaffiliated cable services that compete
directly with those networks.264 Thus, Chipty concluded that vertical
integration, regardless of whether it involves basic or premium cable
networks, does result in some degree of market foreclosure.265
At the same time, however, Chipty found significant evidence that
vertical integration yielded efficiencies. First, if vertical integration did not
yield efficiencies, one would not expect it to have any effect on the total
number of networks that a particular cable operator carried. Chipty found,
however, that cable operators that were vertically integrated with basic
cable networks tended to carry more total networks than non-vertically
integrated cable operators, a result indicating that vertical integration leads
to some gains in efficiency.266 Second, if vertical integration were driven
solely by anti-competitive motives, one would expect to see those
vertically integrated cable operators who had already decided to carry a
home shopping network to replace HSN with QVC. Absent some
efficiency gains from vertical integration, one would not expect
foreclosure to make it any more or any less likely that any given cable
operator would carry a home shopping network in the first instance. Chipty
found, however, that vertical integration did significantly increase the
likelihood that cable operators would carry a home shopping network.
Such a result would not have occurred unless vertical integration had
provided sufficient efficiencies to change the basic economics of the
carriage decision.267 Lastly, Chipty compared the vertically integrated
cable operators’ success in signing up cable subscribers with that of nonvertically integrated cable operators. If no promotional efficiencies
resulted from vertical integration, one would not expect vertically
integrated operators to have any more success in attracting customers than
263 Chipty, supra note 234, at 437-39.
264 Id. at 439.
265 Id. at 429, 439-40, 450.
266 Id. at 433, 435-36, 450. This conclusion applied only to cable operators that were
vertically integrated only with basic cable networks. Cable operators that were also vertically
integrated with premium cable networks tended to offer fewer networks. Id. at 450.
267 Id. at 439, 450.
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non-vertically integrated cable operators. Chipty found, however, that
cable operators that were vertically integrated with cable programmers
were significantly more successful in signing up customers than were nonvertically integrated cable operators, a result that suggested that vertical
integration does yield efficiencies in cable operators’ ability to promote
cable services.268
Most importantly for our purposes, Chipty conducted a series of
welfare calculations to determine whether the pro-competitive effects
dominated the anti-competitive effects or vice versa. These calculations
uniformly indicated that vertical integration had a positive impact on
consumer welfare, and the majority of these calculations found the positive
impact to be statistically significant.269 These findings ultimately led
Chipty to conclude that vertical integration does not harm consumers; if
anything, it may provide substantial benefits to them.270
b.

Vertical Integration vs. Vertical Restraints

The empirical literature on cable television also addressed a separate
question. As noted earlier, a cable operator seeking to use vertical
integration to harm competition can do so in two ways. First, it can
vertically integrate with an essential cable network and refuse to offer that
network to any competing MVPD. Alternatively, it can forego vertical
integration and instead simply enter into a contract with a key cable
network that either guarantees exclusivity or requires the network to
charge competing MVPDs prohibitively high prices. If cable operators
could achieve the same anti-competitive effects through vertical
contractual restraints as vertical integration, then it is thus theoretically
arguable that the presence or absence of vertical integration is actually
irrelevant. The real source of market power would flow from horizontal
concentration in the national market for the purchase of video
programming at the MSO level. The presence or absence of vertical
integration would not affect the leverage provided by this horizontal
market power in any way.271 Although, under this argument, vertical
integration would have no impact on the anti-competitive effects, it would
still have potentially profound effects on the firms’ ability to realize the
available pro-competitive benefits. As discussed earlier, vertical
integration can enable firms to achieve greater efficiencies than vertical
268 Id. at 443, 450.
269 Id. at 448-49.
270 Id. at 430, 449-50.
271 See OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 221-22; WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21,
at 56-57, 67, 129-32. Note that the statutory prohibition of exclusive dealing applies only to vertically
integrated operators. See 47 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1994). As a result, all non-vertically integrated operators
remain free to pursue vertical integration or exclusive dealing strategies.
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contractual restraints. Thus, although the choice of strategies arguably has
negligible impact on competition, the potential impact on the procompetitive effects may be profound.
Waterman and Weiss designed an empirical study to test this
argument.272 If the real source of anti-competitive behavior were vertical
integration and not horizontal market power, one would expect vertically
integrated programmers to enter into a higher percentage of exclusive
dealing contracts than non-vertically integrated programmers. However, if
the real source of market power were vertical integration rather than
horizontal concentration, one would expect the price premium charged by
vertically integrated programmers to be higher than that charged by nonvertically integrated programmers.
Waterman and Weiss’s study refuted the notion that vertical
integration was the source of anti-competitive market power. Although this
consideration was largely rendered moot by the industry-wide
abandonment of exclusive dealing contracts in the early 1990s, their
review of the available empirical evidence revealed that both vertically
integrated and non-vertically integrated cable programmers were similarly
prone to enter into exclusive dealing contracts.273 More important were
their findings regarding the size of the premium charged to competing
MVPDs. A review of the prices charged to two different types of
competing MVPDs revealed that there was no significant difference
between the premium charged by vertically integrated cable programmers
and the premium charged by non-vertically integrated cable
programmers.274 Waterman and Weiss thus found that vertically integrated
and non-vertically integrated firms exhibited precisely the same type of
potentially anti-competitive behavior. As a result, they concluded that
there was no reasonable justification for treating vertically integrated firms
in a different manner than non-vertically integrated firms. In either
situation, the ability to harm competition stemmed from the horizontal
market power possessed by the cable operators and not from the vertical
practice employed.275
In sum, both the theory and the empirical evidence suggest that
vertical integration is unlikely to harm competition in the cable industry.
As a result, the restrictions on vertical integration contained in the 1992
Cable Act appear to be unjustified. Indeed, there is great irony in the
suggestion that cable networks are too weak to confront cable operators,
since the broadcast regulations discussed in Part I are based on the exact
272 See WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 132-41. For an earlier version of this study,
see Waterman, supra note 241.
273 WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 21, at 134-35.
274 Id. at 133, 138.
275 Id. at 147.
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opposite assumption. In broadcasting, the fear was that powerful networks
would overwhelm the local entities responsible for delivering the
programming to the home. In cable, the concern is that powerful local
video distributors will overwhelm the poor, hapless networks. Given the
substitutability of cable and broadcasting, both of these propositions
cannot hold simultaneously. It seems that policy makers are trying to have
it both ways.
C.

The Problematic Nature of Compelled Access

As noted earlier, one of the most distinctive features of the
restrictions on vertical integration contained in the 1992 Cable Act is the
imposition of compelled access requirements. For example, the must-carry
provisions require cable operators to provide free carriage to all full-power
local television stations.276 In addition, both cable operators and cable
programmers must make their facilities available to unaffiliated parties on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.277 In essence, access is the
regulatory analog to the “essential facility doctrine” developed under
antitrust law. The concern is that cable companies will use their control
over the monopoly bottleneck in transmitting multichannel programming
to harm competition in the market for cable programming.278
Some scholars have lauded the imposition of access requirements on
local cable operators as a salutary development.279 Indeed, the shift to
access may represent a fundamental change in approach to regulatory
policy. A recent survey of the regulatory changes taking place in six
different regulated industries conducted by Joseph Kearney and Thomas
Merrill identified compelled access to monopoly facilities as one of the
central features of what they view as a new regulated industries
paradigm.280
I take a less sanguine view of these developments, however. In fact, I
believe that the access requirements imposed by the 1992 Cable Act suffer
from several conceptual and practical problems that undercut its utility as a
basis for media regulation.

276 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (1994).
277 Id. §§ 532 (leased access), 548(c)(2)(B) (program access).
278 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 670 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring);
OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 236-40.
279 See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight From First Amendment
Doctrine: Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817 (1998); Timothy
J. Brennan, Vertical Integration, Monopoly, and the First Amendment, 4 J. MEDIA ECON. 57 (1990);
Chen, supra note 21, at 1498-99.
280 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 22, at 1364-83.
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The Relationship Between Compelled Access and Leveraging
and Foreclosure Theory

First, a review of the findings and legislative history accompanying
the 1992 Cable Act reveals that these access requirements were enacted
out of the concern that a vertically integrated cable operator would be able
to use its control over the retail level of production to harm competition in
the wholesale market occupied by the cable networks and to bar the
emergence of new competition at the retail level.281 Properly understood,
such access requirements represent a version of leveraging and foreclosure
theory and are thus subject to the same criticisms and caveats discussed
above. Specifically, such regulations only make sense if the actor in
question actually has monopoly power over the primary market and poses
a real threat to the competitiveness of the secondary market.282 As detailed
above, neither of these preconditions appears to hold with regards to cable
television.
2.

The Administrability of Compelled Access

Furthermore, scholars of competition policy generally agree that
compelled access is, in many ways, quite problematic as a remedy. If
regulators compel non-discriminatory access without putting any
restrictions on the price charged, the monopolist will simply charge the full
monopoly price. While such access would be beneficial to the
monopolist’s competitors, it provides no benefits to consumers, since the
monopoly is left intact, and no improvements in price or output can be
expected.283 Absent some regulation of the terms and conditions of access,
compelled access represents something of an anomaly. As Professors
Areeda and Hovenkamp note, the purpose of the competition policy “is not
to force firms to share their monopolies, but to prevent monopolies from
occurring or to break them down when they do occur.”284
Thus, if an access remedy is to benefit consumers, it must necessarily
include a requirement that the rates charged be reasonable. Any attempt at
regulating rates would likely be extremely difficult to administer. Since the
monopolist has already evinced a lack of willingness to deal with its
competitor, the relationship is likely to be surrounded by disputes over the
281 S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 25-26 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1158-59.
282 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 118, ¶ 770b, at 167, ¶ 772c3, at 192, ¶ 773d, at
213; OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 236-40, 245; Posner, supra note 67, at 947 n.65; David J.
Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist’s Duty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the
Doctrine of “Essential Facilities,” 74 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (1988).
283 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 118, ¶ 773, at 199; POSNER, supra note 69, at
208.
284 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 118, ¶ 771b, at 174.
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terms and conditions of the compelled access. As Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp have noted, once access is ordered,
[t]he plaintiff is likely to claim that the defendant’s price for access to
an essential facility (1) is so high as to be the equivalent of a continued
refusal to deal, or (2) is unreasonable, or (3) creates a ‘price squeeze’ in
that the defendant charges so much for access and so little for the
product it sells in competition with the plaintiff that the latter cannot
earn a reasonable profit.285

The disputes, moreover, will not be limited just to price. The parties are
likely to disagree on non-price terms and conditions as well.286
As a result, the relationship will require significant ongoing
supervision to a degree that resembles public utility regulation.287 It goes
without saying that rate regulation in declining cost industries has been
plagued by complicated valuation and second-best pricing problems that
have bordered on insurmountable. Previous attempts at imposing rate
regulation on cable television have largely been a failure, as the variability
in the quality of cable programming has frustrated efforts to impose
meaningful rate regulation.288
The FCC’s history with policing access regimes provides ample
reason to question whether it is institutionally capable of executing this
charge. For example, leased access has been plagued by precisely the type
of problems predicted by Areeda and Hovenkamp. Simply put, the
regulatory regime went almost entirely unused, with the various parties
disagreeing vehemently on the reason for the regime’s failure. Firms that
sought leased access complained that local cable operators demanded
excessively high prices and failed to bargain in good faith, while the cable
operators claimed that the lack of leased access reflected a lack of demand
for it.289 Even more spectacular has been the inability of the FCC and the
state public utility commissions to use access requirements to foster
285 Id. ¶ 774e, at 227-28; see also id.¶ 765c, at 103-04, ¶ 772, at 197.
286 Id. ¶ 773, at 216-17, ¶ 774e, at 227-28, ¶ 787, at 281-82; see also POSNER, supra note 69,
at 211; POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68, at 762-63; Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and
Essential Facilities, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1243, 1283-84 (1991); Bruce M. Owen, Determining Optimal
Access to Regulated Essential Facilities, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 887, 890, 893 (1990); Gregory J. Werden,
The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 460-61 (1987).
287 POSNER, supra note 69, at 211. It should be noted that such problems may be avoided if
the owner of the bottleneck facility opens it to other customers. When that is the case, a regulatory
authority can simply order non-discrimination in terms and conditions. This solution will not work,
however, if the bottleneck owner devotes all available capacity to vertically affiliated entities.
288 See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE
TELEVISION (1997); Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the Household Demand and Welfare, 31
RAND J. ECON. 422 (2000).
289 See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 1990 Report on
Cable Competition, supra note 207, at 5048, ¶ 177; Donna M. Lampert, Cable Television: Does
Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 245 (1992).
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competition in local telephone markets as mandated by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The FCC’s experience in policing other
access regimes thus provides little reason to be optimistic that it will be
able to manage the myriad problems associated with administering a
regime of compelled access in this instance.
3.

Compelled Access and Dynamic Efficiency

Compelled access regimes are thus extremely questionable from the
standpoint of static efficiency, since it is far from clear whether they can
deliver the requisite benefits in price and quantity needed to justify the
enterprise. Even more profound is the impact that compelled access
regimes have on dynamic efficiency. From the perspective of dynamic
efficiency, the only viable way to solve the problems caused by monopoly
bottlenecks is the appearance of a new entrant that directly competes with
the bottleneck facility. Access regimes, however, may actually retard such
entry.
Access dampens investment in two ways that harm consumers. First,
it is now well recognized that resources are most likely to receive the
appropriate level of conservation and investment if they are protected by
well-defined property rights. As Garrett Hardin pointed out in his pathbreaking work on the “Tragedy of the Commons,” resources that are in
effect jointly owned tend to be overused and receive suboptimal levels of
investment.290 Hardin’s insights apply with equal force to compelled
access regimes. Since any benefits gained from investments in capital or
research must be shared with competitors, forcing a monopolist to share its
resources reduces incentives to improve their facilities and pursue
technological innovation.291
In addition, compelling access to an input also discourages other
firms that need the input from entering into business alliances with
potential alternative suppliers of the input.292 In effect, forcing a
monopolist to share an input rescues other firms from having to supply the
relevant input for themselves.293 For example, allowing cable networks to
use access requirements to reach audiences may well be depriving DBS of
the parties most likely to invest in helping it build out its facilities. In
effect, compelled access cuts DBS off from its most natural strategic
partners. As a consequence, it preempts the only solution to the bottleneck

290 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
291 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 118, ¶ 773b2, at 203-04, ¶ 773b3, at 206-07,
¶774c, at 220-21.
292 Id. ¶ 771b, at 174-76, ¶ 773a, at 201; Hylton, supra note 286, at 1261.
293 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 118, ¶ 773a, at 201.
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problem that is viable in the long run (i.e., the development of a viable
alternative to the bottleneck facility).
Thus, access should not be compelled whenever the resource is
available from another source, even if it is only available at significant cost
and in the relatively long run.294 This is particularly true in technologically
dynamic industries, in which the prospects of developing new ways either
to circumvent or to compete directly with the bottleneck are the highest.295
The inevitable lag in adjusting regulation also raises the risk that
regulations, such as access, that protect incumbents from new entry will
continue to exist long after the justifications for enacting the regulation
have long disappeared.296
D. The Future of the Vertical Integration Provisions of the 1992 Cable
Act
It thus appears that the case for restricting vertical integration in the
cable industry is quite weak. The relevant markets appear to be too
unconcentrated and unprotected by barriers to entry to permit vertical
integration to have significant anti-competitive effects. In addition, the
cost structure and complementarities associated with television
programming make it quite possible that vertical integration in the cable
industry would yield significant efficiency benefits.
But perhaps the most important aspect of my analysis of the
regulation of vertical integration in the cable industry revolves around the
imposition of access remedies. As the foregoing discussion reveals, access
remedies represent something of an embarrassment to competition policy.
This is because access remedies simply demand that the monopoly power
be shared, rather than broken up. As a result, access remedies are unlikely
to promote static efficiency. The dynamic efficiency problems resulting
from access requirements are, if anything, even more profound. By
rescuing competing firms from having to develop alternative sources of
supply, access remedies deprive those firms who are seeking to deploy
technologies that would compete with the bottleneck of their natural
strategic partners.
Despite these problems, however, the initial FCC and judicial
decisions on these provisions evinced little inclination to challenge the
294 Id. ¶ 773b2, at 203-05, ¶ 774c, at 220, ¶ 787c1, at 290; David McGowan, Regulating
Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under The Sherman
Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 771, 804-06 (1996); John T. Soma et al., The Essential
Facilities Doctrine in the Deregulated Telecommunications Industry, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 565,
594-96 (1998).
295 OWEN & WILDMAN, supra note 169, at 245.
296 Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 611-15
(1969).
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current regulatory regime. There are at least some indications that this
climate may be beginning to change. As noted earlier,297 a recent D.C.
Circuit decision struck down the thresholds established by the FCC to
implement the subscriber and channel occupancy provisions contained in
the 1992 Cable Act.298 In addition, there are open proceedings before the
FCC that could permit greater vertical integration in the cable industry,299
the prohibition on exclusive programming contracts is set to expire next
year,300 and the FCC has commenced proceedings to evaluate whether the
prohibition should be extended.301 It thus seems that the final chapter of
this debate has yet to be written.
III. Open Access to Cable Modem Systems and the New Economy
Theories of Technological Change
Although broadcast and cable television remain important sources of
information and entertainment programming, it goes without saying that
the most singular media-related development of the last several years has
been the arrival of the Internet. In just five short years, the Internet has
revolutionized communications in ways that until recently were
inconceivable. The vast majority of U.S. households receive Internet
service through an analog modem attached to a conventional telephone
line. Now known as “narrowband” technology, conventional telephonebased connections permit theoretical connection speeds of 56.6 thousand
bits per second (“kbps”), with actual connection speeds typically falling in
the range of 30-40 kbps.302 Under the typical narrowband setup, an Internet
user uses a conventional telephone line, provided by a local telephone
company such as Verizon, SBC, Qwest, or BellSouth, to connect to any
one of a large number of Internet service providers (“ISPs”), such as
America Online, MSN or Earthlink. The ISP in turn provides access to the
content and other services residing on a global network of computers
interconnected by what are known as Internet “backbones.” Since local
telephone companies allow any ISP with a local or toll-free telephone
number to operate on their system, narrowband consumers typically face a
wide range of choices in ISPs.
297 See supra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
298 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 644 (2001).
299 Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 16 F.C.C.R. 17,312 (2001) (Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
300 47 U.S.C. § 548(c)(5) (1994).
301 Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, 16 F.C.C.R. 19,074 (2001) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
302 Although most conventional modems are technically capable of carrying up to 56.6 kbps,
the physical characteristics of the telephone lines that those modems use to connect to the Internet limit
speeds to the 30-40 kbps range.
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More and more, however, U.S. consumers have been turning to
“broadband” technologies that allow subscribers to achieve actual speeds
in excess of one million bits per second (1 Mbps).303 Although several
different broadband technologies exist, cable modem systems, which
provide broadband services via coaxial cables originally designed to carry
television programming, have taken the early lead, having signed up well
over five million households. Unlike narrowband systems, however,
broadband providers typically require their customers to use a designated
ISP.
The emergence of cable modem systems has in turn raised serious
questions about whether and how this new industry should be regulated.
The most salient regulatory question has centered on whether the FCC
should require cable modem system operators to offer consumers a broader
range of ISP choices. The ensuing debate over “open access”304 has largely
centered on the classic type of vertical integration arguments discussed
above. For example, Professor James Speta has led a group of scholars
challenging the notion that vertical integration or exclusive dealing
arrangements with ISPs can enable cable modem systems to increase
monopoly profits.305 On the other side of the equation, a group of
distinguished scholars have applied the tools of game theory, network
economics, and innovation dynamics to propose new theories about how
such vertical integration could harm competition.306
This Part will analyze the various economic arguments surrounding
open access, following the same organizational pattern as the previous
discussions of broadcast and cable regulation. Section A will begin by
reviewing the structure of the cable modem industry, the current regulatory
regime governing that industry, as well as the economic arguments
advanced in support of that regime. Section B will use the basic economic
model of vertical integration developed above to conduct a static
efficiency analysis that evaluates the extent to which vertical integration is
likely to threaten competition in the cable modem industry. I conclude that
303 Most DSL and cable modem users can expect speed somewhere in the neighborhood of
1.5 Mbps. Theoretical speeds are much higher. See Speta, Handicapping, supra note 21, at 52, 56
(noting that ADSL and cable modems have a theoretical maximum of 10 Mbps and 27 Mbps
respectively).
304 This particular term is contested. While proponents of this particular regulatory reform
call it “open access,” opponents refer to it as “forced access.” See AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra
note 5, at 9866, ¶ 114.
305 Speta, Vertical Dimension, supra note 21, at 996; see also Benjamin, supra note 26, at
297-98; John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation,
Speculation, and Cable Bundling, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 907-13 (2001); Phil Weiser, Paradigm
Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 819, 834 (2000).
306 See Chen, supra note 13; Hausman et al., supra note 13; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16;
Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13; Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Privacy, 1 COLO. J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming Spr. 2002), available at http://www.edventure.com/
conversation/article.cfm?Counter=2414930.
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the structure of the broadband industry renders it unlikely that such
combinations will pose any significant anti-competitive threat and that in
fact such combinations might well lead to significant transaction cost
efficiencies.
Section C will then apply the framework developed in the discussion
of cable access requirements to evaluate open access in terms of dynamic
efficiency. I conclude that imposing open access would retard the
deployment of cable modem services by rescuing competing ISPs from
having to invest in building out alternative means for reaching high-speed
broadband customers. In so doing, open access would deprive companies
attempting to deploy alternative broadband technologies, such as DSL and
satellite broadband services, of their natural strategic partners.
Finally, Section D will take on the New Economy arguments
advanced by Professors Mark Lemley, Lawrence Lessig, and others
contending that open access is required in order to maintain the uniform,
“end-to-end” architecture upon which innovation on the Internet depends.
My review of the economic literature suggests that the relationship
between open access and innovation is far more complex than these
scholars suggest. In fact, an analysis of the formal models reveals that
requiring all broadband providers to adhere to a uniform set of protocols
may discourage, rather than promote, innovation. It thus appears that
imposing vertical structural restrictions on cable modem services would be
just as unjustified as the imposition of similar restrictions to broadcasting
and to cable television.
A. The Cable Modem Industry and the Open Access Debate
1.

The Structure of the Cable Modem Industry

Despite claims that the Internet is fundamentally different from other
media, the vertical structure of the narrowband and broadband markets are
remarkably similar to other markets. As was the case with broadcasting
and cable, it is quite easy to map the high-speed broadband industry onto
the three-stage chain of production and distribution consisting of
manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing that typifies most conventional
industries.307
The manufacturing stage consists of those companies that generate
the webpage content and Internet-based services that end users will
actually consume. The wholesale stage is occupied by the ISPs, which, in
the words of two noted open access advocates, add value through their
307
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“unique aggregation and presentation of content that allowed for easy
consumption by end users.”308 As was the case with respect to broadcast
and cable television, firms often operate at both the manufacturing and
wholesale stage by controlling proprietary content and providing services
such as chat rooms and instant messaging.309 Finally, cable modem
providers and other companies who deliver the content and service
packages assembled by the ISPs to end customers occupy the retail stage. I
will refer to this stage of production as broadband transport services.
2.

Regulatory Consideration of Open Access

Questions about vertical integration in the cable modem industry first
arose during the FCC’s review of AT&T’s proposed acquisitions of TCI
and MediaOne. In those proceedings, a number of parties argued that
allowing AT&T to bring both physical transmission and ISP services
under the same corporate umbrella would allow AT&T to use its control
over cable to harm competition in the market for ISPs. As a result, these
parties asked the FCC to impose an “open access” requirement, which
would have forced AT&T to allow independent ISPs to interconnect with
AT&T’s cable modem service network on non-discriminatory terms.310
Consistent with its longstanding policy of non-regulation of
computer-based services,311 the FCC refused to impose open access as a
merger condition in either case.312 In so ruling, the FCC rejected
arguments that such vertical linkages threatened competition.313 On the
contrary, the FCC concluded that refusing to impose open access would be
more effective in encouraging the deployment of high-speed broadband
services.314 To the extent that such problems existed, they were primarily
horizontal rather than vertical and would remain regardless of whether the
mergers went through.315
Since cable operators are subject to municipal as well as federal
regulation, open access advocates pressed their arguments before
municipal regulators. Some of these municipal authorities were more
accommodating than the FCC, either mandating open access by municipal
ordinance316 or requiring it as a condition for the transfer of a license
308 Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 634.
309 See AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3193, ¶ 65.
310 Id. at 3197-98, ¶ 75; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9866, ¶¶ 114-15.
311 See, e.g., OXMAN, supra note 7, at 8-12.
312 AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3205-08, ¶¶ 92-96; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra
note 5, at 9872-73, ¶ 127.
313 AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9872-73, ¶ 127.
314 AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3206, ¶ 94, 3229-32, ¶¶ 147-48.
315 Id. at 3207, ¶ 96.
316 See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d
685, 686-87 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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needed to complete AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.317
Although this municipal-based strategy was soon cut short by a series of
judicial decisions holding that the FCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the
issue,318 these early successes represented the first acceptance of open
access as a policy matter.
It was not until the FCC’s consideration of the AOL-Time Warner
merger that the open access advocates were able to garner sustainable
victories. On January 11, 2001, within two years of rejecting calls for open
access in AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne, the FCC abruptly
reversed course and endorsed the FTC’s requirement that Time Warner
and America Online negotiate open access with at least three unaffiliated
ISPs as a condition to their merger.319 It is expected that the FCC will offer
more definitive guidance after it completes an ongoing Notice of Inquiry
on the issue.320
3.

The Economic Theory Underlying the Open Access Debate

As noted earlier, open access advocates have based their arguments
on a wide range of economic theories. The first set of theories should be
quite familiar by now. The first theory argues that vertical integration
between cable modem providers and ISPs enables the combined entity to
harm competition in the market for ISPs by discriminating against
unaffiliated content. 321 This corresponds to the traditional concern about
leverage. The second theory focuses on the danger that cable modem
providers will use their control over proprietary content to obstruct the
emergence of DSL and other broadband alternatives.322 This strategy
corresponds to the traditional concerns about foreclosure.
The other theories draw on a more diverse range of economic
concepts. For example, Professors Lemley and Lessig argue that
innovation in Internet-based technologies depends upon the preservation of
interoperability.323 Other scholars have employed such new economic tools
as game theory324 and network economics325 to support their calls for open
317 See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2001);
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000).
318 See MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 360; AT&T, 216 F.3d at 875.
319 AOL-Time Warner Merger, supra note 10, at 6568-69, ¶ 57.
320 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,287 (2000) (Notice of Inquiry). Open access is also likely to emerge as in
issue in obtaining regulatory approval of Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable properties that was
announced as this Article was going to press. See Yochai J. Dreazen, AT&T, Comcast Likely to Get
Regulators’ Nod, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at A3.
321 See Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 636 (calling this strategy “content
discrimination”).
322 See id. (calling this strategy “conduit discrimination”).
323 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 930-46.
324 See Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13.
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access. After applying the analytical structure developed in the foregoing
discussions to the cable modem industry, I will proceed to evaluate these
New Economy theories.
B.

Structural Market Conditions

As the framework developed earlier reveals, in order to succeed,
foreclosure and leveraging strategies depend on the existence of market
power in the primary market (broadband transport) as well as a real threat
of anti-competitive effects in the secondary market (ISPs). A review of the
current deployment of broadband services renders these claims untenable
on their face. The broadband transport market is too unconcentrated and
the ISP market insufficiently protected by barriers to entry to allow
vertical integration to have significant anti-competitive effects. In addition,
it is possible to identify a number of efficiency justifications for such
integration. Thus, under the conventional economic analysis, it is quite
likely that imposing open access would actually harm, rather than benefit,
competition.
1.

Concentration in the Market for Broadband Transport

The first issue in determining whether vertical integration can harm
competition in the cable modem industry is concentration in the primary
market. Open access advocates have generally concluded without much
analysis that such power exists. In so concluding, they have fallen into two
misconceptions, one resulting from confusion about the proper definition
of the relevant market, and the other stemming from treating the cable
modem industry as a unified whole.
Regarding the first misconception, some analyses have argued that
the fact that many communities have only one cable system inescapably
implies that cable modem providers have monopoly power in the market
for broadband transport services.326 The problem with this approach is that
it focuses on the wrong market. It focuses on the local market in which end
users meet their broadband transport provider. As I pointed out in the
discussion regarding vertical integration in the cable television industry, if
this is the appropriate market, then any restrictions on vertical integration
would be largely irrelevant, since even complete vertical disintegration in

325 See Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 161-64.
326 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 965 (asserting that cable modem providers have
market power in the market for broadband transport because “[c]able companies do have monopolies
over cable wires in their local service area by government fiat”).
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the industry would not change the fact that end users would only have
limited options in broadband transport service providers. 327
The key to clearing up this misconception is to realize that open
access is not designed to mitigate the exercise of monopoly power in the
local markets in which retailers meet end consumers. Rather, its purpose is
to protect competition in the national market in which broadband transport
providers obtain content from the ISPs. Thus, the proper question is not
whether the broadband transport provider has monopoly control over
broadband users in any particular city, but rather whether that provider has
market power in the national market for obtaining broadband content. The
fact that a particular cable modem operator may have a local monopoly in
a particular city is irrelevant so long as each network has access to a
sufficient number of users in other cities around the U.S.
The second misconception is represented by the argument that cable
modem providers clearly have market power because cable modem
systems account for approximately seventy percent of the broadband
market.328 This leads Daniel Rubinfeld and Hal Singer to declare that the
HHI for residential broadband access to be 5673.329 The flaw in this
argument is that, in addition to treating the relevant markets as local in
scope, it treats the entire cable modem industry as if it were a single
company. Although the cable modem industry may control seventy percent
of the market, that industry is made up of a number of smaller players,
none of whom have anything approaching a seventy percent share. It is
thus impossible to determine the degree of concentration simply by
looking at the overall penetration of the cable modem industry. In order to
understand the appropriate degree of concentration in the relevant market,
it is necessary to calculate HHIs on a company-by-company basis.
Turning now to the HHI calculation, there can be no question that
cable modem services have taken the early lead in the broadband race.330
Cable modem services are now available in nearly sixty percent of all U.S.
households,331 and cable modem providers signed up more than 5.4 million
subscribers as of June 30, 2001.332 Even if we were to define cable modem
327 See supra Subsections II.B.1, II.B.5.b.
328 Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 155; Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 952.
329 Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 649.
330 After initially declining to decide the issue, AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3205, ¶
92; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, supra note 5, at 9866, ¶ 116, the FCC squarely concluded that
narrowband and broadband constitute separate markets. AOL-Time Warner Merger, supra note 10, at
78-88, ¶¶ 69-73. A recent econometric study indicates that the price of narrowband service does not
constrain the price of broadband access. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband
Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 303-04 (2001).
331 National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Industry Statistics, at
http://www.ncta.com/industry_overview/indStat.cfm?indOverviewID=2.
332 Residential Broadband Customer Count Tops 10 Million, CABLE DATACOM NEWS (Sept.
1, 2001), at http://www.cabledatacomnews.com/sep01/sep01-1.html.
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systems as a product market unto itself, however, it is far from clear that it
is sufficiently unconcentrated to support leveraging or foreclosure as anticompetitive strategies.333
Table VI. Total High-Speed Lines as of June 2001
(Over 200 kbps in at least one direction)

Technology

Percent Change
June 2000- Dec. 2000Dec. 2000 June 2001

June 2000

Dec. 2000

June 2001

Cable modems 2,284,491
DSL
951,583
Other
1,131,360

3,582,874
1,977,101
1,509,899

5,184,141
2,693,834
1,738,366

57%
108%
33%

43%
36%
15%

Total

7,069,874

9,616,341

62%

36%

4,367,434

Source: High-Speed Services Report, supra note 335, at 6 tbl.1.

But as noted earlier, proper calculation of HHIs requires
consideration of substitutes for cable modem service. The evidence
suggests that DSL has become an effective competitor to cable modem
systems, capturing more than three million subscribers334 and growing at
rates comparable to that of cable modem services.335 Market research
indicates that some subscribers prefer the fact that DSL is not subject to
the privacy and congestion problems that afflict cable modem systems.336
Although it was once true that DSL was only available in households
within roughly 3.5 miles of a large telephone facility known as a central
office switch,337 recent technological developments have made it possible
to extend DSL’s reach through the use of “remote terminals” and “loop
extenders.”338 In addition, DSL providers have lowered adoption costs by
offering substantial promotional discounts and free DSL modems.339

333 A calculation based on the available data reveals an HHI of 1720. See Industry Statistics,
supra note 331.
334 Id.
335 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET
ACCESS: SUBSCRIBERSHIP AS OF JUNE 30, 2001, at 5 (Feb. 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/hspd0202.pdf [hereinafter High-Speed Services
Report].
336 William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle
of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation, 2000
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 147 n.13.
337 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 2, 37.
338 See Donny Jackson, Shifting Gears: DSL Vendors Target ILECs with Retooled Products
and New Standards, TELEPHONY, July 2, 2001, at 60; Michael Martin, Vendors Focus on Bringing
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When DSL numbers are combined with cable modem numbers, it
becomes clear that concentration levels in the market for high-speed
Table VII. Concentration in the Market for
Broadband Transport Services as of June 30, 2001
Subscribers
(thousands)

Share

HHI

Time Warner Cable
AT&T Broadband
SBC Communications
Verizon Communications
Cox Communications
Comcast Cable Communications
Charter Communications
BellSouth Corp.
Cablevision Systems Corp.
Qwest Communications
Covad Communications
Adelphia Communications
RCN Corp.
Rhythms NetConnections
Insight Communications
Mediacom LLC
Broadwing
Other cable modem
Other DSL

1,409
1,346
1,037
840
668
676
419
381
368
360
333
253
95
83
82
80
51
50
249

16%
15%
12%
10%
8%
8%
5%
4%
4%
4%
4%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
3%

258
235
139
92
59
58
23
19
18
17
14
8
1
1
1
1
0
0
1

Total

8,780

100%

944

Provider

Source: Residential Broadband Customer Count Tops 10 Million, CABLE DATACOM NEWS (Sept. 1,
2001), at http://www.cabledatacomnews.com/sep01/sep01-1.html.

DSL to Non-Metro Users, NETWORK WORLD EDGE, June 11, 2001, at 28; Vince Vittore, Making DSL
Go for the Long Run, TELEPHONY, Dec. 11, 2000.
339 See, e.g., John Cook, DSL Providers Jump at Chance to Pick Up New Subscribers,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 5, 2001, at C1; Microsoft, Major Phone Firms in DSL Deal, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 16, 2001, at C10.
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broadband fall far below the levels that traditionally have led to antitrust
concerns.340
Furthermore, when a market is undergoing explosive growth, it is the
projected levels of concentration rather than current levels of concentration
that matter more. The FCC’s own projections indicate that the competition
between DSL and cable modem will only intensify over the next several
years. While the FCC estimates that by 2004 cable modem service will
reach eighty-four percent of U.S. households and 15.2 million subscribers,
it also estimates that, by that time, DSL will approach parity with cable
modems, reaching eighty percent of U.S. households and capturing a total
subscribership of 13 million.341
Table VIII. Projected Subscribership for
Broadband Transport Services
Broadband
Technology
Cable modems
DSL
Wireless
Satellite

As of Dec. 31, 2000
Subscribers (millions)
Projected
Actual
3.2
2.0
n/a
n/a

3.6
2.0
n/a
0.06

Projected Dec. 31, 2004
Subscribers
National
(millions)
Coverage
15.2
13.0
3.0 to 4.4
1.2 to 4.6

84%
80%
34%
100%

Sources: Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,984-86, 20,988, 20,990, ¶¶ 187, 189,
191, 196-197, 202; High-Speed Services Report, supra note 335, at 6 tbl.1.

In addition, there are two satellite broadband providers currently
operating: DirecWay and Starband. Although the service is not yet quite
comparable to that provided by DSL and cable modems,342 they do possess
one advantage: they are already available on a nationwide basis and are
340 As noted earlier, AT&T announced that it was selling its cable holdings to Comcast as
this Article was going to press. See Solomon & Frank, supra note 229. Consummation of this deal,
upon regulatory approval, would not materially affect my conclusions. The combination of AT&T and
Comcast would create a single entity with twenty-three percent of the broadband transport market,
with a resulting HHI contribution of 526, an increase of 233 points over the HHI contributions of
AT&T and Comcast when treated as separate entities. Total HHI would only increase to 1178, still
well below the 1800 level identified by the Vertical Merger Guidelines as the threshold for anticompetitive concern.
341 Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,984-88, ¶ 187, ¶ 189, ¶ 191, ¶ 195.
These estimates contradict the suggestion that DSL is unlikely to exert competitive pressure on cable
modem systems over relevant time horizons. See Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 149-51.
342 Satellite broadband is somewhat slower than DSL and cable modem service, achieving
peak download speeds of 400-500 kbps and peak upload speeds of 128-150 kbps. Users also need to
pay a significant up-front fee for hardware and installation. In addition, at seventy dollars per month, it
is priced somewhat higher than DSL and cable modem service. John Yaukey, Satellite Broadband,
TENNESSEAN, Sept. 18, 2001, at 4E.
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thus able to reach rural areas that are likely to remain unserved by either
cable modems or DSL.343 The FCC reports projected subscription rates of
between 1.2 to 4.6 million, primarily concentrated outside urban areas.344
Other companies have begun to invest in a microwave technology
known as multipoint distribution systems (“MDS”) that was originally
intended to provide television programming in competition with local
cable systems and convert it into providing high-speed broadband
services.345 Estimates suggest that these fixed wireless services should
reach thirty-four percent of U.S. households and obtain somewhere
between 3.0 and 4.4 million subscribers in 2004.346
Furthermore, we are just seeing the beginnings of the deployment of
third-generation (“3G”) wireless devices, which promise to provide yet
another platform for high-speed broadband access on a mobile basis.
Unlike current wireless Internet connections, which can only achieve
speeds between 9.6 to 28 kbps, 3G devices offer the promise of delivering
data at speeds comparable to that offered by cable modem services and
DSL.347
This is not to say that broadband deployment has gone smoothly.
Each of the major broadband technologies has confronted its share of
problems.348 Indeed, it remains quite possible that some unforeseen
development may force one of the contenders for broadband dominance to
fall by the wayside. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to observe
that the market for broadband transport services as it is currently
constituted is insufficiently concentrated for vertical integration to raise
any significant anti-competitive concerns. With regard to the future
broadband market, regulators must take special care not to exert undue
influence on the final technological outcome. The indeterminacy about the
final market position of the various platforms only serves to underscore the
risks attending any regulatory intervention at this point in the industry’s
development.

343 Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,937, ¶ 56, 20,990, ¶ 202.
344 Id. at 20,990, ¶ 202.
345 This includes both multichannel multipoint distribution services (“MMDS”) and local
multipoint distribution services (“LMDS”). See id. at 20,988-89, ¶¶ 197-99.
346 Id. at 20,988, ¶ 197.
347 See James H. Johnston, The Next New Thing: Third Generation Wireless, LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2001, at 25 (noting that 3G systems will operate at up to 384 kbps if the user is walking and 2
Mbps if the user is stationary).
348 As noted earlier, DSL providers have been subject to a significantly higher degree of
regulation than cable modem providers. In addition, DSL deployment has been plagued by service
problems and a number of high-profile bankruptcies. See Dissatisfied Customers Sue Verizon over DSL
Installation, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at C5; Kalpana Srinivasan, Cable Net Providers Taking the
Lead, HOUS. CHRON., June 12, 2001, at 4. At the same time, the collapse of Excite@Home represented
a significant setback for the cable modem industry. See Mylene Mangalindan, Excite@Home’s
Decision to Shut Down Carries Bitter Fallout for Investors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2001, at B8.
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2.

Concentration and Barriers to Entry into the Market for ISPs

In addition, the structure of the ISP market makes it extremely
unlikely that cable modem providers pose any realistic threat to
competition. As the FCC has recognized, the market for ISPs has
historically been quite competitive,349 and the low degree of concentration
in the broadband market discussed makes it all but impossible for any
cable modem service provider to use vertical integration to foreclose other
ISPs from obtaining the high-speed broadband access they need.
In addition, the current wave of explosive growth further lowers the
barriers to entry faced by ISPs. Currently, approximately one-third of all
U.S. households are on-line, with the vast majority (ninety-two percent)
obtaining their services via narrowband connections.350 The FCC projects
that the number of on-line households will double over the next three
years, with almost all of the new growth representing new broadband
users.351 Even if existing users were for some reason unlikely to switch
from their current services, the availability of such a large number of new
customers should be more than sufficient to render most foreclosure
strategies pointless.352

349 AT&T-TCI Merger, supra note 6, at 3206, ¶ 93.
350 Second Advanced Services Report, supra note 4, at 20,983, ¶ 186.
351 Id.
352 It should also be noted that the FCC has consistently maintained that all DSL
technologies constitute network elements that the incumbent local telephony companies (called
incumbent local exchange carriers or ILECs) must offer to their competitors on an unbundled basis.
Deployment of Wireless Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 15 F.C.C.R. 385 (1999)
(Order on Remand) (affirming that ILECs are subject to the obligations imposed by Section 251 of the
Communications Act in connection with the offering of advanced services); Deployment of Wireline
Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,012, 24,031-34, ¶¶ 34-44 (1998)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). Given the easy access to
DSL, it is hard to see how vertical integration by a cable modem provider could serve to restrict entry.
I have serious doubts as to whether compelling access to DSL systems represents good policy.
There seems little justification for compelling access to services that are not natural monopolies and, as
noted above, the relevant markets are insufficiently concentrated for vertical integration to pose a
threat to competition. In addition, by subjecting the different broadband transport to different
regulatory regimes, the FCC risks being responsible for picking the technological winner. A recent
D.C. Circuit decision recently overturned a recent FCC order on unbundled access to DSL systems and
remanded it for further proceeding. See WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(vacating and remanding the FCC’s classification of DSL-based advanced services as “telephone
exchange services” or “exchange access”). Recent regulatory proposals suggest that the FCC may be
ready to release DSL from its access obligations. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to
the Internet over Wireline Facilities, FCC 02-42 (F.C.C. rel. Feb. 15, 2002) (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking); Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecomms. Servs.,
16 F.C.C.R. 22,745 (2001) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); Review of Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,781 (2001) (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking).
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Potential Efficiencies from Combining Cable Modem and ISP
Services

The final step in the conventional analysis is to evaluate whether
vertical integration is likely to yield significant efficiencies. An analysis of
the cable modem industry reveals that many of the potential efficiencies
identified with respect to broadcast and cable television may well exist
with respect to cable modem service as well.
a.

Elimination of Static Transaction Costs and Double
Marginalization

Importance of Guaranteed Distribution. Like all media products, the
creation of broadband content necessarily requires significant, up-front,
first-copy costs that are large in comparison to the marginal costs of
distribution, which tend to be negligible. This cost structure creates a
natural tendency for broadband content to seek widescale distribution,
since economic efficiency increases as the fixed cost investment is
amortized over an increasingly large volume of users.353
As a result, the equilibrium level of distribution in the broadband
market is likely to be fairly widescale. It is quite logical then for ISPs and
other content providers either to enter into contracts that guarantee them
access to all of a cable modem system’s customers or to integrate
vertically with cable modem systems. This is not to say that content
providers unable to secure universal distribution will be barred from
entering, since it is clear that the minimum viable scale is small relative to
the national market. My point is that the erection of artificial regulatory
barriers preventing ISPs from entering into such arrangements with cable
modem systems can increase the risks associated with creating new
broadband content, a development which would correspondingly depress
investment in content below optimal levels, as well as retard or deter the
entry of new content providers.
The Problem of Double Marginalization. As noted earlier, vertical
integration can enhance efficiency by allowing the integrated firm to
transfer inputs at marginal cost.354 Once broadband content has been
created, the marginal cost of duplicating and distributing it to additional
users is negligible. As a result, if the transaction between the broadband
content provider and the broadband transport service provider occurs
across a firm boundary, it is inevitable that the content provider will
charge the transport provider a positive price that exceeds marginal cost,
353
354
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which, in turn, will reduce allocative efficiency. Vertical integration would
allow the combined entity to ignore the appropriate transfer price and
instead focus solely on the price charged for the final delivery of the
service. Doing so should allow the entity to eliminate the markup charged
by the content provider and price the final good closer to the welfaremaximizing level.
Caching. Open access would potentially raise a number of technical
problems as well. Modern ISPs minimize off-network traffic by “caching,”
a process in which the ISP gathers information from popular websites and
stores it at its headend. Thus, the ISP can serve all of its customers who are
interested in accessing a popular site with a single query to that site’s
server. Once the ISP has stored that content at its headend, all interested
subscribers can access the content without having to tie up resources
outside of the ISP’s proprietary system.355
Like all systems involving fixed costs, however, caching systems
must spread their costs over as large a number of subscribers as possible in
order to be economically viable. If other ISPs are allowed access to cable
modem systems, each ISP’s caching costs will be spread across fewer
subscribers, a result which would raise the cost of providing high-quality
service. Worse yet, the unaffiliated ISPs would either have to create
caching systems of their own, a result which would duplicate costs and
waste resources, or would simply provide consumers with a lower quality
product.356 Neither alternative seems particularly attractive.
Economies of Scope. Allowing ISPs to integrate with cable modem
systems would also enable broadband providers to take advantage of the
available economies of scope. For example, requiring open access would
prevent cable modem systems from realizing the transaction cost
economies associated with marketing, billing, and servicing both products
together. Joint provision can be particularly important when the overall
performance of the final product depends upon inputs provided by two
different companies and when consumers have trouble distinguishing
which of the two companies is responsible for any performance
inadequacies. In such cases, the two companies may simply blame each
other for the system’s poor performance. Customers that experience
unsatisfactory performance with an emerging technology may simply
choose to drop the product without attempting to identify the cause of the
poor performance.357 In such cases, allowing a single company to provide
355 Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 160.
356 See Bruce M. Owen & Gregory L. Rosston, Cable Modems, Access and Investment
Incentives 18-19 (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6006242167.
357 See J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
9-10 (2001).
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both complementary services better enables it to ensure the overall
performance of the system. As the Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized in an early cable television case, such concerns are particularly
important in the case of new products, such as cable modem service, since
an emerging industry’s “short and long-term well-being depend[s] on the
success of the first systems sold.”358
Such economies of scope appear to exist in the cable modem industry.
As experience in other telecommunications sectors has revealed, joint
marketing of services can prove to be an essential means of competition.
Absent some ability to guarantee a quality end-to-end product, cable
modem systems will place less promotional efforts behind their products
and risk alienating customers who have unsatisfactory experiences.359
Finally, the overall speed performance is a product of both the
characteristics of the cable modem system, but also the server technology
employed by the ISP. In addition, system performance is also determined
in no small part by the degree of compatibility between the cable modem
system and the ISP.360 A customer receiving unsatisfactory service may
often be unable to discern whether the problem lies with the cable modem
system or with the ISP. In a fledgling industry like the cable modem
industry, the user may well form his or her opinion without determining
the true cause of the poor performance. Integrating cable modem systems
and ISPs simplifies the coordination of decisions in ways that avoid such
problems and ensure end-to-end quality. It also allows customers to call a
single service desk that is responsible for solving all of their problems.
b. Elimination of Strategic Behavior
Hold Up. The presence of the large upfront fixed costs discussed
above also leaves both cable modem and content providers vulnerable to
being held up. Like other creators of media content, broadband content
providers must make significant up-front investments in their content.
They will not do so unless they can expect to recover those fixed costs
later. Once the content is created, however, content providers are
vulnerable to hold-up behavior, since once the costs of creating the content
358 United States v. Jerrold Elecs Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d, 365
U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam); see also Owen & Rosston, supra note 356, at 19 (“In the early stages of
a technology with competitive alternatives, reputation may be a critical feature of marketing. Therefore
integrated service leading to high quality, customer service and ultimately customer satisfaction may
be very pro-competitive.”).
359 Owen & Rosston, supra note 356, at 13-14.
360 Henry B. McFarland, Economic Perspectives on Requiring Unbundled Access to Cable
Broadband Networks 22 (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law, July 11, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/ftp/pub/antitrust/
committees/communication/econ_perspec.doc.
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are sunk, the content owners’ customers can try to beat them down to
marginal cost.
Conversely, cable modem providers are similarly vulnerable to sunk
cost opportunism. They are making a multi-billion dollar investment in
their physical plant. Once the costs are sunk, cable modem providers bear
the risk of being beaten down to levels at which the fixed-cost investment
can no longer be recovered.361 The traditional method for redressing both
of these concerns is either vertical integration or long-term exclusive
dealing contracts. If unable to rely on such exclusive dealing
arrangements, an inherently unstable situation results in which the
reservation prices overlap significantly and in which both sides are left to
settle on price through strategic behavior.
Free Riding. Integrated provision can be particularly important when
a new technology is involved, since the need for presale services typically
required by the introduction of a new technology increases the dangers of
classic Telserian free riding.362 If multiple ISPs are available, they will all
have the incentive to underinvest in promotional activities, an effect that
can be particularly damaging in the early days of a new business when the
burden of the sunk costs is spread over the smallest number of
customers.363 Furthermore, the speeds attainable via cable modem systems
are determined by both the quality of the transport network provided by
the cable operator, as well as the amount of server space provided by the
ISP. A cable modem subscriber that receives poor service may not be able
to determine whether it is the ISP or the transmission provider that is the
cause of the problem.364 This ambiguity creates some incentive for each
party to shirk. Furthermore, as the courts recognized in one of the earliest
decisions involving cable television, inability to manage this potential
problem may drastically increase the risks involved in deploying the new
technology, since customers that experience unsatisfactory performance
with emerging technologies may simply choose to drop the product
without attempting to identify the cause of the poor performance.365
The potential for congestion also raises the possibility of free riding.
Since each user and each ISP do not internalize all of their costs, each has
inadequate incentives to conserve bandwidth.366 In addition, the cable
modem provider will eventually have to make additional capital
investments to upgrade its system to accommodate increases in traffic.
Theoretically, simply forcing each ISP to bear the full costs of their usage
361 Owen & Rosston, supra note 356, at 22.
362 Telser, supra note 97.
363 Owen & Rosston, supra note 356, at 13-14.
364 McFarland, supra note 360, at 23; Owen & Rosston, supra note 356, at 14.
365 United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-57 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d,
365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam).
366 McFarland, supra note 360, at 23.
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could solve such problems. To the extent that open access is limited to
marginal cost, however, the existence of such externalities also gives ISPs
the incentive to free ride on the cable modem provider by avoiding making
any contribution to the additional capital costs that the ISP itself is
responsible for creating. Even if regulators attempt to allocate such fixed
costs fully, the allocation of fixed costs has proven quite difficult and even
arbitrary. In addition, rate making authorities have had little success setting
the appropriate cost of capital to reflect the true ex ante risks once the
market has arrived in the ex post world.
Adverse Selection. Broadband transport services are also subject to
two types of adverse selection problems. The first stems from the inability
to determine ex ante which portions of the cable modem network are likely
to be the most profitable. In such cases, a unified provider can focus on
average profitability, trusting that those areas which turn out to be
relatively less profitable will tend to be balanced by other areas that turn
out to be relatively more profitable. Open access, however, allows
competing ISPs to wait until the relative profitability of each part of the
network is revealed and then to simply offer ISP services only in the most
attractive areas of the network. Not only does this allow the competing ISP
to avoid bearing its fair share of the overall risk of the venture, it also
prevents the cable modem provider from using the different parts of the
system to offset these risks.
In addition, cable modem service is subject to a second adverse
selection problem resulting from the fact that cable modem systems are
subject to congestion. Cable modem providers cannot measure the
intensity with which particular individuals use the system. In the absence
of the ability to sort customers, unaffiliated ISPs can avoid the costs of
their use of the bandwidth and have inadequate incentives to conserve
bandwidth. Unless vertical integration is allowed and open access is
forbidden, the cable modem provider has little choice but to engage in
costly measures to meter usage, to build in contractual protections, or to
sort users.367
It is thus possible to identify several plausible ways in which vertical
integration can promote efficiency in the cable modem industry. It is not
my purpose to prove that such efficiencies actually exist in any particular
case. The mere possibility of such efficiencies serves to rebut arguments
that vertical integration is so unlikely to be pro-competitive that the
practice may be prohibited without any inquiry into the facts of specific
cases.

367
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4.

Post-Chicago Models of Open Access

The only major post-Chicago analysis of open access to appear to
date was offered by economists Daniel Rubinfeld and Hal Singer in
connection with the AOL-Time Warner merger.368 Rubinfeld and Singer
base their analysis on two closely related articles, the first being the
discursive analysis proffered by Michael Riordan and Steven Salop369 and
the second being the formal model derived by Janusz Ordover, Garth
Saloner, and Steven Salop370 from which the Riordan and Salop analysis
draws its theoretical justification.371
The heart of Ordover, Saloner, and Salop’s analysis is its reliance on
a form of oligopolistic competition known as “Bertrand competition.”372
One of the unique qualities of Bertrand competition is that it supposes that
two competitors are sufficient to drive the price down to competitive
levels. Thus, unlike under other oligopolistic analyses in which reductions
in the number of competitors gradually lead to increasingly anticompetitive results, under Bertrand competition, the existence of as few as
two competitors is sufficient to drive prices down to the levels that would
result under perfect competition. This phenomenon is known as the
“Bertrand paradox.” Thus, any reduction in the number of competitors
does not force the market away from the perfectly competitive result until
only two competitors remain. The elimination of one of these two
remaining competitors, however, causes the market to shift abruptly and
discontinuously from the perfectly competitive result to the monopolistic
result.373
The Ordover, Saloner, and Salop model takes advantage of this large
discontinuous change to generate the only model that indicates that vertical
integration unambiguously leads to higher prices for consumers.374 It
posits a market composed of successive duopolies, in which two input
suppliers sell to two downstream manufacturers. Despite the extreme
concentration of both of these levels of production, the market is presumed
to be completely efficient, since under Bertrand competition the existence
of two input suppliers is sufficient to yield the perfectly competitive result.
Vertical integration between one of the suppliers and one of the
manufacturers causes the input market to change from a duopoly to a
368 Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13.
369 Id. at 642-43, 647, 653-54, 656-57 (citing Riordan & Salop, supra note 131).
370 Id. at 655 (citing Ordover et al., supra note 131).
371 See William E. Cohen, Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and
Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 562 n.162 (1996); Reiffen &Vita, supra note 72, at 922
n.16, 925.
372 On Bertrand competition, see generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 135, at 166-72;
CHURCH & WARE, supra note 135, at 256-70; and TIROLE, supra note 24, at 205-06.
373 Ordover et al., supra note 131, at 127.
374 Snyder & Kauper, supra note 135, at 594.
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monopoly. The resulting price increase by the non-vertically integrated
firm unambiguously causes welfare to fall.
The post-Chicago models upon which Rubinfeld and Singer base their
analysis have been subjected to several conceptual criticisms. The most
questionable aspect of these models is the extent to which their result
depends on the Bertrand paradox. Bertrand models depend upon a number
of strong assumptions that may not hold with respect to the markets
involved in the open access debate. For example, classic Bertrand models
assume that the goods produced by the duopolistic competitors are perfect
substitutes for one another. It is generally acknowledged that the Bertrand
paradox collapses if the products are non-homogeneous, since any degree
of product differentiation will give the firms sufficient market power to
raise prices above competitive levels.375 Bertrand competition assumes that
the duopolistic competitors will take their rival’s prices as fixed and will
not anticipate any actions. As Timothy Muris, the newly appointed
Chairman of the FTC, has noted, such an assumption is empirically
untested and is likely to be theoretically unsound.376
In addition, the anti-competitive effect described in the OrdoverSaloner-Salop model depends on the assumption that only two firms exist
at each level of production. The existence of a third competitor (or a
potential entrant) will cause the anti-competitive effects to disappear.377 In
addition, in order for the Bertrand paradox to spring, the firm that
vertically integrates must use all of the input it produces internally. If the
company continues to sell the input to other customers, vertical integration
does not have the effect of reducing the number of competitors. As David
Reiffen has pointed out, Ordover, Saloner, and Salop fail to explain why or
how a company could precommit to forego external sales.378
Finally, these models fail to take into account the possibility of
efficiencies resulting from the merger. By assuming that two firms are
sufficient to force price down to competitive levels, the Ordover, Saloner,
and Salop model, by its nature, precludes any possible welfare benefits
resulting from the elimination of double marginalization even though the
successive duopoly structure strongly suggests that such efficiencies would
exist.379 In addition, the model fails to take into account the possibility that
vertical integration could rationalize input substitution in ways that
375 See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 135, at 217; CHURCH & WARE, supra note
135, at 258-64; TIROLE, supra note 24, at 212, 277-78.
376 Muris, supra note 236, at 311.
377 See Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 682; Snyder & Kauper, supra note 135, at 594.
378 David Reiffen, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure; Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 694
(1992).
379 See Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 128, at 325-26; Klass & Salinger, supra note
128, at 681-82; Reiffen & Vita, supra note 72, at 929; Snyder & Kauper, supra note 135, at 594-95.
For the discussion on double marginalization, see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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promote efficiency,380 as well as the possibility of significant transaction
cost savings. These problems have led even those economists firmly
committed to regulatory intervention to question the utility of Bertrand
models.381 Although some of the refinements offered by Riordan and Salop
mitigate some of these problems, these concerns raise serious questions as
to whether vertical integration yields such unambiguously anti-competitive
outcomes so as to justify prohibiting it as a regulatory matter.
For the purposes of this Article, we need not come to any definitive
resolution of these issues. As Rubinfeld and Singer acknowledge, the
models upon which they base their argument depend on the same
structural assumptions employed in my analysis. Specifically, Rubinfeld
and Singer acknowledge that (1) the market for broadband transport
services must be concentrated and burdened by high switching costs382 and
(2) the market for ISPs must be concentrated and protected by barriers to
entry.383 Their support for compelling open access as a condition of the
AOL-Time Warner merger depended upon their assumption that the HHI
in the residential broadband transport market was 5673, that DSL was
unlikely to emerge as a competitor to cable modem service, and that
switching costs among the services was likely to be high.384 Thus any
disagreement with their position can be resolved simply by showing that
these preconditions have not been met. For the reasons discussed above,385
I believe that such preconditions have not been met with respect to open
access.
5.

The Empirical Evidence on Open Access

Despite the relative youth of the broadband transport industry, one
relevant empirical study on open access has already appeared in the
literature. Thomas Hazlett and George Bittlingmayer designed an event
study to determine the impact that positive and negative news concerning
open access had on three different metrics: (1) a general index of Internet
stocks, (2) the stock price of Excite@Home (to serve primarily as a
control), and (3) the stock price of America Online. All three were
380 See Reiffen & Vita, supra note 72, at 929-30; Snyder & Kauper, supra note 135, at 595.
For the discussion on the welfare impact of vertical integration when inputs can be used in variable
proportions, see supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
381 F.M. Scherer, Comment, in BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 323 (1991) (“We
economists love . . . Bertrand models because we can have a good bash at them with the powerful tools
of calculus. . . . We have known at least since Edward Chamberlain published his famous book nearly
sixty years ago that [Bertrand models are based on] unrealistic assumptions.”).
382 Rubinfeld & Singer, supra note 13, at 648-50 (citing Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at
539-45).
383 Id. at 646-47 & n.54 (citing Riordan & Salop, supra note 131, at 533).
384 Id. at 649-52.
385 See supra Subsections III.B.1-2.
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adjusted for changes in the S&P 500 index. If vertical integration and
exclusivity did not yield net efficiency benefits and open access on balance
enhanced efficiency, one would expect that setbacks to open access would
have negative impacts on the Internet index and the stock price of AOL,
while victories for open access would have a positive impact on both
metrics. In fact, precisely the opposite was true, as setbacks to the open
access movement were correlated with an increase in both the Internet
index and the stock price of AOL, with the former effect being statistically
significant. Hazlett and Bittlingmayer thus concluded that the data tended
to be more consistent with the idea that vertical integration yielded net
efficiency benefits than with the hypothesis that open access would be
more beneficial.386 Although changes in stock prices and indices are
subject to numerous other influences and, as a result, are admittedly
imperfect measures of efficiency, in the absence of better evidence, this
study does provide some preliminary support for the position that vertical
integration in the cable modem industry may promote efficiency.
C.

The Problematic Nature of Compelled Access as a Remedy

For the same reasons described more completely in the discussion of
the use of access remedies in cable television,387 it is likely that open
access will prove problematic as a remedy. First, as noted earlier, access
remedies by their nature depend on theories of leveraging and foreclosure
that have largely been discredited388 and, in any event, depend on the
existence of structural preconditions, including market power in the
primary market and the existence of barriers to entry in the secondary
market, that are not satisfied in the current case.
Second, the terms under which access is compelled are likely to be
very difficult to administer. If the FCC were to compel access without
imposing any restrictions on price, a cable modem provider would simply
charge the monopoly price. While such access would clearly benefit other
ISPs by rescuing them from having to make the capital investments that
would have otherwise been required for them to secure carriage through
other means, it would provide no tangible benefit to consumers, as price
and output would remain at monopoly levels. Attempts at forcing prices
below monopoly levels, however, would force regulators to referee a

386 Thomas W. Hazlett & George Bittlingmayer, The Political Economy of Cable “Open
Access,” 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV., (forthcoming Fall 2001), available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/hazlett/working_01_06.pdf.
387 See supra Subsection II.C.
388 See e.g., Speta, Vertical Dimension, supra note 21, at 996.
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never-ending series of disputes over the terms and conditions of access, a
role for which the FCC has historically proven ill-suited.389
Most importantly, the economic literature suggests that open access
would harm dynamic efficiency as well, by slowing the deployment of
high-speed broadband services. The fact that any positive developments
would need to be shared with competitors would represent a deviation
from the well-defined property rights needed to provide cable modem
operators with the incentive to engage in efficient levels of investment in
their own technology.390 In addition, compelled access would also rescue
unaffiliated ISPs from having to support the development of alternative
broadband providers. These unaffiliated ISPs represent the natural
strategic partners for DSL, satellite, and other broadband transport
providers seeking to build services to compete directly with cable modem
services. Providing unaffiliated ISPs with access to cable modem systems
would remove any incentive to support such initiatives.
This insight underscores the core problem in the broadband industry,
which is the paucity of providers capable of delivering broadband transport
services into the home. An open access regime would do nothing to
alleviate this central problem, since choice among ISPs will not provide
consumers with any additional options for broadband transport services.
Giving consumers their choice of ISP will thus not allow them to pay less
than the monopoly price. Likewise, allowing vertical integration between
cable modem services and ISPs will not make this problem any worse. On
the contrary, open access will make the problem worse by preventing cable
modem providers from realizing the available efficiencies and by
depriving DSL and other alternative broadband transport providers of their
natural strategic partners
D. The New Economy Arguments: The Effect of Standardization on
Innovation
Open access advocates have gone far beyond the conventional
economics of vertical integration and instead have turned to arguments
inspired by various features of the New Economy. Led by Professors
389 See Owen & Rosston, supra note 356, at 20-22; McFarland, supra note 360, at 27; see
also supra text accompanying note 289. As noted earlier, such problems can be mitigated if the
bottleneck facility sells to multiple customers. See supra note 287. Following the collapse of
Excite@Home, it is increasingly likely that each broadband transport provider will be paired with a
dedicated ISP.
390 Owen & Rosston, supra note 356, at 15, 17; Daniel Shih, Comment, Open Access or
Forced Access: Should the FCC Impose Open Access on Cable-Based Internet Service Providers?, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 793, 806 (2000). This argument is not, as Lemley and Lessig suggest, that monopoly
profits are needed to “prim[e] the pump.” Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 957-62. Well-defined
property rights play an essential role in encouraging investment even when monopoly power is not
involved.
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Lemley and Lessig’s recent article, this distinguished group of scholars has
raised a wide range of arguments based on innovation theories and
network economics. First advanced as considerations that should guide
merger policy,391 more recent work has suggested that these arguments
should serve as a guide to regulatory policy as well.392 The importance of
these arguments justifies discussing them in detail.
Professors Lemley and Lessig’s central contention is that the failure
to impose open access would threaten innovation on the Internet. In their
eyes, innovation on the Internet depends on the maintenance of the “endto-end” design principle that has ensured that the Internet has remained
fully interoperable since its inception. At the core of this principle is the
belief that the functions of the Internet involved in transporting data
between computers should be as simple and general as possible and should
not be tailored towards any particular application. The computers
connected to the ends of the network (rather than the network itself) should
provide the functionality of particular applications. Put more simply, the
connections between the computers should be as “dumb” as possible and
should focus on carrying bits and bytes between computers as quickly as
possible without performing any additional functions. The “intelligence”
in the network should instead reside at the edges.393
Professors Lemley and Lessig believe that innovation on the Internet
depends upon the continued standardization provided by this end-to-end
architecture. As a result, they condemn the agglomeration of broadband
transport providers and ISPs that threatens this standardization by
permitting proprietary networks to introduce a greater degree of
intelligence into the body of the network itself. In addition, Lemley and
Lessig contend that the end-to-end architecture of the Internet encourages
innovation by shifting the locus of creativity away from centralized control
by dominant firms and towards a more diverse array of smaller
innovators.394 Lemley and Lessig also assert that the empirical evidence
indicates that creativity is better spurred by more competitive market
structures.395
Finally, Lemley and Lessig argue that open access is necessary to
ensure the new type of competition that is emerging in the New Economy.
Drawing on the work of Timothy Bresnahan,396 they contend that

391 Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 WHITTIER L.
REV. 3 (2000) (reprinting ex parte declaration filed in connection with the AT&T-MediaOne merger).
392 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 971.
393 Id. at 931-32.
394 Id. at 943.
395 Id. at 961.
396 Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure
of the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY:
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competition in the broadband industry will differ from competition in more
conventional industries. Bresnahan argues that, unlike in conventional
industries in which the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail levels are each
occupied by several participants engaging in vigorous competition, the
presence of large economies of scale will cause each level of the
broadband industry to become dominated by a single player. Although
strategic entry barriers and cost asymmetries appear to play some role, the
primary cause of market concentration at each level is the presence of
strong network externalities.397 Jerry Hausman, Gregory Sidak, and Hal
Singer advance a similar argument.398 They argue that the existence of
network economic effects can allow the early leader in the race to provide
broadband Internet access to “lock in” subscribers and content providers.
The existence of these network externalities can deter innovation by
making it prohibitively expensive for subscribers and content providers to
switch to alternative platforms, even when it might be in their best
interests to do so.399
These scholars should be applauded for advancing such an important
and innovative perspective. Clearly any policy evaluation in this area must
take into account the impact of standardization and network externalities
on innovation. That said, my review of the literature on the relationship
between innovation, standardization, concentration, and network
economics reveals that the relationship between these factors is more
ambiguous than Professors Lemley, Lessig, and those advancing similar
arguments would have us believe. If anything, it appears that permitting
competing proprietary standards to emerge might help to mitigate, rather
than exacerbate, some of the problems that may also emerge. Finally, the
literature raises serious questions regarding the propriety of open access as
a solution. In fact, the argument offered by Timothy Bresnahan, upon
which Lemley and Lessig rely, suggests that even if firms achieve
dominance over particular levels of production, open access may
ultimately prove counterproductive.
1.

The Tradeoff Between Standardization and Product Diversity

First, it bears noting that standardization and openness can deter, as
well as encourage, innovation. Scholars who have studied the problems of
standardization in the face of network economic effects have long
recognized that standardization necessarily limits product variety by
ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds.,
1999).
397 Id. at 159-65.
398 Jerry A. Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 129.
399 Id. at 161-62, 163-64; see also Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL:
Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 306 (2001).
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“prevent[ing] the development of promising but unique and incompatible
new systems.”400 The resulting limits on possible innovation leave
consumers with a narrower range of products from which to choose.401
Indeed, the introduction of proprietary standards may simply represent the
natural outgrowth of heterogeneous consumer preferences.402 Professors
Lemley and Lessig implicitly concede as much when they recognize that it
is the need for greater security and the growth of e-commerce that is
leading network providers to move away from standard protocols and to
introduce greater levels of intelligence into the network itself. The clear
consumer benefits provided by the development of the commercial
potential of the Internet lead Lemley and Lessig to recognize that a move
towards proprietary standards may be “inevitable.”403 The recent discovery
of security flaws in certain commonly used Internet protocols only serves
to underscore the potential security dangers associated with the use of
uniform standards.404
Similarly, even scholars concerned about the dangers of closed
systems have acknowledged that exclusivity can similarly serve procompetitive functions, in that it “can serve to differentiate products and
networks, to encourage investment in these networks, and to overcome
free-riding.”405 As a result, these scholars have uniformly rejected applying
a rule of per se illegality to such arrangements.406
2.

The Relationship Between Market Concentration and Innovation

Professors Lemley and Lessig further oppose permitting cable modem
providers to exert too much control over the architecture of the Internet on
the grounds that “the empirical evidence suggests quite strongly that it is
400 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON.
PERSP. 93, 110 (1994).
401 See id. (noting that “the primary cost of standardization is loss of variety: consumers have
fewer differentiated products to pick from”); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 71 (1985) (counting “reduction in variety” as one
of the “important social costs” of standardization).
402 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 400, at 106 (noting that “market equilibrium with
multiple incompatible products reflects the social value of variety”); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283,
292 (1996) (“Where there are differences in preference regarding alternative standards, coexistence of
standards is a likely outcome.”).
403 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 939.
404 See Hiawatha Bray, Software Flaw May Pose Risk for Net Users, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
13, 2001, at D2 (discussing security flaw in TCP/IP); James Glanz, Cryptologists Discover Flaw in EMail Security Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at A14 (discussing security flaw in commonly
used encryption program).
405 Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 678 (1999).
406 Id. (“I am certainly not proposing a per se rule against exclusivity in a network
context.”); TIROLE, supra note 24, at 186 (“Theoretically, the only defensible position on vertical
restraints seems to be the rule of reason. . . . Legality or illegality per se . . . seems unwarranted.”).
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competition, not monopoly, that best spurs creativity.”407 In support of this
proposition, they cite two pieces of data: (1) a recent study by Professor
Howard Shelanski408 of the speed with which innovations in the
telecommunications industry were deployed and (2) the empirical evidence
about the relationship between market concentration and innovation on the
Internet.409 My own review of both of these sources reveals that the
relationship between market concentration and innovation is more
ambiguous than Lemley and Lessig suggest.
The Shelanski Study. This ambitious work identified ten recent
innovations in telecommunications and measured both the market structure
under which each was deployed, as well as the length of time between the
initial deployment of the technology and the time each technology was
deployed in thirty percent of the relevant network points.410 Specifically,
Professor Shelanski identified whether a particular innovation was
deployed under one of three market structures: (1) monopoly conditions,
(2) “concentrated oligopoly conditions,” defined as competition restricted
to two or three firms, and (3) “competitive oligopoly conditions,” defined
as competition among more than three firms.411 Professor Shelanski then
calculated the average deployment time for technologies deployed under
monopoly conditions (9 years), concentrated oligopoly conditions (8
years), and competitive oligopoly conditions (4.3 years). This led
Professor Shelanski to conclude that faster deployment times correlate
with more competitive market structures.412
The care with which Professor Shelanski frames his empirical study
makes it particularly important to pay close attention to the caveats that he
attaches to his work. First of all, Shelanski himself concedes that his
results are far from conclusive. Given the relatively small number of
observations and the high degree of variance within each category, it
comes as no surprise that Shelanski made no attempt to evaluate whether
the differences were statistically significant. Even a casual review of the
numbers reveals that even a small change in almost any of them would
.

407 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 961.
408 Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of New Technology in U.S.
Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85.
409 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 961-62.
410 Shelanski, supra note 408, at 99.
411 According to Shelanski, four innovations were deployed under monopoly conditions:
touch-tone dialing, digital stored-program-control switching, ISDN transmission, and electronic storeprogram-control switching. Three other innovations were deployed under concentrated oligopoly
conditions: SS-7 signaling, fiber-optic transport, and automatic switching. Three other innovations
were deployed under competitive oligopoly conditions: DSL service, cable modem service, and digital
wireless telephony. See id. at 98-114 (describing these various innovations in detail).
412 Id. at 115.
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Table IX. Deployment of Ten Telecommunications Innovations
Market
Structure

Monopoly

Concentrated
Oligopoly

Competitive
Oligopoly

Technology

Time to 30%
Deployment

Touch-tone dialing

4 years

Digital stored-programcontrol switching

7 years

ISDN transmission

9 years

Electronic stored-programcontrol switching

14 years

SS-7 signaling

4 years

Fiber-optic transport

6 years

Automatic switching

12 years

DSL service

2 years

Cable modem service

3 years

Digital wireless

7 years

Average Time
to Deployment

9 years

8 years

4.3 years

Source: Shelanski, supra note 408, at 116.

likely have a drastic impact on the results. It also bears mentioning that
Shelanski’s study focused on the time it took to deploy technologies that
had already been developed rather than innovative activity proper.413
Indeed, as Shelanski specifically notes, many of the innovations that he
studied had lain fallow for several years after their initial development.414
As such, his study is more properly regarded as focusing on investment
rather than innovation, since it measures the time it took to deploy
technologies that had already been developed rather than the time needed
to create the technological innovations in the first place. Shelanski also
413 See id. (noting that the key measurement in the study was the length of time between the
date of initial deployment and the date when thirty percent deployment was reached).
414 See id. at 99 (touch-tone dialing was developed in the late 1950s, but not deployed until
1963), 105 (SS-7 signalling was developed in the 1970s, but not deployed until 1987), 111 (DSL was
developed in 1989, but not deployed until 1996).
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correctly notes that finding a correlation says nothing about causation.415
Indeed, as Joseph Schumpeter famously suggested, it is quite possible that
innovative activity causes market concentration and not the other way
around.416
In addition, Shelanski recognizes that the speed with which a new
technology is deployed depends on a wide range of considerations aside
from market concentration. Differences in costs and benefits can have a
large impact on deployment rates.417 Similarly, the leading commentary on
product diffusion has recognized that a wide range of factors can affect the
speed of product diffusion, including (1) the relative advantage conferred
by the new product, (2) the compatibility of the new product with existing
products, (3) the complexity of the product, (4) the new product’s
trialability, and (5) the observability of the innovation to others.418 Other
relevant factors include initial costs, ongoing costs, risk and uncertainty,
scientific credibility, and social approval.419 Most importantly, since all of
the innovations studied occurred in a heavily regulated industry, Shelanski
was unable to determine whether some other factor correlated with market
concentration might, in fact, be the true causal driver of the effect he
observed. These would include a wide variety of factors, including
“pricing rules, service requirements, subsidy flows and other regulatory
and institutional factors.”420
Finally, and most importantly, the conclusion that Shelanski draws
suggests that he would disagree with any attempts to draw simple policy
inferences from his work. Shelanski simply argues that the data provided
“sufficient support for an initial presumption that competition and
implementation of new technology are mutually reinforcing, rather than
conflicting, objectives.”421 He concedes that the record is too mixed and
the data points too few to support a conclusive presumption. His work thus
does not support the kind of categorical determination against such

415 Id. at 117.
416 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942).
417 Shelanski, supra note 408, at 114-15.
418 EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 240-51 (4th ed. 1995). This
framework represents the basic analytical approach reflected in many of the leading marketing
textbooks. See, e.g., PHILIP KOTLER, MARKET MANAGEMENT 357 (Millennium ed. 1999); THOMAS S.
ROBERTSON, JOAN ZIELINSKI, & SCOTT WARD, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 373-76 (1984).
419 KOTLER, supra note 418, at 442; Minhi Hahn, Sehoon Park, & Andris A. Zoltners,
Analysis of New Production Diffusion Using a Four-Segment Trial-Repeat Model, 13 MARKETING SCI.
224 (1994); Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller, & Frank M. Bass, Diffusion of New Products: Empirical
Generalizations and Managerial Uses, 14 MARKETING SCI. G79 (1995); Fareena Sultan, John U.
Farley, & Donald R. Lehmann, Reflection on “A Meta-Analysis of Applications of Diffusion Models,”
33 J. MARKETING RES. 247 (1996).
420 Shelanski, supra note 408, at 86.
421 Id. at 117.

275

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 19:171, 2002

consolidation that would be embodied in a regulation imposing open
access. Indeed, Shelanski’s other work strongly suggests the contrary.422
Empirical Studies of the Relationship Between Concentration and
Innovation. Professors Lemley and Lessig suggest that “the empirical
evidence suggests quite strongly that it is competition, not monopoly, that
spurs creativity.”423 My own review of the extensive empirical literature on
this question indicates that, as a general matter, the relationship between
innovation and market structure is more ambiguous than Lemley and
Lessig suggest.424 While some studies found that increases in research and
development tended to be associated with high market concentration,425
other studies came to precisely the opposite conclusion.426 Still others
studies argued that the relationship between market concentration and
innovation was non-linear. Under these analyses, innovative activity is at
its lowest when the market is either highly competitive or monopolistic
and at its highest at moderate levels of concentration. If the level of
innovation were drawn as a function of market concentration, the resulting
pattern would thus appear as an “inverted-U.”427 Still other studies suggest
422 See Shelanski, supra note 25, at 739-44 (arguing that competition could slow the
deployment of broadband transport services).
423 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 48.
424 For useful surveys of the empirical literature, see MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L.
SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION 86-91 (1980); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 72, at
644-51; PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 46-49 (1983);
Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 1059, 1074-78 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig
eds., 1989).
425 See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1968); F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH:
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 59-64 (1984); Louis Amato & J. Michael Ryan, Market Structure and
Dynamic Performance in U.S. Manufacturing, 47 S. ECON. J. 1105 (1981); A.J. Buxton, The Process
of Technical Change in UK Manufacturing, 7 APPLIED ECON. 53 (1975); Douglas F. Greer & Stephen
A. Rhoades, Concentration and Productivity Changes in the Long and Short Run, 43 S. ECON. J. 1031
(1976); D. Hamberg, Size of Firm, Oligopoly, and Research: The Evidence, 30 CANADIAN J. ECON. &
POL. SCI. 62 (1964); Ira Horowitz, Firm Size and Research Activity, 28 S. ECON. J. 298 (1962); Albert
N. Link, An Analysis of the Composition of R&D Spending, 49 S. ECON. J. 343 (1982); Edwin
Mansfield, Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: Determinants, Prospects, and Relation
to Size of Firm and Inventive Output, 72 J. POL. ECON. 319 (1964); Edwin Mansfield, Composition of
R and D Expenditures: Relationship to Size of Firm Concentration, and Innovative Output, 63 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 610 (1981); J.B. Rosenberg, Research and Market Share: A Reappraisal of the
Schumpeter Hypothesis, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 101 (1976); see also DANIEL HAMBERG, R&D: ESSAYS
ON THE ECONOMICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 64-65 (1966) (finding a positive correlation
between industry concentration and research and development spending but calling it weak).
426 See, e.g., BARRY BOZEMAN & ALBERT N. LINK, INVESTMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY 53
(1983); Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical
Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678, 686-87 (1988); Arun K. Mukhopadhyay, Technological Progress
and Change in Market Concentration in the U.S., 1963-77, 52 S. ECON. J. 141 (1985); Oliver E.
Williamson, Innovation and Market Structure, 73 J. POL. ECON. 67 (1965).
427 See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and
Engineers, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 524 (1967); John D. Culbertson, Should Antitrust Use the
Schumpeterian Model?: The Case of the Food Industries, in ISSUES AFTER A CENTURY OF FEDERAL
COMPETITION POLICY 103, 106-07 (Robert L. Wills et al., eds., 1987); Richard C. Levin et al., R&D
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that understanding the relationship requires the study of variables.428 In
particular, many studies have focused on the level of “technological
opportunity” available to a particular industry,429 with some studies finding
concentration to be particularly conducive to innovation when
technological opportunity is high430 and other studies finding the
contrary.431 Given this confusing welter of information, it comes as no
surprise that surveys of this literature have tended to describe it as
“inconclusive”432 and exhibiting “little consensus.”433
Thus, as Professors Lemley and Lessig acknowledge,434 there appears
to be little empirical basis for believing that, as a general matter, higher
levels of innovation are associated with lower levels of market
concentration. In the end, their argument turns on their own observations
on the relationship between open architecture and innovation with respect
to the Internet and their belief that past performance has been sufficiently
Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumpeterian
Hypotheses, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 20 (1985); John T. Scott, Firm Versus Industry Variability in R&D
Intensity, in R&D, PATENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 233 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984); B. Wahlroos & M.
Backström, R&D Intensity with Endogenous Concentration, Evidence for Finland, 7 EMPIRICAL ECON.
13 (1982); Thomas Monroe Kelly, The Influences of Firm Size and Market Structure on the Research
Efforts of Large Multiple-Product Firms 85-86 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma
State University) (on file with author).
428 Reinhard Angelmar, Market Structure and Research Intensity in High-TechnologicalOpportunity Industries, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 69 (1985); William S. Comanor, Market Structure,
Product Differentiation, and Industrial Research, 81 Q.J. ECON. 639 (1967); J. Lunn & S. Martin,
Market Structure, Firm Structure, and Research and Development, 27 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 31
(1986); Dennis C. Mueller & John E. Tilton, Research and Development Costs as a Barrier to Entry, 2
CANADIAN J. ECON. 570 (1969); Ronald E. Shrieves, Market Structure and Innovation: A New
Perspective, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 329 (1978); Robert W. Wilson, The Effect of Technological
Environment and Product Rivalry on R&D Effort and Licensing of Inventions, 59 REV. ECON. & STAT.
171 (1977).
429 See KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 424, at 91 (“There is agreement that the relation
[between research efforts and concentration] may vary with the ‘technological opportunity class’ of the
industry.”). For useful surveys of this literature, see Cohen & Levin, supra note 424, at 1083-90;
KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 424, at 58-64, 88-90; SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 72, at 646-49;
STONEMAN, supra note 424, at 47-49.
430 Kelly, supra note 427; Almarin Phillips, Patents, Potential Competition, and Technical
Progress, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 301 (1966); F.M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and
the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1965); Scott, supra note 427.
431 F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 24-46
(1984); W.J. Adams, Firm Size and Research Activity: France and the United States, 84 Q.J. ECON.
386 (1970); P. A. Geroski, Innovation, Technological Opportunity, and Market Structure, 42 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 586 (1990); Steven Globerman, Market Structure and R&D in Canadian
Manufacturing Industries, 13 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 59 (1973); Henry G. Grabowski, The
Determinants of Industrial Research and Development: A Study of the Chemical, Drug, and Petroleum
Industries, 76 J. POL. ECON. 292 (1968); John Lunn, An Empirical Analysis of Process and Product
Patenting: A Simultaneous Equation Framework, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 319 (1986); Lunn & Martin,
supra note 428; Rosenberg, supra note 425; Shrieves, supra note 428.
432 Cohen & Levin, supra note 424, at 1061.
433 KAMIEN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 424, at 91.
434 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 961 (recognizing that whether competition or
monopoly better fosters innovation “is not a question that can be answered a priori, but only by
reference to actual cases”).
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meritorious to justify erecting a presumption in favor of the status quo.435
Lemley and Lessig may well be correct. Unfortunately, it is impossible to
verify such a claim, since one cannot determine whether the world would
have been more or less innovative had the Internet taken a different
structure. Given that the imposition of open access is tantamount to a
declaration that vertical integration in this industry is per se illegal, the
unlikelihood of economic harm and the real possibility of efficiencies
identified by conventional vertical integration theory would seem to make
it more appropriate to place the burden of proof on those who would
impose open access regulation. The ambiguities surrounding the
relationship between market structure and innovation should lead us to
require more than casual empiricism before enacting what would amount
to a declaration of per se illegality.
3.

Network Externalities and Vertical Competition

Finally, in relying on the work of Timothy Bresnahan,436 Professors
Lemley and Lessig implicitly base their argument in favor of preserving
the Internet’s end-to-end architecture on a theory of network externalities.
As I noted earlier, other open access advocates have advanced similar
arguments.437 My principal concern about such arguments is that, all too
often, the existence of network externalities is automatically associated
with the phenomena of “tipping” and “lock in.” An examination of the
economic literature reveals that reducing network externalities to the
harms to innovation associated with these phenomena is far too simplistic
and that a correct application of network economic principles yields a far
more complex (and ambiguous) perspective.
a.

The Ambiguous Impact of Network Economic Effects on
Innovation

As noted above, network economics are almost invariably cited for
the fact that the presence of network externalities can harm innovation by
causing an inferior technology to become locked in. A review of the
leading articles on the subject reveals that such a perspective is far too
simplistic. As Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner have pointed out, a
consumer’s decision to adopt a new technology actually gives rise to two
distinct and countervailing externalities. When the value of a network
435 Id. at 933, 961-62.
436 Id. at 942. In his other work, Lemley recognizes that the policy implications of network
economics are quite ambiguous. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 498-99, 591-601 (1998).
437 E.g., Hausman et al., supra note 13, at 161-64.
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depends on the number of people using the network, any decision to adopt
a new technology enhances the value of the new network to those who
have already adopted it as well as to those who will adopt it in the
future.438 Because the person adopting the new technology is thus unable
to capture all of the benefits created by his or her adoption decision,
individuals may refrain from adopting a new technology even when it
would be socially beneficial for them to do so.439 The existence of such
positive externalities (i.e., benefits that the person adopting the new
technology is unable to capture) may make the market reluctant to adopt a
new technology, even when doing so is in society’s best interest. This can
cause markets to become “locked in” to obsolete technologies, a
phenomenon that Farrell and Saloner refer to as “excess inertia.”440
At the same time, however, the adoption of a new technology also
gives rise to a countervailing negative externality that may produce
precisely the opposite effect. This is because any decision to adopt a new
technology also lowers the value of the old technology by reducing the
number of people using it. Individuals considering adopting a new
technology thus do not fully internalize the costs created by their decision.
This may make an individual willing to adopt a new technology even when
the net costs to society exceed the net benefits, a situation variously called
“excess momentum”441 or “insufficient friction.”442 It is thus theoretically
possible that the presence of network economic effects may accelerate,
rather than retard, the pace with which new technologies are adopted. The
impact of network externalities on innovation thus depends upon which of
these two externalities dominates. This is an empirical question that cannot
be simply asserted.
In addition, the economic literature also identifies a number of other
features relevant to the broadband transport industry that can mitigate, or
even eliminate, whatever problems are caused by network externalities.
For example, excess inertia can be overcome if the value of the new
product introduction exceeds the value of maintaining standardization.443
As Steven Kaplan and Mark Ramseyer succinctly put it, “an entrenched
438 Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 941 (1986).
439 Farrell and Saloner also point out that this burden will rest particularly heavily on the
earliest adopters, and that “[o]nce the first potential adopters decide not to adopt the new technology,
. . . the excess inertia only becomes worse.” Id. at 942.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J.
INDUS. ECON. 55, 73 (1992).
443 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 400, at 106 (observing that new, incompatible standards may
emerge despite the presence of network externalities if “consumers . . . care more about product
attributes than network size”); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 4 (1990) (noting that the “greater the gap in performance between the two standards, . . . the
more likely that a move to the efficient standard will take place”).
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inefficient technology is potentially a twenty-dollar bill lying on the
sidewalk.”444 A sufficiently large difference in value should be sufficient
to overcome whatever inertia exists. Even in the absence of such
differences in valuation, convertibility or interoperability may limit the
inhibition of innovation.445 Thus, even if owners of proprietary networks
optimize their systems in ways that favor their own applications, the
problems stemming from network externalities may be ameliorated if the
network owner preserves the ability to run the basic Internet protocols,
notwithstanding the fact that the proprietary changes imposed by the
system owner may cause those protocols to run less efficiently.
Most importantly for our purposes, explosive growth of the kind that
the broadband transport industry is currently undergoing can render the
network externalities largely irrelevant.446 As Stan Liebowitz and Stephen
Margolis have observed, “If a market is growing rapidly, the number of
users who have made commitments to any standard is small relative to the
number of future users.”447 In such cases, the fact that a particular firm
may currently dominate a market is of little consequence. People
concerned about lock-in will focus on the size of the network that will
exist in the future, not the size of the one that exists today.
It is thus far from clear whether the broadband transport industry is
susceptible to becoming locked in to any technology at this point. But the
questions will become more complex still. As the next subsection will
demonstrate, even when problematic network externalities are present, it is
far from clear that standardization and preventing firms from controlling
large portions of the network are the best way to solve the problem. On the
contrary, the economic literature suggests that such steps might exacerbate
these problems further.
b.

Proprietary Networks as a Solution to Network
Externalities

Even if a market is subject to network externalities, it is arguable that
insisting on standardization will make the problem worse and not better.
First, the existence of multiple standards can mitigate many of the

444 Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with their Disdain for
Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 405 (1996).
445 Lemley & McGowan, supra note 436, at 516; Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 443, at
5; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy,
9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 310, 312 (1996).
446 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 442, at 67, 73 (concluding that exponential market growth
effectively prevents excess inertia); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 445, at 292 (“Entrenched
incumbents are less entrenched when consumers react to new sales . . . .”).
447 Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 445, at 312.
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problems caused by network economic effects. As Michael Katz and Carl
Shapiro have noted:
Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to limit tipping
and sustain multiple networks. If the rival systems have distinct
features sought by certain customers, two or more systems may be able
to survive by catering to consumers who care more about product
attributes than network size. Here, market equilibrium with multiple
incompatible products reflects the social value of variety.448

Even in the absence of such customer heterogeneity, permitting
proprietary networks to develop may also solve the network externality
problem in the way that economics traditionally solves externality and
investment problems: by creating well-defined property rights in the
resource. The benefit that a person connected to a network receives from
other people’s adoption decision increases with the percentage of the
network that the person controls. Allowing a single firm to control a
significant portion of the network would thus allow the firm to internalize
more of the benefits of the larger network and give it the incentive to make
the investments needed to get the ball rolling.449 Indeed, a formal model
proposed by Katz and Shapiro indicates that competition among
proprietary networks is more likely to lead to the adoption of the socially
optimal technology than is competition between non-proprietary networks
or competition between a proprietary and a non-proprietary network.450
Another of Katz and Shapiro’s models found that “the sponsor of a new
technology earns greater profits than its entry contributes to social welfare.
In other words, markets with network externalities in which new
technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias towards new technologies.”451
Thus, the suggestion that the existence of proprietary networks tends to
retard innovation is far from unassailable.
The presence of firms that occupy a large proportion of a particular
network may make that network less susceptible to becoming locked in to
any particular technology. Large suppliers and customers of the network
also suffer less from the problems caused by network externalities since
448 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 400, at 106 (citing Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 (1986)); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 445, at
292 (“Where there are differences in preference regarding alternative standards, coexistence of
standards is a likely outcome.”).
449 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 400, at 101; Katz & Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the
Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 825 (1986); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?, 17 RES. L. ECON. 1, 11, 13
(1995). The fear of being held up after committing to a network might make consumers reluctant to
join proprietary networks. Katz and Shapiro describe a number of ways that a network owner can allay
such fears. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 400, at 104-05, 107.
450 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 449, at 825, 838-39.
451 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 442, at 73.

281

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 19:171, 2002

their sheer size allows them to be the primary beneficiaries of their own
adoption decisions.452 As a result, “large buyers are natural candidates to
be the network sponsor.”453 The existence of large players thus represents
one way in which the problems of network externalities may be
circumvented. Far from being a bane, such firms may be a blessing in
disguise.
c.

The Ultimate Ambiguity of Vertical Competition

Finally, even assuming that the network externalities ultimately prove
intractable and cause the market to become locked in to particular
technologies, it is far from clear whether regulatory intervention would be
appropriate. The most complete exposition of this approach appears in the
work of Timothy Bresnahan, upon which Lemley and Lessig rely.454
Bresnahan’s focus is on a market in which the presence of network
externalities, strategic entry barriers, and cost asymmetries leads each
horizontal layer of a chain of production to become dominated by a single
firm. Once these firms achieve dominance over each horizontal layer of
the market, the nature of competition changes. Unlike the standard
industrial organization framework, under which multiple firms compete at
each level, what emerges is a distinctly Schumpeterian (if not Kuhnian)
form of competition,455 characterized by “long eras of stable buyer-seller
relationships,” during which players focus on making incremental
improvements to the existing platforms, “punctuated by epochs of radical
change” resulting from major leaps forward in technology.456
Under this theory, Bresnahan regards many of the features that
trouble other commentators as nothing more than the result of market
equilibrium. For example, the existence of dominant firms is inevitable
rather than problematic. As Bresnahan notes, “there will be a client-side
dominant firm (whether its name is Microsoft or not).”457 In addition,
competition in such a market is likely to be characterized by what
Bresnahan calls “divided technical leadership,” in which firms with similar
technical and marketing capabilities attempt to seize control over key

452 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 400, at 102-03.
453 Id. at 102.
454 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 942 (citing Bresnahan, supra note 396).
455 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF A SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962); SCHUMPETER,
supra note 416, at 83-85.
456 Bresnahan, supra note 396, at 161; see also id. at 169 (“It is not easy to spring customers
loose from the network effects of the incumbent’s standard, not even for an entrant from an adjacent
layer. The most common trigger for an outbreak of epochal vertical competition is a major
technological dislocation.”).
457 Id. at 194.
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platform elements.458 Since the different platform elements act as
complements, each firm depends, in the short run, on the cooperation of
other firms in keeping prices from any one layer from being too high and
in making sure that the components remain compatible.459 In the long run,
however, the companies vie to capture the rents generated by other layers
primarily by channeling their energy into inventing new platform
components.460 Over time, firms can be expected to push constantly at the
boundaries between the layers, either by attempting to expand into
additional technologies or by advancing their own technology in ways that
affect the interfaces between layers.461 Thus, although the emergence of
proprietary standards and the move to integrate into adjacent markets may
well represent an attempt to monopolize a market in an anti-competitive
manner, they may also be nothing more than the logical outgrowth of
vertical competition. The problem is that it can be very hard to distinguish
the two.462
It is not at all clear that this model fits the cable modem industry. At
present, no firm controls more than sixteen percent of the high-speed
broadband market. The current level of competition from DSL and the
regulatory constraints limiting the ability of cable operators to increase
their geographic footprint make it unlikely that any cable modem operator
will be able to achieve dominance in the future.463
Even if the theory does apply, it is far from clear what policy makers
should do about it. Kevin Werbach somewhat conclusorily asserts that the
proper solution is to impose open access and other regulations that help
insure that the interfaces between the various layers remain open.464 In
contrast, Bresnahan is more circumspect about the possible benefits
flowing from open access. His analysis suggests only two policy goals.
First, policy makers could attempt to encourage dominant firms operating
within an “era” to become more innovative. Bresnahan questions the
wisdom of this goal since vertical competition already provides substantial
incentives for dominant firms to innovate within eras and any failure to do
so will have the pro-competitive consequence of hastening the arrival of

458 Id. at 166. Bresnahan identifies several factors driving dominant firms to attempt to
disadvantage other firms operating at a different level. Since the goods sold are typically
complementary, each firm depends upon keeping firms at other levels from charging high prices,
failing to innovate, and making their products incompatible. In addition, each firm has the incentive to
attempt to capture rents generated by another layer. Id.
459 Id.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 168.
462 Id. at 172.
463 See Hazlett & Bittlingmayer, supra note 386, at 22-23; Lopatka & Page, supra note 21, at
915.
464 See Werbach, supra note 306.
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the next epoch.465 Indeed, regulatory intervention into the interfaces
between the various layers might actually hurt competition by locking in
the existing relationships in ways that decrease the level of vertical
competition.
Second, policy makers could attempt to speed the arrival of the next
wave of epochal competition by making it easier for competitors to
dislodge the incumbent dominant firm. As a general matter, this would
require the government to promote the emergence of a new technology
platform.466 Bresnahan finds this second policy goal to be problematic for
several reasons. Not only does it require users to abandon considerable
investments that they have already made in the existing platforms, it also
requires policy makers to forecast which new platform should be the
winner and do so at an early stage in the technology’s development, when
such judgments are hardest to make. Even worse, such a decision would
likely be made on the basis of proprietary information supplied by the
parties themselves.467 In addition, Bresnahan warns that policy making in
this area tends to be influenced by certain biases that can lead to bad policy
results.468 As a result, Bresnahan urges policy makers to refrain from
intervening and instead to let the forces of the market determine the proper
outcome.469
Thus, the very model upon which Professors Lemley and Lessig rely
does not necessarily support the imposition of open access. Indeed, given
the high-rates of growth currently associated with both cable modems and
DSL providers, it appears that, for the time being, the broadband transport
industry is in the throes of an epochal phase of competition, in which
radical technological change is transforming the market. In such a
situation, there seems little purpose for the government to attempt to speed
the arrival of the next epoch. On the contrary, according to Bresnahan, the
real danger arises from the possibility that the government would be thrust
into the position of picking technological winners and losers.
Unfortunately, the current state of asymmetrical regulation, in which DSL
providers are subject to significantly greater regulatory burdens than cable
modem providers, makes it increasingly likely that the government will
assume this role. Confronted with these dangers, I would heed Bresnahan’s
advice and allow the market to sort out the relative merits of these two
technologies. I thus agree with Lemley and Lessig’s call for regulatory
symmetry in the broadband industry.470 Where we differ is that Lemley
465
466
467
468
469
470

284

Bresnahan, supra note 396, at 167-69, 198-99.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 200-03.
Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 927-28.
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and Lessig would impose access requirements on both DSL and cable
modems, whereas the symmetry I envision is one in which neither industry
is subject to access regulation.
IV. Obstacles to an Integrated Approach to Vertical Media Regulation
Many, if not most, of the economic principles I have described are far
from new. Quite the contrary, many of the ideas on which I rely represent
some of the most firmly established principles of competition policy. What
then explains the failure to appreciate the relevance of the various
economic principles? Three ideas come to mind.
A. Misplaced Focus on Technological Differences Rather than
Functional Similarities
The most salient mistake identified by the foregoing analysis is the
tendency to treat each technology as if it were a universe unto itself.
Failing to recognize the emergence of cable networks as competitors to the
broadcast networks, DBS as a competitor to cable, and DSL as a
competitor to cable modem service tends to exaggerate the dominance of
the supposedly dominant technology.
The first problem stems from a misconception about the important
role that the existence of substitutes can play in dissipating market power.
Courts long exhibited a tendency to treat each technology as if it were a
universe unto itself.471 For example, courts hearing tying cases have
historically presumed that the exclusive right to use a technology granted
by a patent necessarily gave rise to market power.472 This presumption
only makes sense if each technology is regarded as occupying a separate
market. Courts and commentators have become increasingly aware that
exclusive control over a particular technology confers no monopoly power
when substitutes for that technology exist.473 In such cases, any attempt to
471 See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 52, § 3.9d, at 141-42, § 10.3c, at 400-01.
472 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (“[I]f the
government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that
the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power.”); United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 619 (1977) (“Thus, the statutory grant of a patent monopoly . . .
represented tying product[s] that the Court regarded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption
of economic power.”); United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 45 n.4 (1962) (“The requisite
economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented . . . .”; “[W]hen the tying product is
patented . . . sufficiency of economic power is presumed.”).
473 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37 n.7 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A common
misconception has been that a patent . . . suffice[s] to demonstrate market power. . . . [A] patent holder
has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented products.”); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958) (“Of course it is common knowledge that a
patent does not always confer a monopoly over a particular commodity.”); Abbott Labs. v. Brennan,
952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A patent does not of itself establish a presumption of market
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extract additional benefits will simply induce customers and suppliers to
turn to the alternative technology instead.
Even if aware of this problem, policy makers at the FCC remain
constrained by the technological approach embodied in the structure of the
Communications Act of 1934 itself. As Kevin Werbach has pointed out,
the Act divides the communications market horizontally, with each major
technology being governed by a separate chapter in Title 47 of the U.S.
Code and a separate bureau within the FCC.474 As a result, each regulatory
decision is statutorily and bureaucratically programmed to address a single
technology.475 This technological division could provide a satisfactory
basis for policy making only so long as the various technologies did not
act as substitutes for one another, since the FCC could focus on each
medium in isolation and could craft solutions tailored to the particular type
of communications conveyed, as well as to the economics underlying the
means of transmission. For example, the regulatory model developed for
telephony combined the natural monopoly economics of wire-based
communications with the relatively uncomplicated free speech
implications of person-to-person communications. The logical response
was common carriage obligations combined with rate regulation.
Conversely, with respect to broadcasting, the FCC attempted to craft a
solution suited to the interference-related problems of spectrum-based
communications, as well as the unique economic and First Amendment
issues raised by mass media products, which tend to be differentiated and
non-rivalrous and which tend to play a more important role in the political
process.
The emergence of cable television began to cause this tidy division to
unravel. Cable allowed mass media programming to reach consumers via
the technology previously dedicated to personal communications. As a
result, neither the telephony model nor the broadcast model could serve as
an adequate basis for regulation. What followed was thirty years of
.
power in the antitrust sense.”), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992); POSNER, supra note 69, at 172 n.3
(“A patent is actually a poor proxy for monopoly power . . . . (Some patents confer no monopoly
power at all. . . .)”); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247, 249-50 (1994) (“[I]t became conventional to say that a patent is a monopoly. Nonetheless,
it is readily apparent that the right to exclude another from ‘manufacture, use, and sale’ may give no
significant market power . . . .”); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES.
L. & ECON. 31, 31 (1986) (“Since competitive forces which act upon a patent holder are readily
identifiable, the patent holder cannot be assumed to have monopoly power.”). Consistent with this
insight, Congress amended the patent statute in 1988 to make clear that patent tying applies only when
the patents have been shown to confer monopoly power. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994).
474 For example, telephony is governed by Title II of the Communications Act and is
regulated by the Common Carrier Bureau. Broadcasting is governed by Title III of the Act and is
regulated by the Mass Media Bureau. Cable television is governed by Title VI of the Act and is
regulated by the Cable Services Bureau.
475 Werbach, supra note 306, at 2.
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Table X.

Means of
Transmission

Wire-Based
Spectrum-Based

Type of Speech Conveyed
Personal
Mass
Communications
Communications
Telephony
Broadcasting

confusion, as both the FCC and the courts attempted first to fit cable into
one of the existing regulatory boxes established by the Communications
Act and then struggled with the limits imposed by the application of
categories developed with another technology in mind.476 But the problems
raised by cable were more profound than simply finding a new regulatory
approach designed for the underlying characteristics of a new technology.
For the first time, policy makers had to design a regulatory scheme that
took into account not only the unique aspects of a new medium, but also
the fact that the new medium could act as a substitute for another medium.
Thus, the FCC could no longer treat each medium as a separate regulatory
problem. Any solution would have to confront the more difficult problem
of the interaction between two different media that each possessed
different strengths.477
The results can perhaps most charitably be described as chaotic.
Many of the FCC’s early attempts to regulate the relationship between the
broadcast and cable industries were either struck down by the courts478 or
abandoned.479 In the end, the major policy disputes were not resolved until
476 At first, the FCC denied that cable fell into any of the conceptual categories established
by the Communications Act. See Frontier Broad. Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) (Memorandum Opinion
and Order). It soon reversed itself and asserted jurisdiction over cable on the basis of its authority to
regulate the television industry. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 464-65
(1962) (Decision). The Supreme Court eventually upheld the FCC’s jurisdiction to act in United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). Placing cable within the broadcast regulatory scheme
only raised additional complications, however. The natural monopoly characteristics of cable led the
FCC to attempt to mandate leased access. The Supreme Court overturned the FCC’s leased access
requirement on the grounds that the title of the Communications Act governing broadcasting forbade
the imposition of common carriage obligations. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689
(1979).
477 See Werbach, supra note 306, at 10.
478 Most significantly, the courts struck down the FCC’s earliest attempts to impose must
carry requirements. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). Courts also struck down the FCC’s attempt to prohibit premium
channels as well as the “anti-siphoning rules” designed to prevent movies and other programs that
previously would have been shown on broadcast television from migrating to pay cable. See Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. ) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
479 For example, in 1974 the FCC repealed a regulation attempting to introduce parity
between broadcasting and cable by requiring cable operators to originate local programming. See
Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G, of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations Relative to Program
Origination by Cable Television Syss.; and Inquiry into the Dev. of Cable Casting Services to

287

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 19:171, 2002

Congress enacted major cable legislation in 1984 and 1992 that established
a separate title that largely prescribed the regulatory regime that would be
applied.480 The enactment of those statutes did not end the confusion and
the disputes over the proper scope of cable policy, however. Although the
Acts largely resolved the major jurisdictional and substantive issues over
cable regulation, they simply shifted the basis for dispute towards the First
Amendment.481
The arrival of wireless telephony completed the collapse of this neat
regulatory division. The identity between the means of transmission and
the type of speech transmitted disappeared altogether, as both mass market
and private speech could be conveyed through either means of
transmission.
Table XI.

Means of
Transmission

Wire-Based
Spectrum-Based

Type of Speech Conveyed
Personal
Mass
Communications
Communications
Telephony
Cable
Wireless
Broadcasting

Although the Telecommunications Act was trumpeted as a way to end
the “balkanization” of communications technologies,482 it did little to
dislodge the horizontal model of communications policy.483 It left the
existing technologically-oriented structure of the Communications Act
firmly in place. Even worse, it failed to take seriously the prospect that
Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974) (Report and Order). In
addition, the FCC later abolished rules in place since the mid-1960s that prevented most cable
operators from importing broadcast signals from other cities. See Cable Television Syndicated
Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980) (Report and Order) (repealing the prohibition on
distant signal importation), aff’d sub nom. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Amendment of Subpart D of Part 76 of the Comm’n’s Rules and
Regulations with Respect to Selection of Television Signals for Cable Television Carriage (Leapfrog
Rules): §§ 76.59(b)(1) and (2), 76.61 (b)(1) and (2), and 76.63, 57 F.C.C.2d 625, 645 (1976) (Report
and Order) (repealing the “anti-leapfrogging” rules that required those cable operators who were
permitted to import distant signals do so only from adjacent cities).
480 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102385, 106 Stat. 1460; Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
481 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 644 (2001); Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001); Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C.
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1112 (1996).
482 See Krattenmaker, supra note 200, at 130, 156 (1996).
483 Werbach, supra note 306, at 3.
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competition could arise from the same type of speech transmitted via
different technology.484 Although the recent reorganization of the FCC
along more functional lines is a welcome innovation, it does nothing to
change the balkanized structure of the underlying substantive mandates
that the FCC is charged with enforcing.
These problems are starting to plague the Internet as well.485 For
example, the proper categorization of cable modem service remains
elusive. At first, commentators tended to believe that it should be
classified as a cable service.486 A pair of recent judicial decisions has
classified cable modems as a telecommunications service.487 A recent
Supreme Court decision declined to resolve the issue.488 Hopefully, the
FCC will resolve the issue in the near future.
The problem, moreover, is about to get much worse. The impending
shift of all networks to packet-switched technologies promises to cause all
of the distinctions based on the means of conveyance and the type of
speech conveyed to collapse entirely. Once all communications are
reduced to bits and bytes, they can be transmitted via any technology.
Once this occurs, the distinctions drawn in the columns and the rows
represented in Table XI will no longer remain coherent as a regulatory
approach. Even more importantly, the shift to packet-switched, dataoriented networks will cause all the different means of transmission to
become substitutes for one another. The logical step is to adopt what
Kevin Werbach has termed a “layered approach,”489 which discards the
current policy of technological compartmentalization in favor of treating
the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing segments of the industry.
At this point, however, the existing statutory approach remains firmly
entrenched, and as the recent experience with financial services reform
reveals, any attempt to revise it promises to be time-consuming and
484 For example, when establishing the conditions under which a local telephone company
faces sufficient competition to justify releasing it from its regulatory obligations, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 in effect disregarded the possibility of competition from wireless
telephony. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997) (“For the purpose of this subparagraph,
services provided pursuant to subpart K of part 22 of the Commission’s regulations (47 C.F.R. 22.901
et seq.) shall not be considered to be telephone exchange services.”). The problems with this approach
are readily apparent in an era during which many cellular providers are encouraging customers to
terminate their landline service and to regard their wireless phones as the only phone they will ever
need.
485 For an excellent review and analysis of these issues, see Chen, supra note 13.
486 Shelanski, supra note 25, at 740-41; Speta, Handicapping, supra note 21, at 71-75; Shih,
supra note 390, at 801.
487 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2000); MediaOne Group,
Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 364-65 (4th Cir. 2001).
488 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782, 788 (2002). The
lower court had held that cable modem services were neither cable services nor telecommunications
services. See Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002).
489 Werbach, supra note 306, at 9-13.
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heavily politicized. We thus appear to be stuck with the statutory structure
we now have, and the regulatory and institutional framework resulting
from that structure makes any revolutionary shifts in approach all but
impossible. So long as the underlying statutory framework remains in
place, there remains a danger that the FCC will continue to analyze
markets on a technology-by-technology basis without taking into account
the extent to which services serve as substitutes for one another.490
B.

Lack of a Comprehensive Approach to the Economics of Vertical
Integration

Another key explanation is that policy makers and commentators are
all too often incompletely versed in the basic economic insights of the past
few decades of scholarship on vertical integration. The dangers of vertical
integration seem quite intuitive: It seems obvious that a merger between
the nation’s largest ISP and its second largest cable operator would
threaten competition. In fact, the Supreme Court accepted both leveraging
and foreclosure as rationales for decades. Furthermore, there is a
tremendous temptation to look at the real problems facing the competitors
who are being shut out and forget that antitrust laws exist to benefit
competition, not competitors. What the last half-century of economic
theory has demonstrated is that, while vertical integration can harm
competition, circumstances also exist in which vertical integration can
promote efficiency.
In addition, antitrust and regulated industries law has done a relatively
poor job of developing a sophisticated understanding of vertical
integration. Both antitrust and regulatory policy are largely geared towards
static efficiency concerns of price and quantity and consumer choice in the
here and now. They seem badly designed to take into account dynamic
efficiency considerations, such as the effect that compelled access has on
incentives to invest and innovate. In addition, the law has tended not to
give potential transaction cost efficiencies proper consideration. A review
of the leading communications law and antitrust textbooks reveals that
discussions of transaction cost considerations tend to be limited to brief
descriptions of the possibility of free riding on pre-sale services.491 The
490 See Shelanski, supra note 25, at 741 (noting that the need to place DSL and cable
modems in particular regulatory boxes may lead the FCC to ignore any rivalry that may exist between
those services).
491 For the discussions appearing in the leading communications law textbooks, see STUART
MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW AND POLICY 293, 301 (2001); and MICHAEL BOTEIN, REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS
MEDIA 267, 285 (3d ed. 1998). For the discussions appearing in the leading antitrust textbooks, see
PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 614-15 (5th
ed. 1997); CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW: INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION 464-66 (1998); MILTON HANDLER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE
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economic literature on vertical integration does not fare much better. In
fact, the formal models of vertical integration routinely fail to take
efficiencies into account.492
Finally, a proper understanding of vertical integration depends as
much on the interaction between the various economic principles as it does
on the principles themselves. Viewed in this manner, the nature of the
disagreement between Professors Lemley and Lessig and Professor Speta
over the dangers of monopoly leveraging begins to make sense. Professors
Lemley and Lessig argue that Professor Speta’s critique of leveraging
suffers from a large prediction problem since cable modem providers are
clearly engaging in vertical integration.493 It is true that, if viewed in
isolation, the critique of leveraging would suggest that vertical integration
would never occur. The conclusion changes dramatically when all of
vertical integration theory is viewed as an integrated whole, since the
existence of welfare-enhancing efficiencies provides a strong explanation
of why vertical integration might be economically beneficial. Thus
reconstructed, the argument is not that the critique of leveraging
demonstrates that vertical integration is never profitable and thus never
undertaken. A more comprehensive view of the vertical integration
literature reveals that it is highly unlikely that vertical integration in the
markets considered by this Article is being driven by anti-competitive
motives. The fact that vertical integration is in fact occurring tends instead
to suggest the existence of efficiencies from vertical integration. Thus, the
supposed prediction problem that Professors Lemley and Lessig have
identified simply disappears.
C.

Misconceived Analogies to Previous Legacy Monopolies

Lastly, there is also a temptation for policy makers and commentators
to draw inspiration from old regulatory patterns and models. The FCC’s
long history with rate regulation and common carriage obligations in both
telephony and cable television, along with its perceived mandate to open

REGULATION 582-84 (4th ed. 1997); THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 604-06 (2d ed. 2001); and E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 420-21 (4th
ed. 1999). Note that none of these texts contain an index entry for “transaction costs.” Regulated
industry textbooks provide somewhat more extended discussions of these issues. See JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, THOMAS D. MORGAN, & PAUL R. VERKUIL, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 191-219 (1997); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION 261-74 (1994);
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
405-08 (2d ed. 1998).
492 See Klass & Salinger, supra note 128, at 679, 681-83; Snyder & Kauper, supra note 135,
at 593.
493 Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 948, 951.
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markets,494 appear to lead to the imposition of compelled access on nondiscriminatory terms. It is all too easy to see a lot of Ma Bell in the modern
incarnation of Ma Cable.495
The comparison to AT&T, however, is inapt. As noted earlier,
compelled access makes sense only if the industry being regulated is truly
a natural monopoly that has already entered its mature stage in which the
technology has already been largely deployed and incremental revenue and
customer growth is relatively slow. Regulatory solutions are easier to
manage, in that regulators can predict the future with greater confidence.
Investment incentives also play a lesser role. Such an approach, however,
has little applicability to industries like high-speed broadband, which are
undergoing explosive growth and technological change. In such industries,
firms do not compete over switching over a fixed number of existing
customers. Instead, firms engage in vigorous competition to capture new
customers. In addition, investment incentives play a more central role in
regulatory policy when a growing industry is involved, and regulators
confront the nearly intractable task of having to predict which technologies
are likely to emerge as superior. As a result, policy makers should think
long and hard before extending regulatory solutions developed for mature
markets to an industry that is growing rapidly at a time when the growing
competition among communications channels that had previously been
separate is beginning to erode the natural monopoly characteristics of all
media.
Not only are there dramatic differences in the industries being
regulated; there are also drastic differences in the size and scope of the two
organizations being compared. There can be little question that AT&T was
able to use its absolute control over particular vertical levels of
competition to squelch competition in other levels.496 There is a key
difference between the two situations, however. Unlike the old AT&T,
which controlled the entire national market for long distance, local service,
and telephone equipment, the current players in the telecommunications
markets control only a limited portion of the national market. In fact, the
largest MSO controls only seventeen percent of the national market for
MVPDs and sixteen percent of the broadband transport market; the second
494 See Shelanski, supra note 25, at 739.
495 See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 16, at 936-38. The specter of Ma Cable was largely
dissipated by AT&T’s recent announcement that it was selling its cable properties to Comcast. See
Solomon & Frank, supra note 229.
496 For example, from 1900 to 1930, AT&T was able to use the market power provided by
its long distance patents to quash the emergence of competitive providers of local telephone service.
See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v.
AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 292-93 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds.,
1989). Later on, it was able to use its monopoly control over the nation’s local telephone service to
stifle the arrival of competition in the long distance markets. Id. at 302-06.
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largest controls only fifteen percent of both of those markets. As the D.C.
Circuit recently held, given that the FCC has concluded that a new cable
network need only reach twenty percent of the market to achieve minimum
viable scale, the argument that either of these companies was in a position
to unilaterally harm competition in the market for television networks is
simply not credible.497
In addition, it is far from clear that the FCC’s previous efforts to
dislodge legacy monopolies should properly be viewed as success models.
Although there are clearly some examples in which the FCC served to
promote competition in telephone service,498 other commentators have
been struck by the extent to which AT&T was able to use the regulatory
process to thwart competition.499 Indeed, both Chicago500 and PostChicago theorists501 agree that regulation can be a way to impose cost
disadvantages on rivals and to create barriers to entry. These insights have
been confirmed by a vibrant empirical literature identifying a wide variety
of cases in which various forms of regulation were used precisely in this
manner.502
A review of the history of mass media regulation reveals a long
legacy of policies that frustrated the emergence of competition. With
respect to broadcasting, even though policy makers had long regarded
network dominance as one of the central problems plaguing the broadcast
industry, subsequent analyses have shown that the maintenance of that
dominance was almost entirely the result of regulatory policy. Indeed, the
FCC had rejected a number of policy alternatives that would have allowed
more networks to emerge.503 Even worse, those measures adopted to
combat network dominance had the perverse effect of entrenching the
497 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 644 (2001).
498 See, e.g., Use of the Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968) (Decision).
499 E.g., Noll & Owen, supra note 496; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 22, at 1367.
500 See BORK, supra note 70, at 159, 347-64; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard Posner, Taxation by
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22 (1971); Richard Posner, Theories of Regulation, 5 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
501 See Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 128, at 276-77, 279; Salop & Scheffman,
supra note 131, at 268, 268-69; Williamson, supra note 118, at 293.
502 See Robert E. McCormick, The Strategic Use of Regulation: A Review of the Literature,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 13, 18-25 (1984) (providing an excellent review of the
early literature).
503 The central problem was the FCC’s decision to allocate only three television stations to
most markets. This decision all but foreordained that only three broadcast networks would develop.
See NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 67-81, 488-9; MISREGULATING TELEVISION, supra
note 32, at 12-16; Henry Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal
Communications Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 705, 707-18 (1975); Thomas L. Schuessler, Structural
Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communications Commission’s
Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875 (1981).
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existing broadcast networks, since steps taken to limit the profitability of
network operations also served to make entry of new networks more
difficult.504
The history of cable regulation is just as troubling. Even though cable
television represented an obvious way to introduce greater competition in
television programming, the FCC’s initial response was to attempt to
suppress its growth.505 Once cable became established, the central policy
problem became cable’s supposed position as a natural monopoly. As a
result, one might have expected policy makers to embrace DBS when it
began to emerge as an alternative to cable. Instead, policy makers
established a regime that protected both broadcasting and cable from the
emergence of this new rival by making it all but impossible for DBS to
carry programming from the major broadcast networks in most areas.506
Even though Congress took a range of fairly drastic steps to curb the
monopoly that cable television held over local markets,507 it did not revisit
this fundamental decision to deny DBS the ability to carry local broadcast
programming for more than a decade.508 Thus, despite the fact that the
central policy dilemma posed by cable was its tendency towards local
monopoly, policy makers consistently adopted policies that failed to
encourage the development of alternative video technologies.
Even the mere threat of access regulation can stifle the emergence of
competition in an emerging industry characterized by large, up-front
investments. Regulators have incentives to attempt to force firms to price
at marginal cost after the initial fixed costs have been sunk that are quite
similar to the incentives faced by private firms. While firms can use
vertical integration or vertical contractual restraints to manage the
possibility of such opportunistic behavior by business partners, the
impossibility of merging with the government and the near-impossibility
of estopping the government from imposing access regulation render the
504 See NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS, supra note 28, at 521-22; Chen, supra note 21, at
1454-56.
505 See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen, The Economics of the Cable Television “Consensus”, 17 J.L.
& ECON. 39 (1974); Rolla Edward Park, The Growth of Cable TV and Its Probable Impact on Overthe-Air Broadcasting, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 69 (Papers & Proc. 1971). As FCC Chairman Dean Burch
candidly admitted, the FCC had interpreted its public interest mandate to include “the short-term
protectionism for over-the-air broadcasting” against incursions by cable television. See Besen, supra,
at 41.
506 See 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(2)(B) (1994) (limiting the compulsory copyright license for
satellite broadcasters’ retransmission of broadcast programming to areas not already served by local
broadcasters). In so doing, Congress explicitly acknowledged that the primary purpose of this
restriction was to protect local broadcasters. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-887, pt.1, at 8 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5617 (recognizing that the original Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 was
intended to protect the existing “network/affiliate distribution system”).
507 See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
508 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.

294

Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy
risk of regulatory opportunism essentially intractable.509 The inability to
render these risks more manageable will deter firms from making such
fixed cost investments in the first instance.
Policy makers would thus do well to follow the advice of a recent
study published by a staff member of the FCC’s Office of Plans and
Policy. This study cautioned against knee-jerk extension of the regimes
devised to regulate the existing legacy monopolies to new technologies,
such as high-speed broadband. On the contrary, the study concluded that
the better policy response would be to deregulate the existing legacy
monopolies as technologies converge.510
Conclusion
The history of vertical integration policy has been dominated by a
search for simple policy inferences. The Harvard School’s initial advocacy
of what amounted to per se illegality gave rise to the Chicago School’s call
for a rule of reason approach to vertical integration. The Chicago School’s
eventual rejection of the rule of reason in favor of per se legality, in turn,
spawned the post-Chicago reaction demonstrating that vertical integration
can under some circumstances have anti-competitive effects. There can be
no question that post-Chicago scholarship is greatly enhancing our
understanding of the economics of vertical integration and is likely to
make additional contributions in the future.
The problem is that many advocates are all too tempted to try to turn
the post-Chicago literature into a basis for returning to a world in which
vertical integration is once again regarded as per se illegal. As is the case
with most economic problems, the economics of vertical integration are
not susceptible to the type of simple policy inferences needed to support
broad generalizations. Instead, the economic literature suggests that
whether a particular instance of vertical integration harms competition is
likely to depend on a fairly refined set of factual predicates. As such, the
problems of vertical integration appear to be poorly suited to the type of
per se resolution associated with the categorical approach inevitably
associated with regulatory enactments. This is not to say that vertical
regulation should be immune from governmental scrutiny. This position
simply acknowledges that, to the extent that anti-competitive dangers
exist, they are better addressed in a forum, such as an antitrust court, that
can evaluate each situation on the basis of its individual facts.
509 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in
Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 122-25 (1998); see also Goldberg, supra note 114, at
432-36 (noting that market participants seek some assurance regarding the long-term availability of the
market before investing).
510 OXMAN, supra note 7, at 24-25.
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Moreover, noting that the anti-competitive impact of vertical
integration turns on the facts of specific cases does not mean that we
cannot draw some generalizations about the circumstances under which
such anti-competitive impacts are most likely to occur. As I have described
above, there is a broad economic consensus that spans both the Chicago
School and post-Chicago literature confirming the notion that vertical
integration is unlikely to harm static efficiency unless certain structural
preconditions are met. Specifically, vertical integration raises few anticompetitive concerns absent concentration and barriers to entry in the
relevant markets. In addition, both approaches acknowledge that efficiency
considerations might justify vertical integration even when these structural
preconditions have been met. An application of this analytical framework
to the broadcast television, cable television, and cable modem industries
reveals that vertical integration in these industries is too unlikely to harm
competition to justify broad regulatory prohibition.
Analyzing these markets in terms of dynamic efficiency only serves
to reinforce this core conclusion. Regulatory restrictions on vertical
integration harm dynamic efficiency by rescuing competitors from having
to invest in developing alternative sources of supply that would ultimately
break whatever monopoly bottleneck power that represents the true source
of the anti-competitive harms. In addition, prohibitions on vertical
integration can deter new entry in another way. By preventing firms from
realizing available efficiencies, such regulations reduce the profitability of
all operations. As commentators have noted, the fact that such a burden
will weigh especially heavily on new entrants may lead such regulation to
have the perverse effect of deterring entry, thereby entrenching whatever
market power already possessed by incumbent firms.
Dynamic efficiency, of course, depends on innovation as well as
investment incentives, and one can easily identify approaches that suggest
that large integrated enterprises and considerations such as network
economics can prevent the market from achieving an efficient level of
innovation. A close review of the full range of the economic literature on
innovation reveals a much more ambiguous story. Although some studies
suggest that standardization, concentration, and network externalities can
reduce innovation below welfare maximizing levels, other studies
conclude that those same factors may play essential roles in ensuring that
an appropriate amount of innovation does in fact occur. Thus, in the end, it
appears that innovation-related theories do not provide a clear basis for
adopting a skeptical stance towards vertical integration. The fact remains
that, notwithstanding the many arguments to the contrary, vertical
integration is not sufficiently likely to threaten competition as to justify
imposing a categorical, regulatory prohibition of the practice. Such a result
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would be tantamount to return to the world of per se illegality that typified
the now discredited economic thinking of the 1950s and 1960s.

297

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 19:171, 2002

Appendix A. Broadcast and Cable Networks Ratings as of March 2001
Company/Network
Viacom
CBS
UPN
Nickelodeon
TNN
MTV
TV Land
Comedy Central2
VH1
Total
Walt Disney Co.
ABC
Lifetime3
Disney Channel
A&E4
History Channel4
ESPN
Toon Disney
ESPN2
Total
News Corp.
Fox
Fox News Channel
FX
Fox Family Channel
BET5
TV Guide Channel
Total
General Electric
NBC
PaxTV7
MSNBC
CNBC
Total

Rating

8.6
2.5
1.6
1.1
0.9
0.7
0.7
0.5
16.6

8.7
2.0
1.5
1.4
0.9
0.9
0.5
0.4
16.3

6.3
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.6
9.9

8.1
0.9
0.4
0.4
9.8

Company/Network

Rating

AOL Time Warner
WB
TBS Superstation
TNT
Cartoon Network
CNN
WGN1
Total

2.6
1.9
1.6
0.8
0.7
0.6
8.2

Liberty Media
Discovery Channel6
TLC6
Court TV
Travel Channel
Game Show Network
Animal Planet6
Odyssey Channel
Total

1.3
1.0
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.4
4.8

USA Networks8
USA Network
Sci-Fi Channel
Total

1.9
0.8
2.7

Cablevision Systems
AMC
Bravo
Total

0.7
0.4
1.1

E.W. Scripps Co.
HGTV
Food Network
Total

0.7
0.4
1.1

Landmark Communications
Weather Channel

0.3

1
WGN is owned by the Tribune Company, which in turn owns a 25% stake in WB. Although
WGN is a WB affiliate, it does not transmit WB programming outside the Chicago area.
2
Comedy Central is a joint venture between Viacom and HBO/AOL Time Warner and is
allocated to the company with the largest holdings (Viacom).
3
Lifetime is a joint venture between ABC/Walt Disney (50%) and the Hearst Corp. (50%) and is
allocated to the company with the largest holdings (Walt Disney).
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4
A&E and the History Channel are joint ventures of ABC/Walt Disney (37.5%), the Hearst Corp.
(37.5%), and NBC/General Electric (25%), and are allocated to the company with the largest holdings
(Walt Disney).
5
BET is a joint venture of BET Holdings, Microsoft Corporation, News Corp., USA Networks,
and Liberty Digital and is allocated to the company with the largest holdings (News Corp.).
6
Discovery Communications, which operates the Discovery Channel, TLC, and Animal Planet, is
a privately held company owned by Liberty Media Corp. (49%), Cox Communications,
Advance/Newhouse, and founder John S. Hendricks. It is allocated to the company with the largest
holdings (Liberty Media Corp.).
7
NBC owns 32.5% of PaxTV.
8
USA Networks, Inc., is a corporation owned by Liberty Media Corp. (20%), Universal (9%),
and the public (71%). Because of the large percentage of public holdings, it is presumed to set price
independently.

Ratings for cable networks are taken from Basic-Cable Prime-Time
Ratings, BRANDWEEK, June 11, 2001, at SR20, and represent prime-time
ratings for the top forty cable networks for the first quarter of 2001.
Notably, this data does not include data for premium movie or home
shopping channels.
Ratings for the broadcast networks are taken from Broadcast Watch,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 2, 2001, at 25, and represent season-todate prime time ratings as of Mar. 25, 2001. Although the time periods are
not directly comparable and prime time ratings may not be representative
of viewership during other times of day, these numbers should provide an
adequate basis for making a rough estimate of market concentration.
Ownership information is taken from WATERMAN & WEISS, supra
note 21, at 24-32, and was verified by visiting the networks’ websites. In
the absence of a clear majority owner, I attempted to make the most
conservative assumption in terms of calculating HHIs by allocating the
ratings to the player with the largest rating share.
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Appendix B. Revenue of Twenty-Five Largest
Television Networks, Projected 2000 Revenue
Company/Network

Revenue
($ billion)

Walt Disney Co.
ABC
ESPN
Disney Channel
Lifetime
A&E
Total

4.4
2.1
0.6
0.5
0.5
8.1

Viacom
CBS
Nickelodeon
Showtime
MTV
Total

3.5
1.0
0.9
0.7
6.1

General Electric
NBC
CNBC
Total

4.7
0.5
5.2

AOL Time Warner
HBO
TNT
TBS Superstation
CNN
Cinemax
Total

1.7
1.2
0.8
0.8
0.4
4.9

Company/Network

Revenue
($ billion)

Liberty Media
QVC
Discovery Channel
Starz!
TLC
Total

3.3
0.6
0.4
0.4
4.7

News Corp.
Fox
Fox Sports Net
Total

1.8
0.6
2.4

USA Networks
HSN
USA Network
Total

1.5
0.8
2.3

Univision

0.5

Dollar revenue estimates are taken from 25 Top Television Networks,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 27, 2000, at 54. They represent only the
top twenty-five networks and include all revenue. Ownership attribution
follows the approach taken in Appendix A.
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